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This dissertation examines religion‟s satirical portrayal in The Simpsons. Building upon a sociological 
theory of humour developed from Peter Berger‟s sociological theories of knowledge, religion, and 
humour, it assesses how The Simpsons criticizes America‟s major religious traditions and their social 
roles. Arguing that the program presents a spectrum of acceptable religious practice, this dissertation 
demonstrates how The Simpsons constructs its arguments by selectively interpreting each tradition 
through its most recognizable characteristics and the common sentiments through which those 
characteristics are interpreted. These “ignorant familiarities” are used as a basis for understanding 
what Americans presumably know about religion, what is deemed acceptable “religious behaviour” in 
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I remember the first time I watched The Simpsons. I was nine years old. My family was living 
in New Minas, NS while my father earned his MDiv at Acadia Divinity School. The Simpsons was 
the new hit television program and merchandising sensation and Bart Simpson intrigued me. After 
convincing my parents to let me watch an episode, we tuned in to “Two Cars in Every Garage, Three 
Eyes on Every Fish.”
1
 Bart and his sister Lisa are fishing near the local nuclear power plant, when a 
reporter pulls up and asks the kids if they have caught anything. When they respond that they have 
not, he asks Bart for his name. Bart responds with “I‟m Bart Simpson. Who the hell are you?” and my 
parents turned off the television. I was not allowed to watch The Simpsons at home again. 
Flash forward to the winter of 2005. I was teaching a freshman course entitled “Religion and 
Contemporary Culture” at Saint Mary‟s University in Halifax. In over my head without knowing it, I 
found it difficult to teach the students different world religions. The majority were there for course 
credit, not interested in the material, and only cared about what would show up on the test. When I 
started quoting religious examples from The Simpsons and South Park, however, they responded. 
These were representations they knew. References to George Harrison and the Beatles‟ Hindu 
influences fell on deaf ears, but they knew Apu Nahasapeemapetilon, the Indian immigrant who runs 
the local Kwik-E-Mart in the Simpson‟s hometown of Springfield and has a shrine to Ganesha in his 
store. Kung-fu movies did not entice the entire crowd, but references to Lisa‟s conversion to 
Buddhism brought the class back on topic. When I taught about changing religious dynamics and 
“spirituality,” there was no substitute for the spiritual quest of Bart‟s father, Homer, in “Homer the 
Heretic.” For somebody trying to teach world religions for the first time, The Simpsons became the 
lingua franca that facilitated instruction. 
These two stories are at the heart of The Simpsons‟ significance for this project. The first tale 
illustrates the controversies surrounding family values and appropriate television viewing. Eighteen 
years after “Two Cars in Every Garage, Three Eyes on Every Fish” first aired, I played it again for 
my mother. Even though the episode is a brilliant piece of satire mocking today‟s political campaigns, 
she stood by her decision. There was no way my parents would let me watch The Simpsons, and in 
this they were like other parents who worried about the program‟s moral content (see Alters 2002, 
203-260).  
                                                     
1
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 2 
The Simpsons has featured in various debates about the corrosive role of media on family life 
in the United States. In his January 27, 1992 speech before the National Religious Broadcasters, 
former president George H. W. Bush famously stated that “We need a nation closer to the Waltons 
than the Simpsons” (New York Times, 28 January 1992, sec. 1, page 17). Elsewhere, the American 
Family Association (AFA), a Christian media watchdog organization that encourages its readers to 
boycott advertisers as a way of controlling media content, has argued that various episodes of The 
Simpsons promote anti-Christianity, include profanity, advocate substance abuse, and encourage the 
homosexual agenda (AFAjournal 2000, 2003).
2
 Further afield, Venezuelan television station Televen 
TV removed the show from its 11:00 a.m. timeslot because parents complained the program was 
inappropriate for children. It was replaced with Baywatch: Hawaii (Associated Press 2008). To this 
date, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regularly receives complaints about references 
to violence, sex, homosexuality, profanity, and drugs in the program, arguments frequently framed in 
the language of protecting children (governmentattic.org 2008).  
My parents acted according to their values regarding what was appropriate for their children. 
Although inappropriate media content did not inspire them politically, they still reinforced a 
particular vision of Christian life upon me through their decision. This battle over appropriate content, 
how it is determined, and how The Simpsons challenges it runs throughout this dissertation. As 
religious groups and ideologies have gained social prominence, they have been selectively interpreted 
and incorporated into The Simpsons‟ content, making the show a product of its culture that can tell us 
about significant cultural tensions over the last twenty years. 
The second story stresses another important theme: The sociology of religious knowledge. 
How significant is it that a group of young adults did not know the basics of most world religions 
beyond what they knew from The Simpsons and other television shows? Boston University religious 
studies professor Stephen Prothero contends that Americans are remarkably ignorant about religion—
both their own (if they have one) and others‟ (2007; a point a 2010 Pew Forum illustrated [2010]). 
Arguing that this is a civic problem, he suggests teaching biblical literacy and world religions in 
secondary schools and making world religions part of the core curriculum of postsecondary studies 
(Prothero 2007). While Prothero‟s analysis can be extended to Canada, my students apparently 
learned something from The Simpsons. But what does The Simpsons teach? How does it teach it? And 
what are the assumptions about religion undergirding the program‟s depictions of it? Tying into the 
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previous discussion of religious opposition to The Simpsons, we start seeing that The Simpsons‟ 
significance lies in its popularity, pervasiveness, and recountability. It frames a lexicon of references 
that people can draw upon to make sense of the world, a lexicon that includes a significant amount of 
material about religion. Indeed, out of 463 episodes in the first twenty-two seasons, only twenty-three 
lack a clear reference to religion. This suggests that the show‟s creators find it useful to draw upon a 
body of religious knowledge for humorous purposes. Furthermore, these jokes convey complex ideas 
about religious behaviours and their social significance quickly and simply.  
I want to know what these references to religion are and what they tell us about about 
religion‟s role in the contemporary United States. The Simpsons promotes a liberal vision of religion, 
where deinstitutionalized “spirituality” is heralded as the religious ideal and religious practices 
characterized by conservativism and institutionalization are marginalized and ridiculed.  
Others, however, would disagree. Among them is Mark Pinsky, author of The Gospel 
According to The Simpsons (2001, 2007).
3
 A journalist for the Orlando Sentinel, Pinsky started 
watching the program with his children and was surprised the “modern cartoon sitcom turned out to 
be family-friendly and full of faith” (2007, 1). His work documents religious diversity in The 
Simpsons, acknowledging religious traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism and starts tracking 
some of these representations‟ importance. Pinsky‟s final assessment of the show is that it is “not at 
all dangerous or threatening to the status quo, it is a sweet funny show about a family as „real‟ as the 
faith lives of many Americans. It is a show that does in fact give hope and joy and, yes, inspiration to 
millions. But mostly, as my wife reminds me, it‟s funny. And as Homer says, „it‟s funny ‟cause it‟s 
true‟” (226). Pinsky‟s most useful insights are into the way that the program‟s creators have 
incorporated their own religious views into the program (199-215), and where an episode satirizes a 
significant social issue (e.g., same-sex marriage in the episode “There‟s Something About Marrying” 
[192-198]). This allows him to comment on the larger social patterns influencing religion‟s depiction 
in the program. Pinsky‟s analysis, however, only captures surface issues that arise around individual 
episodes of The Simpsons, and he lacks any deep assessment of the complex social and political 
networks that make the caricatures in The Simpsons plausible (the exception being his treatment of 
evangelicals). Throughout this dissertation I engage Pinsky‟s work as a first level of analysis about 
religion in The Simpsons. However, I challenge the assumption that the show is funny “because it‟s 
true.” The Simpsons‟ truth claims are always debatable and are inherently contentious.  
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 4 
Reformed theologian Jamie Heit‟s The Springfield Reformation (2008) presents a different 
perspective. Heit offers numerous illustrations from The Simpsons to articulate the program‟s critique 
of contemporary American Christianity. The problem with Heit‟s analysis is his thesis that The 
Simpsons is calling on Christianity to reform because there is no reason to hold The Simpsons to any 
particular theological or moral standards. As a product of American
4
 culture with no stated religious 
agenda it is an insightful look into that culture, but the program itself is not a voice that offers 
theological solutions to contemporary Christianity‟s situation, nor is it calling for specific solutions 
like Heit‟s.  
By tackling the challenges that The Simpsons raises, Heit questions how Christianity‟s moral 
authority can be restored. Approaching the issue from a Christian theologian‟s vantage point, he 
assumes that because The Simpsons‟ Springfield‟s residents are depicted in the pews on Sunday 
mornings they are Christian, that Christianity is the program‟s religious voice, and Christians‟ 
concerns are fundamental to religion‟s presentation in the program. I see The Simpsons presenting 
religion in a pastiche manner and ascribing any theological perspective (in the sense of addressing a 
religious tradition as participants) to the program attributes a religious voice to it that not only reflects 
the scholar‟s concerns, but appropriates the program for Heit‟s moral agenda (cf., Keslowitz 2006, 
207-211). The Simpsons is significant because its depictions of American life resonate with its 
audience and it is seen as an excellent summation of contemporary America (Dalton et al. 2001). That 
does not mean that it carries an explicit theological agenda. Rather, The Simpsons captures religions 
as they appear to people from the inside and outside, making jokes based on these portrayals. The 
moral agenda Heit ascribes to The Simpsons is his own.  
Heit‟s fellow theologian David Dark offers a similar assessment of The Simpsons in his 
Everyday Apocalypse (2002, 42-62). Dark assumes that a Christian truth of loving others and 
acceping people as they are is revealed in The Simpsons‟ depictions of everyone as a broken 
individual. While he usefully points out that The Simpsons reveals the paradoxical state of human 
nature (60), this does not necessarily reveal God‟s grace as he thinks it does. It reveals that humans 
fall short of their moral proclamations, but we still find something significant in that fallen state. 
While The Simpsons may reveal grace to somebody who has a framework receptive to that theology, 
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there is no proof that the program reveals God‟s grace. Theological arguments like Heit‟s and Dark‟s 
are limited because they presume unprovable ontologies.
5
 
While Pinsky and Heit offer book-length treatments of religion in The Simpsons, a variety of 
articles and book chapters need to be briefly discussed. Historian Gerry Bowler‟s article “God and the 
Simpsons” (1996/1997) is one of the earliest discussions of religion‟s role in the program. Evaluating 
the program‟s first seven seasons, he identifies the general patterns of religious adherence, the ironic 
and satirical perspectives Bart and Homer facilitate, and the supernatural affirmation that comes in the 
form of a God who always wins. I build upon these general themes, but while Bowler‟s work focusses 
extensively on Christianity and how it is portrayed, my main concern is with religion as a generalized 
social and cultural category. That is, while Bowler is happy to see religion portrayed on television, 
sees both positive and negative elements in The Simpsons‟ portrayal of Christianity, and tries to 
explain why some Christians did not like the program (15-20), I explain how The Simpsons portrays a 
particular series of ideas about “religion” and its roles in contemporary American life.  
Bowler‟s and Heit‟s concerns with Christianity‟s portrayal in The Simpsons can be usefully 
contrasted with religion‟s treatment in sociologist Tim Delaney‟s Simpsonology (2008, 189-217) and 
journalist Chris Turner‟s Planet Simpson (2004). According to Turner, “faith is usually treated with 
sincerity and uncommon respect on the frequent occasions when it comes up on The Simpsons. 
Organized religion—like all authoritarian institutions—is a target for snarky asides on the show, but 
topics such as the nature of belief, the use of ritualistic worship and the meaning of existence are 
approached seriously and discussed in depth” (266; emphasis in original). He then examines the way 
individual religious experiences are treated, while challenging the increasing complicity that 
institutionalized religions have with American consumerism. Turner‟s treatment of religion differs 
from Bowler and Heit in that he is concerned with “religion” in The Simpsons as a social and cultural 
phenomenon in contemporary America, rather than with the treatment of a particular religion.
6
 Contra 
Turner, I see religions portrayed along a continuum of acceptability; and where a religion is 
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because even though Turner claims that The Simpsons is his religion with my current data set I have no way of 
proving if this is a common phenomenon among Simpsons fans.  
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positioned in The Simpsons is significant. While I agree with Turner‟s basic premise, when we look at 
what kinds of spiritualities are applauded and how institutionalized religion is denigrated, religion‟s 
depiction in the program becomes more complicated than Turner‟s simple dichotomy. 
Delaney‟s assessment is antagonistic to religion, arguing that the program juxtaposes religion 
and science. He contends that The Simpsons reveals a world where religious ideas are basically 
human projections. The program thus slays sacred cows and leaves the supernatural exposed as 
irrational (2008, 189-217). Delaney stresses hyper-rationality in sociological assessments of religion, 
but my analysis demonstrates that his reading is not representative of the program‟s different 
depictions of religion. This will become especially apparent in chapter four. 
 Finally, the academic treatments of The Simpsons that come closest to the way I approach 
this project are by religious studies scholars Lisle Dalton, Eric Mazur, and Monica Siems (2001), and 
humanities scholar Matthew Henry (2008). I agree with Dalton and his associates that “there is a 
persistent message of a loss of institutional authority (although institutional practice and loyalty 
linger) coupled with diverse forms of personal and noninstitutional religiosity” (2001, 245) in The 
Simpsons. An in-depth study of these representations means addressing the historical circumstances 
that have brought about these changes and analyzing the way the program presents the changes 
through its characters. However, I disagree with them when they write, “it is precisely because the 
program fails to offer us any sustained ideals of its own—least of all desirable ideals that challenge 
the majority—that it serves as a negative model for mainstream ideals of family and religion, if only 
by default, and offers instead a catharsis generated by a good laugh” (241; emphasis in original).
7
 I 
argue that the program offers sustained ideals built on a specific set of assumptions about late modern 
American culture. Henry‟s dissertation is a clear statement of The Simpsons‟ left-wing politics. 
However, while he echoes my central hypothesis that spirituality is supported and institutionalized 
religion is criticized in the program, he does an insufficient job analyzing how the show promotes 
institutionalized religions which facilitate spiritual insight (2008, 233-292).  
By drawing upon not only the literature concerning religion in The Simpsons, but also studies 
of The Simpsons in American culture which help me locate the program in its larger cultural matrix, I 
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demonstrate how The Simpsons satirizes contemporary American culture (e.g., Alberti 2004; Dobson 
2006; Gray 2006; Henry 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008; Hull 2000; Irwin, Conard, and Skoble 2001; Knox 
2006; Wood and Todd 2005). The Simpsons is often compared to a fun house mirror; but it is a mirror 
shaped by particular people, at a specific point in time, for reasons that suit the program‟s creators. 
Aside from the obvious reason that The Simpsons is made the way it is because it is profitable, we 
have to ask what ideological assumptions it conveys. After all, those ideologies resonate with 
audiences, which means they come back for further entertainment, which allows television networks 
to charge for advertising. Ideology, entertainment, and profitability are intimately interwoven in The 
Simpsons. 
That said, the significant question is what is The Simpsons‟ vision of religion in the United 
States and what are its implications? Three broad fields in religious studies and sociology inform my 
answer: the study of religion and popular culture, the sociology of religion, and the sociology of 
knowledge. The Simpsons is a television program, mass marketed to people of all ages (especially 
young adult males and teenage boys) in over 100 countries (McDowell 2006), and it constantly 
references other popular culture media. Films, music, popular fads, and other television programs are 
part of its internal lexicon. In chapter two I discuss religion and popular culture‟s importance for this 
project, focussing on the key ideas of lived religion and cultural intertextuality. Further, I draw upon 
symbolic interactionism and the increased focus in religious studies on lived religion to describe how 
depictions of religion in The Simpsons are connected to the everyday religious lives of contemporary 
citizens of the United States—the raw data which observant comedy writers use to craft jokes.  
Chapter three introduces my theoretical foundation. Building on sociologist Peter Berger‟s 
work and other sociologists of knowledge, religion, and humour, I construct a theory of religious 
satire. Outlining satire‟s ability to quickly convey information to attack ideological opponents and 
reinforce pre-existing plausibility structures, this chapter forms the theoretical base from which I will 
analyze The Simpsons. Using examples of Catholicism in the program, I demonstrate that The 
Simpsons‟ satire draws upon certain assumptions and texts about Catholics, selectively interpreting 
the religion and projecting it for consumption by a broad audience. 
Chapters four through seven extend this analysis to the different religions portrayed in The 
Simpsons, establishing an evaluative range of religions from acceptable to hated.
8
 Chapter four 
                                                     
8
 Tracking humorous depictions from an ideological centre to the periphery is inspired by Christie 
Davies‟ work on ethnic humour. Arguing that ethnic jokes are told about minorities, depending on how the 
jokes are classified (stupid or canny), we can learn a lot about their relationships with dominant ethnic groups 
 
 8 
contains an evaluation of religious beliefs and ideas The Simpsons portrays positively—“spirituality,” 
Buddhism, Native American religions, and scientific rationality. I criticize these presentations in light 
of theories of appropriation, consumerism, and the limits of rationality, but more importantly outline 
their significance for The Simpsons‟ understanding of religion‟s role in contemporary America. 
Chapter five discuss Christianity, examining how the characters Reverend Timothy Lovejoy, pastor 
of the First Church of Springfield, and the Simpsons‟ neighbour Ned Flanders are stereotypes of 
liberal and evangelical Protestantism respectively. I focus on how the major institutional religious 
traditions of contemporary Christianity are criticized while also highlighting their important ethical 
contributions. Moving between laudable and damnable traits in these two characters, I build upon 
chapter four‟s argument about positive and negative religious traits as portrayed in two caricatures. 
Chapter six is concerned with immigrant religious traditions and the question of pluralism in 
Springfield. Discussing the Jew, Krusty the Clown, and the Hindu, Apu, I propose that The Simpsons 
advocates an America in which different religions are welcome, but marginalized both in terms of 
numbers and influence, which I interpret through contemporary concerns about immigrant religious 
life in the United States. Finally, chapter seven discusses The Simpsons‟ treatment of new religious 
movements, secret societies, and Muslims, arguing that it replicates many of the most pernicious fears 
about these groups in contemporary American media while working under the guise of being 
appropriately critical. 
Why do we need a dissertation about religion in The Simpsons? The answer is twofold. First, 
no book-length academic study examines religion‟s role in the program even though, as Henry states, 
it is the topic that has generated the most discussion about the program (2008, 29). Similarly, no 
book-length study investigates how The Simpsons uses satire to promote a specific vision of religion‟s 
place in the United States and criticize it with adequate depth and breadth. Pinsky has breadth, but 
lacks the depth that prolonged academic reflection and analysis offers. Heit has some of that depth, 
but uses it to promote his vision of Christianity rather than trying to explain the views put forth in the 
program. This dissertation addresses these problems. Secondly, as chapter three discusses, there is a 
dearth of social scientific writing on religion and humour. This is an area ripe for study. As a first 
study of religion and humour, specifically as a way of critiquing religion from the outside through 
satire, this dissertation sets the groundwork for future studies in this field. The Simpsons is a 
significant example of the larger phenomenon of religious satire and “Springfield‟s Sacred Canopy” 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1990, 1998, 2002). Here I map religion and humour moving from the centre to the periphery, using Davies‟ 
“stupid” label, but also incorporating the “accepted but marginalized” and “hated” categores. 
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both explains what you have to believe to find The Simpsons funny and what the implications of those 
beliefs are for religious life in the contemporary United States, while demonstrating the benefits of a 
sustained criticism of religion‟s satirical depictions.  
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Chapter 2—The Study of Religion and Popular Culture: A Literature 
Review 
Scholarly work is built upon the concepts, theories, methods, and arguments of preceding 
generations of thinkers (see Parkhill 1997, 1-16). This chapter presents the key concepts of religion, 
popular culture, and cultural intertextuality; the study of religion in popular culture and its 
significance; and the social phenomenological method used in this dissertation, assessing them in 
light of three overarching questions: What are the different ways to study popular culture? How do 
they allow us to access the religious lives of the United States‟ contemporary residents? And how can 
they help us answer our significant questions effectively? In conjunction with the next chapter, my 
goal is to establish a “toolkit” of analytical concepts, methods, and theories that explain religion‟s 
significance in The Simpsons.  
2.1 Religion in Theory and Practice 
Studying religion and popular culture requires working definitions of these terms. Defining 
religion is a nigh impossible task, given religious studies scholar Jonathan Z. Smith‟s argument that 
religion is “solely the creation of the scholar‟s study. It is created for the scholar‟s analytic purposes 
by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization” (Jonathan Smith 1982, xi).
9
 “Religion” is a 
constructed category without ontological content, a way of classifying disparate ideas, activities, and 
objects as relevant in the scholar‟s imagination. However, a working definition provides a necessary 
framework for comparing and analyzing divergent ideas and behaviours. As such, I agree with 
religious studies scholar David Chidester that defining religion is an intensely self-reflexive process 
of determining limitations and boundaries (2005, 68). 
Boundaries are essential for any definition because while demarcating them is often difficult, 
we need to know what can usefully be included and excluded from “religion.” However, once we 
start including essential traits into our definition we quickly find that “religion” is a broader category 
than its popular conception.  
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 Smith has also tracked the concept of religion‟s history (1998), a process that reveals shifting 
definitional boundaries and locates “religion” within the Western enlightenment tradition. For other accounts of 
the concept‟s history see, e.g., Asad (1993), McGuire (2008, 19-44), and Wilfred Smith (1991). While this is a 
valuable critique, a definition is still important because I am discussing things which are commonly compared 
in the popular imagination. As such, whether or not religion is an empty category, it remains a meaningful 
concept in our culture with significant social consequences. Therefore, it is worthy of study and needs to be 
defined for my work to proceed. 
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For example, sociologist Emile Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (1995, 
44). Durkheim‟s definition is concerned with boundaries, where the sacred is included and the 
profane excluded, but he was also aware of the sacred‟s contagious nature (224). Once something has 
been classified as sacred and set apart as meaningful, everything associated with that thing is 
interpreted through its relationship with it. Including or excluding certain kinds of beliefs and 
practices on paper is easy, but it is more difficult to do when we look at actual human behaviour. 
Some scholars argue popular culture can be a religion or something religious, pushing the boundaries 
of what most people would consider “religion” (see, e.g., Callahan et al. 2010, Ingersoll 2001, Jindra 
2005, Lelwica 2005, Lyden 2003, Plate 2008, Price 2005, Sylvan 2003). Based on his definition of 
religion as “ways of being a human person in a human place” (Chidester 2005, vii), Chidester 
suggests that baseball, Coca-Cola, rock and roll, and Tupperware (among other things) are religious 
or, at least, do religious work. At the same time, he calls them “fake” religion because they are not 
legitimated in popular consciousness as “religion,” thereby capturing the tension between what is 
commonly acknowledged as religion and the range of behaviours that fulfil different criteria ascribed 
to the category (2005, 9; see also Chidester 1996). While certain traditions of thought and practice are 
classified under terms such as Daoism and Judaism and customarily considered “religions,” once we 
start investigating how people treat other activities as “sacred”—that is, setting them apart and 
treating them as special—the boundaries between religion and non-religion that once seemed distinct 
become increasingly blurry. 
This has been the problem with anthropologist Clifford Geertz‟s famous definition of religion 
as “(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods 
and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic” (1973, 90).
10
 Geertz‟s definition, often summarized as “a system of symbols” finds 
its way into various discussions about religion and popular culture (see, e.g., Dalton et al. 2001, 
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 There are other critiques of Geertz that are not directly related to this definition‟s usage in the study 
of religion and popular culture. Asad argues that Geertz‟s definition essentializes religion apart from its 
historical manifestations and, therefore, becomes the privileged gaze of the academic rather than an accurate 
assessment of the way historically contextualized humans make sense of their world (1993, 27-54). Elsewhere, 
Frankenberry and Penner critique Geertz‟s reifying metaphysical meaning as problematic because there is no 
way to prove that meaning‟s ontology (1999). For a critique of these positions see Schillbrack (2005). 
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Lelwica 2005, Scholes 2004). The problem here, as religious studies scholar Jean Graybeal illustrates, 
is that “system of symbols” is too broad a concept to be useful. Noting that Geertz (1973, 98) 
acknowledged that just being passionate about an activity is insufficient for it to be a religion and that 
there had to be transcendent truths revealed through it as well, Graybeal demonstrates that women‟s 
weight loss culture constitutes a comprehensive worldview to its members. She argues that women 
learn how to suffer through failed dieting while concurrently paying attention to and caring for their 
bodies, something about which they might otherwise feel guilty (2001). Graybeal proves that Geertz‟s 
definition can be extended to any system of symbols which generates emotional responses and could 
be considered a “worldview” for people. In other words, the definition‟s undefined boundaries make 
it too broad to be analytically useful. 
To overcome the problem of breadth other scholars propose strong boundaries. Sociologists 
Rodney Stark and Roger Finke‟s definition of religion as “very general explanations of existence, 
including the terms of exchange with a god or gods” (2000, 91) is one such example, as identifying a 
“god or gods” in popular culture is difficult. However, religions often contain superhuman characters 
(Chidester 2005). Including gods and goddesses becomes problematic for a definition of religion. 
After all, there are specific religious traditions such as Theravada Buddhism which do not consider 
exchanges with gods and goddesses important. While I am not suggesting that Theravadan Buddhists 
do not engage in contact with divine beings in their popular religious practice, theoretically the gods 
are not essential to being a good Theravadan Buddhist. Achieving moksha through entirely human 
means is plausible, excluding an exchange relationship with the gods. In this case, Stark and Finke‟s 
definition has erected such strict boundaries that a recognized religious tradition has been rejected. 
A third problem is to assume mistakenly that because things are classified as “religions,” they 
are all basically the same. For example, media studies scholar Mara Einstein argues that branding 
religion hinders its ability to effectively change our worlds by allowing us to elevate ourselves 
beyond the everyday. However, “We are less able to do this because all products—religious and 
otherwise—are presented as quick and easy fixes . . . Moreover, religion isn‟t supposed to be 
comfortable, and it is through discomfort that we find new parts of ourselves” (2008, 210). Einstein‟s 
objections are based on normative assumptions about what religion should do, not on what it does. 
She argues that in the contemporary marketplace religions have to become brands to survive, 
eventually risking becoming consumer products. This analysis is based on faulty assumptions, namely 
that “religion is a commodity product. The majority of religions offer the same end benefit for the 
consumer (salvation, peace of mind, etc.). Though packaged differently, fundamentally they are the 
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same product, no different than buying one shampoo versus another” (13) and “religion is a 
commodity. Religion is personal and religion is packaged and sold the same way as other marketed 
goods and services” (78). Assuming that all religions offer the same thing ignores the fact that only in 
the most general terms do all religions offer things such as “salvation.” Nirvana for a Theravadan 
Buddhist and heaven for an evangelical Christian are two different concepts accompanied by different 
ethical, moral, and epistemological structures. Societies with an evangelical history have a conception 
of a supernatural entity acting in people‟s lives and guiding the world towards a particular end. 
Conversely, the Theravadan tradition presents the Buddha‟s Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path 
which facilitate achieving enlightenment, and it is through our own actions and ways of overcoming 
our karma that we escape the cycle of rebirths. There is no reliance on a supernatural being. One‟s 
own behaviours determine the course of spiritual development. These are two different worldviews 
and, as such, they lead to different ways of being in the world. While they may compete in the 
marketplace of ideas about how to live, part of what they offer is their difference. Treating all 
religions as essentially the same ignores the historical differences which have affected each religion‟s 
development. This makes comparison tricky, but awareness of difference is pivotal to understanding 
and properly interpreting our data. 
Psychologist William James defined religion as “belief that there is an unseen order, and that 
our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto” (2002, 61).
11
 This definition 
guides us towards identifying people‟s cognitive frameworks regarding a specific order of the world 
and the ethical imperative to adjust our behaviour towards it. However, James‟ psychological 
framework makes insufficient concessions to social influences on our thinking. Social interactions 
shape our cognitive frameworks; therefore, we are looking for the webs of significance people have 
built around their notions of an unseen order. However, unlike Geertz, the unseen order is not an 
abstract system of symbols with its own agency. A society‟s unseen order is communicated among 
people, inspiring religious actions, but need not exist in a metaphysical sense. For our purposes, all it 
has to be is a shared perspective communicated by human means. Sociologists of religion Douglas 
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 Similarly, Rita Gross writes “all religions share . . . an attempt to provide meaning and orientation in 
a chaotic world. Thus, I locate the essence of religion in its impulse toward world-construction of great 
significance to those who live in those worlds. What lies behind or drives that impulse to find meaning and 
orientation, to construct a world in the face of chaos, is not a question that needs to be settled in order to study 
religion non-reductionistically” (1993, 316). However, I prefer James‟ definition because of its ethical 
imperative towards harmonious adjustment. This indicates that the unseen order is not only intellectually 
significant, but that it impels adherence, structuring life so that its disruption generates negative emotions (such 
as fear), and compels people to respond to these feelings (see Cowan 2008b; Cowan and Bromley 2008). 
 
 14 
Cowan and David Bromley argue that James‟ definition captures the way a religious vision inspires 
people to develop intellectual frameworks explaining the unseen order which stimulate a variety of 
actions—from mythmaking and the development of personal devotions and beliefs, to rituals and 
abiding by ethical systems—that adherents find rational (2008, 11).
12
 This illustrates the shift from 
belief to action and from individual actions to institutionalized patterns of behaviour. My working 
definition of religion as institutionalized systems of beliefs and actions relating to an unseen order 
which compels harmonious adjustment thereto, tempers James‟ original insights and allows concrete 
examples to be isolated and analyzed. The social dynamics inherent in the creation and dissemination 
of unseen orders now become objects of analysis.  
The processes by which religions are created—the ways in which things are made religious—
is also at work in the institutionalization of unseen orders. Berger and Luckmann‟s theory of 
externalization, objectivation, and internalization—which I discuss in detail in the next chapter—
allows us to see that the social construction of any religion is a dynamic process. Indeed, 
institutionalizing acts, living within the institutionalized orders which reflect and reify the unseen 
order, and contributing—whether constructively or destructively—to the order‟s ongoing 
maintenance is part of being a socially engaged human being. As a product of human activity, The 
Simpsons is engaged in an ongoing dialogue about how differing unseen orders should exist within 
the United States‟ geographical, social, and cultural borders. To do this, it draws upon depictions of 
American religious traditions and arranges them in a particular way so that it creates its own unseen 
order—to use Peter Berger‟s phrase, its own “sacred canopy” (1967)—through such an arrangement. 
This is not to say that The Simpsons is a religion, but it does a kind of religious work which invites 
consideration from those who share its viewpoint and from its opponents. The next chapter deals with 
the theoretical approach I employ in analyzing how The Simpsons arranges American religions‟ 
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 Religious visions need not take on the characteristics of Otto‟s numinous, that presence which is 
powerful, majestic, urgent and wholly other than ourselves (1950) or Eliade‟s hierophaines which occur when 
the wholly other reveals itself to humans (1959). All that is required is an understanding of an unseen order to 
the universe which is shared among people. Whether or not that unseen order actually exists is immaterial. Its 
significance is established when people believe it exists and act accordingly. 
13
 For further discussions of the difficulty of defining religion, see Griel and Bromley (2003).  
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2.1.1 Lived Religion in America 
One mistake we can make in studying religion is to commit what sociologist Christian Smith 
calls the “representative elite fallacy” (2000, 7-9). That is, we should not privilege religious leaders as 
their religion‟s sole and authoritative interpreters. Group leaders, prominent thinkers, and people in 
positions of institutionalized authority (e.g., priests) can be invaluable sources of information, but we 
risk distorting the picture of a people‟s religiosity if we privilege these perspectives as more 
authoritative than the laity‟s. For example, one could read the Catholic encyclical Humanae Vitae 
(Paul VI 1968) and say that Catholics do not practice birth control because the church officially 
forbids it. This is certainly not true. The majority of American Catholics use birth control and do not 
follow this authoritative document‟s instructions. While knowing “official” sources is important, how 
people use these interpretations of the unseen order—if they use them at all—is essential for 
understanding lived religion. I draw upon the concept of “lived religion” to discuss how The 
Simpsons represents different religious traditions. That said, I am also aware of the irony of using 
lived religion to discuss a fictional representation. I am not discussing anybody‟s lived religion, but 
the concept and its theoretical arguments give us insight into The Simpsons‟ crafted portrayal (cf., 
Heit 2008, 11; Ott 2003, 58). 
Scholars use the concept of “lived religion” to explain how people actually go about being 
religious. This often means looking at people‟s behaviour as “incoherent,” at least when we compare 
it to their tradition‟s theological and ethical teachings (McGuire 2008, 15). As sociologist Meredith 
McGuire reminds us, it may only be scholars who care about the dissonance between what a religious 
tradition purportedly teaches and what people do (16). Numerous studies demonstrate that people‟s 
religious practice varies greatly, making it unreasonable to rely upon “official” arguments for 
people‟s religiosity (see, e.g., K. Brown 2001; Clark 2003; Goulet 1998; D. Hall 1997; Neitz 1987; 
Primiano 1995; Roof 2001; Tweed 1997a, 2006; Wilson 2009).  
Robert Orsi, a scholar of American Catholicism, is one of the foremost voices in the study of 
lived religion and his work offers valuable insights into how religions in the United States appear 
differently in practice than they do in theory. For example, in The Madonna of 115
th
 Street (1985), 
Orsi argues that the Catholicism of Italian immigrants in East Harlem from 1880-1950 was shaped by 
the intersection of their home lives in their domus (a term implying the relationships between people, 
their extended families, and their possessions [xix-xx]), by the Italian concept of rispetto (respect 
encompassing all proper conduct in interpersonal relationships and the duties people have to each 
other [92-94]), and their experiences as poor immigrants who were not welcomed by the established 
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Catholic Church in America during that time. The annual festival honouring the Madonna of 115
th
 
Street demonstrated both a love for this entity, whom the people called upon for favours rooted in 
their family‟s needs (e.g., employment, healing), and their Italianness. The Madonna was popularly 
conceived as an Italian: She was a concerned mother, a woman with incredible power in the home, 
and also trapped in the relationships of the domus which structured the lives of her followers. If she 
did not fulfil her responsibilities according to the interfamilial codes of domus and rispetto the people 
became angry with her. She was part of the family and a link to the unseen order. While the Irish 
Catholic authorities in New York were embarrassed by this display of popular Italian religiosity, Orsi 
demonstrates that this devotion was a way into the sacred and profane‟s intersection through the 
relationships between individuals and their social networks, which included natural and supernatural 
beings that made life in Italian Harlem meaningful (163-218). In this case, lived religion takes us into 
people‟s complicated lives and demonstrates that our identities are integrated in many competing 
arenas, including work, family, religion, and entertainment. Were we to follow the “authorities” in 
this discussion, we might deride this practice as the Irish Catholic leadership did. Instead, looking at 
lived religion lets us see the way that human lives are integrated and the unseen order incorporated 
into people‟s understandings beyond “official” definitions.  
Orsi‟s Between Heaven and Earth (2005) makes these connections even more explicit and 
brings us into the complexities of explaining and understanding unseen orders. Using the examples of 
marginalized people in twentieth-century American Catholicism (the handicapped, children, and 
women), Orsi argues that both humans and supernatural beings populate religious worlds. In 
Catholicism this includes the saints and angels, although the saints are more prominent in his case 
studies. Drawing upon his own experience growing up Catholic, Orsi argues that religion is but one 
tool people use to make their lives meaningful (168-169). As this example demonstrates, people 
weave religion in and out of their lives, drawing upon it when necessary, revelling in its festive 
moments, and mourning through it when loved ones die. Orsi‟s significant point is that religious 
studies scholarship rarely shows religious people where they stand and often distorts their experiences 
to render them acceptable for the academy (177-204). However, religious lives continue and 
academic explanations often fail to capture those lives in their messy meaningfulness. Orsi‟s 
challenge is to uncover those meanings and bring them to people‟s attention, whether we judge them 
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good or bad, and explain their significance for the people being studied, not for an abstract body of 
academic theory (202-203; see also Orsi 1997; cf. Tweed 2006).
14
  
Religious studies scholar Russell McCutcheon, however, criticizes Orsi‟s work (2006a, 
2006b; see also 1997, Courtright 2006). While Orsi advocates writing about religion in a way that 
echoes people‟s lives as they understand it, McCutcheon argues that this leads to accepting their 
interpretations as authoritative (2006a). That is, if scholars conform their interpretations to what their 
informants think, then the critical distance required for scholarly work is compromised. I treat lived 
religion as a concept that tries to capture religious life‟s complexity so that the densest data set is 
available for interpretation. Data, according to McCutcheon, is a “four-lettered word” (721) for Orsi 
because it dehumanizes people. However, scholarship need not dehumanize people to accept their 
lives as data for testing our theories. Theories are explanations, and the scholar‟s job is to explain 
something convincingly based on evidence. If people disagree and can disprove the theory, then our 
knowledge is advanced and the scholar‟s contribution (inspiring further reflection) noted. 
Practitioners‟ voices are important and should not be obscured, but their interpretations of the larger 
phenomena are not the final authority in academic work. 
Lastly, lived religion does not need to be studied exclusively through ethnographic methods. 
While examining how people live if we want to study “lived” religion makes sense, sometimes this is 
impossible. Orsi uses historical documents extensively in his work, in conjunction with personal 
interviews. Historian David Hall (1989) further demonstrates that the material culture of a people lets 
us view their relationships with the unseen order. Studying religious life in early New England, Hall 
illustrates that the people were not strict Puritans in the theological sense. They also believed 
extensively in signs and wonders in the natural world, and interpreted these phenomena through 
almanacs and other popular documents (71-116). Early New England was a more diverse religious 
landscape than was previously supposed, largely because scholars relied upon representative elites 
instead of trying to analyze the cultural perspective as a whole.  
Religious studies scholar Thomas Tweed provides a compatible theoretical framework for 
explaining the importance of artifacts in Crossing and Dwelling (2006), although his work is based in 
his ethnographic research among Cuban Catholics in Miami (1997a) and artifacts are but one part of 
his theory of religion. Arguing that religion should be seen as an ongoing process which allows 
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 Orsi‟s work also includes a historical-ethnographic study of how women engage St. Jude in complex 
devotional relationships, speaking to his relevance in resolving crises in their lives, and with enduring ongoing 
suffering (1996). He has also contributed to mapping urban lived religion (1999). For a discussion of lived 
religion‟s political importance see Orsi (2003). 
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people to dwell in a meaningful world while also crossing boundaries—whether “terrestrial, 
corporeal, and cosmic” (2006, 76)—Tweed reminds us that religions are constantly changing through 
an ongoing dialectic between traditions and the changing worlds in which people dwell (2006, 54-79). 
He also emphasizes the importance of objects, suggesting that “artifacts anchor the tropes, values, 
emotions, and beliefs that institutions transmit, and that the religious create artifacts and prescribe 
procedures for their use—from domestic furnishings and ordinary dress to ritual objects and sacred 
buildings. Making and using artifacts are practices, and as many theorists have noticed, religions are 
performed” (68; emphasis in original). While this is not a study of the practice of making The 
Simpsons, there is an important point to be taken from Tweed‟s discussion. Viewing the program as 
an anchor for tropes, values, and emotions that reflect particular ways of viewing the world helps us 
to understand the program‟s cultural relevance. The Simpsons cannot make jokes about religion 
without being grounded. The program transmits ideas that are distilled from real people‟s experiences 
with everyday religions, interprets these concepts through a humorous framework, and broadcasts 
those notions in the form of jokes to its audience. Similarly, the contributors to Diane Winston‟s 
Small Screen, Big Picture use “lived religion” to explain “the ways in which television characters 
express, in words and deeds, their spiritual commitments and moral dilemmas, as well as the ways 
that viewers structure television watching and integrate it into their daily experience of meaning 
making” (2009, 5). In other words, television programs comprise another important data set for 
examining lived religion. While Winston is right that lived religion informs television content, 
television characters are not independent from the people who script their lives. That is, writers, 
actors, directors, and producers convey things through characters on the small screen. When 
discussing religion in The Simpsons, realizing that what the characters say and do reflects the way that 
a group of producers interpret lived religions is important. The program is a cultural point of contact 
between producers and the program‟s audience, a node in the larger cultural conversation about 
religion‟s role in modern life. 
Lived religion‟s usefulness for this project is, therefore, twofold. First, the people who write 
The Simpsons are themselves embodied individuals who interact with lived religions. They have 
absorbed the contradictions between official and lived religion, watched friends and neighbours doing 
“irrational” things, and observed people mixing and matching religious beliefs to suit their needs. 
These are resources for writing jokes. Official religious proclamations and the way people respond to 
them—ignoring them, following them dogmatically, or selectively appropriating from them—are all 
available as raw data for humour. When jesters consider these decisions irrational they become fodder 
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for jokes. This is discussed further in the next chapter, but we must remember that The Simpsons 
draws widely from lived and official religion for its humour. Ignoring the way people actually behave 
does not take us any closer to understanding the program‟s jokes. 
Second, popular culture exists in dialectic tension with lived religions. Historian Colleen 
McDannell‟s work (1995) is illustrative in this case. Working with generations of American 
Christians‟ material culture, McDannell argues that “Christian material culture does not simply reflect 
an existing reality. Experiencing the physical dimension of religion helps bring about religious 
values, norms, behaviors, and attitudes” (2; emphasis in original). A good example of this is her 
treatment of the Bible in Victorian households. While many scholars treat the Bible as scripture, very 
few treat it as a meaningful object. However, Victorian Christians knew differently. The Bible was 
the centre of the parlour, a record of family life, and a way of bringing the family together. As 
Victorian art demonstrates, fathers were expected to show themselves as heads of the household by 
instructing their children from the Bible while mothers were to give their children “spiritual milk” by 
reading to them from the family Bible. Bibles were big, bound books, conspicuously marketed to 
people to match their tastes and wallets (67-102). McDannell makes it clear that living religiously 
includes interacting with meaningful objects. To this I would add images, sounds, smells, tastes, and 
all other sensory information. Religion is something embodied humans do, drawing upon all our 
senses to make the unseen order present.
15
  
Because people use popular culture for religious purposes I turn to the next major question: 
What is popular culture and what is its significance in this project? 
                                                     
15 Other scholars connect material culture and dwelling within an unseen order. Morgan‟s work (2005, 
2007a) argues for religion‟s transmission through visual culture. The unseen order is represented through 
images we are trained to see using what he calls the sacred gaze (“a term that designates the particular 
configuration of ideas, attitudes, and customs that informs a religious act of seeing as it occurs within a given 
cultural and historical setting. A sacred gaze is the manner in which a way of seeing invests an image, a viewer, 
or an act of viewing with spiritual significance” [2005, 3]). This historically contextualized way of approaching 
images explains how humans train their senses to encounter the sacred through cultural products. Beal‟s 
Roadside Religion (2005) recounts his experiences travelling through America‟s religious-themed attractions 
and encountering the people who create them. Especially significant here are the examples of people who felt 
religiously compelled to recreate the landscape to reflect their religious visions, projecting themselves into a 
material universe, and inviting others to participate in their unseen orders. Finally, Plate (2008) argues that 
religion and cinema each engage in the act of creating worlds which people use to understand their lives. 
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2.2 Popular Culture and Its Significance 
When defining popular culture, scholars studying religion and popular culture tend to restrict 
it to mass produced culture, with an emphasis on mass media. Theologian Kelton Cobb defines 
popular culture as “the amalgamation of these delivering media and the delivered cultural symbols” 
(2005, 41; emphasis in original), while religious studies scholars Eric Mazur and Kate McCarthy 
argue that the “popular” in popular culture is usually “taken to refer to the wide diffusion of the 
product, usually via mass media; its acceptance by the majority of a given population; or its source in 
non-elite segments of the society” (2001, 7). For religion and media scholar Lynn Schofield Clark it 
is “anything that can be successfully packaged for consumers in response to their desire for a means 
to both identify with some people, ideas, or movements, and to distinguish themselves from others” 
(2007, 9). Chidester sees popular culture more expansively. It “encompasses the ordinary—the 
pleasures of our lives, which we may even take for granted, such as the creative and performing arts, 
sports, and leisure activities” (2005, 1). 
Scholars focussing on aspects of popular culture beyond religion alert us to material culture‟s 
importance in defining popular culture. In the introduction to Rethinking Popular Culture (1991), 
sociologists Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson argue that popular culture is “the beliefs and 
practices, and the objects through which they are organized, that are widely shared among a 
population” (3). Similarly, British cultural studies scholar Dick Hebdige defines popular culture as “a 
set of generally available artefacts: films, records, clothes, TV programmes, modes of transport, etc.” 
(1988, 47). Furthermore, he emphasizes mass production‟s role in our contemporary definitions of 
popular culture, allowing us to discuss the economic changes that make mass popular culture possible 
(47). These concerns shape the discourse about popular culture, but Hebdige‟s discussion still does 
not accurately identify what “popular culture” includes and excludes.  
Similarly, popular culture scholar Russel Nye defines popular culture as “those productions, 
both artistic and commercial, designed for mass consumption, which appeal to and express the tastes 
and understanding of the majority of the public, free of control by minority standards. They reflect the 
values, convictions, and patterns of thought and feeling generally dispersed through and approved by 
American society” (Nye 1982, 24). While he shares Mazur and McCarthy‟s concern that popular 
culture reflects consumers‟ values and cultural patterns, there are two problems with this definition. 
First, “American society” is too broad and ambiguous to be useful. Popular culture products often 
appeal to much smaller subcultures within the broader context of the United States. For example, a 
program with a regular viewership of 20 million people is a popular culture success. But in a country 
 
 21 
of roughly 307 million people those 20 million individuals represent roughly 6.5% of the population, 
which is hardly representative of the whole country.
16 
The other problem is Nye‟s assertion that 
popular culture is free from minority control. As I will demonstrate later, a comparatively small group 
controls The Simpsons‟ content and distribution relative to its consumers.
17
 
Other scholars propose definitions based on the distinction between high, popular, and folk 
culture. For example, religious studies scholar Gordon Lynch suggests that we should treat popular 
culture as the “shared environment, practices, and resources of every life” (2005, 17) as a way of 
negotiating between elite high culture, mass mediated and distributed popular culture, and 
regionalized folk culture (see also Browne 1982; Mazur and McCarthy 2001, 7-9; Nye 1982; Forbes 
2005, 2-4; cf. Romanowski 2007, 20-22). While the distinction between high and popular culture is 
discussed later, I do not use the “folk culture” distinction because I treat artefacts such as handmade 
quilts and home recipes as small scale popular culture. That is, they are non-elite culture on a much 
smaller scale than is usually ascribed to “popular” culture (cf. Browne 1982, Kidd 2007, Nye 1982, 
Strinati 2004). Acknowledging mass culture‟s relevance for definitions of popular culture is important 
because The Simpsons is mass marketed and distributed to a broad audience. However, distinguishing 
between “folk” and “popular” culture as separate categories is not useful. Using “folk culture” and 
“mass culture” as subcategories of “popular culture” is more productive because they focus our 
attention on the ways that small groups create culture for larger groups to consume. The main 
difference is scale. That said, sociologist Herbert Gans (1974) differentiates between high and popular 
culture because of the class differences that distinguish these two kinds of culture in the social 
imagination. Because these distinctions create significant material discrepancies between people, I 
use them as separate categories for analytical purposes.  
This focus on definitions emphasizing popular culture‟s mass mediated nature, everyday 
quality, and broad acceptance is relevant to this project because The Simpsons meets their criteria. 
First, The Simpsons is a product. It is a television program a small group of people (writers, 
animators, directors, producers) creates and which the FOX network—a component of conservative 
billionaire media mogul Rupert Murdoch‟s multinational News Corporation—distributes.
18
 While this 
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 The CIA‟s World Factbook website estimates the American population at 307, 212, 123 as of July 
2009 (The World Factbook). 
17
 For further sociological definitions and discussions of popular culture see, e.g., Bar-Haim (1990), 
Fluck (1987), Gans (1974), Gillespie (1972), Kidd (2007). 
18
 For a brief political biography of Murdoch and The Simpsons‟ relationship with FOX and News 
Corp., see Henry (2008, 34-46). 
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study deals mainly with the television program‟s content and The Simpsons Movie (Silverman 2007), 
The Simpsons brand extends to, among other things, comic books, advertising for other corporate 
products (e.g., Burger King, Butterfinger chocolate bars), DVDs and VHS cassettes, clothing, toys, 
Christmas ornaments, books, candy, bumper stickers, American postage stamps, mugs, and special 
designs for medical inhalers. Simpsons products generated two billion dollars in merchandising 
revenue alone in its first fourteen months (January 1990 to February 1991) and The Simpsons‟ global 
merchandising empire is now valued at five billion dollars (Grala 2007, Griffiths 2000). This does not 
include the bootlegged “Black Bart” merchandise that media scholar Peter Parisi (1993) found in the 
African American community shortly after the program‟s debut, which speaks both to the program‟s 
popularity and its use beyond FOX‟s control. It is clearly something that is produced, reproduced, and 
generates profit in the market.  
Second, The Simpsons‟ financial success alerts us to the fact that while the program is 
popular, its consumers do not create it. A powerful corporation owns The Simpsons, and a small 
group of writers, producers, and animators shape its content. Creators Matt Groening and James L. 
Brooks, writers including Ian Maxtone-Graham, George Meyer, Mike Reiss, Mike Scully and John 
Swartzwelder, and showrunners (producer-managers responsible for the program‟s daily operations) 
Al Jean and David Silverman are among the most prominent contributors to the program‟s 
humourous perspective. This comparatively small group of individuals are important because The 
Simpsons is consumed by a greater number of people than those who create it, agreeing with Mazur 
and McCarthy‟s contention that while most popular culture is produced by a relative few, it is only 
successful if it resonates with their audience, which makes popular culture “of the people” (2001, 7-
8). However, a salient point is that mass-produced popular culture‟s means of production are not 
available to “the people” because it is expensive, making it difficult to think of popular culture as “the 
people‟s” property. In other words, consumers may find something in the program that resonates with 
their values, but they do not have the privilege of creating and altering it. Those who have the 
resources to produce popular culture can disproportionately project their ideas into mainstream 
society where consuming the product funds the ideas‟ continued propagation.
19
 While a product‟s 
visionaries may have modest origins, those who can fund and distribute it select which messages are 
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 Fluck contends that popular culture does not work because of ideological manipulation but “because 
society constantly reproduces social relations with which the recipients have to come to terms symbolically” 
(1987, 39). As the above discussion demonstrates, while popular culture resonates with people this does not 
disqualify it as a system of ideological dissemination (cf. Bar-Haim 1990). 
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propagated. Groening was an underground cartoonist before creating The Simpsons as a series of 
shorts for The Tracey Ullman show in 1987. He would never have become an iconic sitcom creator 
were it not for Brooks hiring him and FOX deciding to turn The Simpsons into a half-hour feature. He 
needed the experience and money of those connections to bring his vision to a broader public. 
Without their help he would not have his current audience.  
Third, The Simpsons mediates cultural symbols that different people appropriate differently. 
It transmits a vision of American culture that viewers selectively interpret. In the introduction, I 
mentioned disputes about The Simpsons as a corrupting force, but it has also been co-opted by 
Christian groups. Pinsky‟s The Gospel According to The Simpsons (2001) was so successful that he 
and youth pastor Skip Parvin created a small group study guide for churches (2002). In the same vein, 
Bowler turned his article about The Simpsons (1996/1997) into a small booklet in Inter-Varsity 
Christian Fellowship‟s Dare series which is dedicated to helping students “explore the relevance of 
Christian faith for today‟s culture” (2001, back cover). The Anglican Church in England also 
produced a booklet for pre-teen small group activities built around the show as a means of 
evangelizing (O. Smith 2007).
20
 Furthermore, Willow Creek pastor Lee Strobel used Bart‟s prayer in 
“Bart Gets an F” as an illustration of something Jesus would use positively when teaching people how 
to pray (1994, 29-41).
21
 However, it is not just Christians appropriating religion in The Simpsons. 
Philosopher Daniel Dennett, a prominent member of the “New Atheist” movement, quotes the 
Simpsons‟ evangelical neighbour Ned Flanders as a way of demonstrating religious adherents‟ 
ignorance about scientific truths: “Science is like a blabbermouth who ruins a movie by telling you 
how it ends” (2006, 12; original quote in “Lisa the Skeptic”). This echoes Delaney‟s arguments from 
the introduction about The Simpsons favouring science over religion (2008, 197-218) and shows how 
the program can be variously interpreted.  
Beyond religious appropriations, we can also examine The Simpsons‟ different political 
usages. Groening‟s secret motto is “To entertain and subvert” (Griffiths 2000), a call to his viewers 
(especially children) not to trust authority figures because they do not have viewers‟ best interests at 
heart (Griffiths 2000; see also A. Duncan 1999, Hull 2000). Yet, with its promotion of a united 
family, Marge Simpson as a stay-at-home mother, portrayal of small town community life (see Wood 
and Todd 2005), and Mayor “Diamond” Joe Quimby as a parody of the Kennedys, some 
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 Although I am not analyzing how groups have used these resources, that would be another fruitful 
area of scholarship in the religious reception of popular culture. 
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 Specifically, Strobel felt that Jesus would approve of Bart‟s praying from the heart, approaching God 
fondly, confessing, and concluding in a way that stresses Bart‟s friendship with God. 
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conservatives have come to love the show (Andrews 2007, Murdock 2002; cf. Cantor 2001). These 
examples demonstrate that The Simpsons can be used as an identity marker, which Cobb and Clark 
emphasized in their definitions of popular culture (see also Alters 2002; Hoover 2006, 277-280; Ott 
2003). Using Clark‟s definition as my working definition of popular culture (“anything that can be 
successfully packaged for consumers in response to their desire for a means to both identify with 
some people, ideas, or movements, and to distinguish themselves from others” [2007, 9]), this project 
demonstrates that The Simpsons‟ humour is a product of the program‟s creators‟ liberal religious 
identities which is projected for popular consumption. 
2.2.1 Popular Culture’s Significance: A Matter of Taste 
Popular culture‟s significance lies in arguments about its merits for either enhancing or 
degrading social life. This can helpfully be analyzed through the concept of “taste.” The most famous 
discussion of this concept is French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu‟s Distinction (1984),
22
 although Gans 
makes similar arguments in his Popular Culture and High Culture (1974; see also Carey 2006). 
Bourdieu (1984, 1-2) argues that “taste” reflects educational attainment and signifies class differences 
among people, with which Gans would agree. Both scholars combat the idea that “high culture” (e.g., 
opera, ballet, classical music, impressionist art) is intrinsically superior to popular culture on this 
premise. Gans is especially critical of the mass culture argument against popular culture (1974, 19-
64), arguing that it “is self-serving, oriented to the interests of high culture alone, and to the 
maximization of its power and resources” (62). The argument that popular culture‟s mass production 
deprives it of redeeming value is actually class based propaganda that is used to influence public 
policy (e.g., funding for the arts, determining what is taught as “culture” in schools) in favour of 
cultural elites. 
The mass culture argument‟s most famous example is the Frankfurt School‟s Max 
Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno‟s “The Culture Industry” (2007, 94-136). They argue that popular 
culture‟s mass production makes originality and enlightenment impossible. Instead, a bland sameness 
infects culture and degrades the individual because mass production generates artifacts which cannot 
elevate the human soul.
23
 A predictable formula extricating evidence of individualism and personal 
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 For critiques of Distinction and Bourdieu‟s sociology of culture see B. Berger (1986), Brubaker 
(1985), Dunn (1998), Gartman (1991), Gronow (1993), Holt (1997), and Veenstra (2005). For an application of 
Bourdieu‟s theories to consumption of The Simpsons, see Alters (2002, 234-260). 
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 Horkheimer and Adorno‟s argument against the culture industry is based in their larger argument 
that enlightenment should free people from the confines of social structures which repress the individual and 
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style from the work is required to ensure the products continue to sell (99). They think popular 
culture‟s homogeneity makes people homogeneous (95-97), and they argue that mass produced 
culture replicates its capitalist producers‟ ideology. Regardless of what we do, there is no escape from 
mass culture‟s power to shape our experiences and society.  
Others echo Horkheimer‟s and Adorno‟s arguments. Philosopher Allan Bloom (1987) argued 
that the generation of students he encountered from the 1960s to the 1980s had lost its moral 
moorings that could only come from familiarity with and love for the classical traditions of literature 
and music. It is safe to assume he would extend the criticism to today‟s students. Contending that 
rock music‟s and cinema‟s mass produced cultures encourage students to indulge their basest desires 
and have no perspective for the future, Bloom‟s solution was to promote study of the classics of 
Western civilization. Like Horkheimer and Adorno, Bloom looked to high culture‟s canons for 




Bloom‟s use of the mass culture argument illustrates Bourdieu‟s and Gans‟ concerns with 
taste. There is no empirical evidence that listening to Mozart or reading Plato will make you a better 
person. Furthermore, these are cultural artefacts and thinkers a certain segment of society uses and 
consumes. Distinction aptly demonstrates that education is the deciding factor in liking high culture 
and using it to distinguish oneself from lower classes (Bourdieu 1984, 18-96; Gans 1974, 70; see also 
Lizardo 2006; Veenstra 2005). Gans goes even further, arguing that there are a variety of different 
“taste cultures,” which meet different groups‟ needs (1974, 10-15, 67-118). Taste cultures “consist of 
values, the cultural forms which express these values . . . taste cultures include the values, forms, and 
media of the natural and social sciences and philosophy—including their commercial popularizations 
and even „folk wisdom.‟ Finally, taste cultures have political values; although they do not often 
express them explicitly, they do so implicitly, and even when not, they frequently have political 
implications” (10-11). When we look at mass culture theorists‟ motivations, we can see their taste 
cultures‟ political implications. Destroying the mass production machine and replacing it with 
classical content are portrayed as society‟s saving grace, but this reifies a worldview that empowers 
people with elite educations and aesthetics. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
enable them to achieve their full potential. See the first three chapters of Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007, 1-
93). 
24




While it would be easy to dismiss mass culture arguments as high culture propaganda (62), 
their insight into the disproportionate control over popular culture‟s production is too valuable to 
ignore. This takes us to Bourdieu‟s concept of habitus, which can be summarized as the social 
structures which shape our decisions by shaping our predispositions towards certain choices (1977, 
72). Our habitus shapes our taste culture. Through our social interactions with others we learn 
dispositions that shape our tastes. As sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) argue, 
human beings reproduce the social structures they internalize through basic socialization.
25
 However, 
because societies are stratified, Bourdieu acknowledges that knowing the “right” kind of culture leads 
to substantial material rewards (1984). That said, people from all different classes and taste cultures 
draw upon popular culture as a way of communicating their group membership with others (Lizardo 




Finally, because popular culture is contested ground on which major social differences are 
marked, it is also grounds for conflict. Censorship is a tactic powerful groups employ to control the 
ideas and values others project through popular culture. Film critic Michael Medved argues that 
Hollywood (meaning film companies, but he also extends his criticism to television and music) has 
lost touch with the majority of the United States‟ citizens who still value patriotism, a positive view 
of religion, and the nuclear family (1992, 10). Accordingly, “What troubles people about the popular 
culture isn‟t the competence with which it‟s shaped, but the messages it sends, the view of the world 
it transmits” (10). Medved contends that Hollywood‟s producers should craft media that reflects those 
values which he attributes to the American majority. That is, religion should not be attacked as 
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 Berger and Luckmann‟s sociology of knowledge is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
26
 This issue is often linked to consumerism, a topic discussed in chapter four. Audience reception 
studies further demonstrate that people consume the same products in different ways. Clark‟s (2003) and 
Hoover‟s (2006) work illustrate different ways people use mass media‟s religious content. Clark identified five 
types of teenage media observer through interviewing teenagers and their parents. Furthermore, teenagers draw 
from their families, social institutions (e.g., school, religion), social position (e.g., race, class, and gender), and 
the media as they shape their identities (2003). Similarly, Hoover argues that media contribute to the symbolic 
inventories people use to interpret their place in the modern world. Like Clark, he finds a range of responses to 
religion in the media. Hoover sees people as active consumers and interpreters of media who create meaning 
from the images and ideas they absorb from a variety of media (e.g., newspapers, television, the Internet) (39-
44). Hoover‟s study is important because it emphasizes media‟s role in disseminating ideas in today‟s culture 
where a pastiche approach to constructing religious identities is considered normal. Employing a 
methodological approach based in interviews with media consumers, Hoover criticizes models of popular 
culture which denigrate it as somehow degrading the audience without testing how the audience is affected or 
which praise it without assessing the complexities with which people approach it. See also, e.g., Alters (2002), 
Hebdige (1991), and Henry Jenkins (1992, 2006a, 2006b). 
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pernicious or ridiculed as misguided; marriages should be presented as predominantly stable and the 
family should be seen as a source of stability rather than conflict; America and her troops should be 
celebrated; and violence and the more grotesque elements of human behaviour like sadism should be 
denigrated (10). For Medved, “The most significant problems of the popular culture stem from the 
pervasive presence of antisocial material” (242). Tipper Gore echoes similar sentiments in her book 
Raising PG Kids in an X-Rated Society (1987). Gore argues that “porn rock” (music which is “part of 
an escalating trend toward the use of more explicit sex and graphic violence in entertainment industry 
offerings” [12]) is a leading cause of increased violence, suicide, Satanic and occult practices, and 
alcohol and drug consumption among American youth. Like Medved, she calls for increased industry 
regulation of artistic productions, accusing popular culture producers of corrupting impressionable 
teenagers for financial gain. Gore contends that she is not calling for censorship, but expressing her 
first amendment rights and challenging popular culture‟s content through the market (15-17). 
Prominent in Gore‟s crusade are her attacks on heavy metal music as “porn rock,” which 
musicologist Robert Walser (1993, 137-171) and sociologist Deena Weinstein (2000, 237-275) 
counter. They contend that Gore‟s position reflects a conservative moral bias based on assumed 
Christian norms and other symbolic institutions in American culture such as “the American family” 
(Walser 1993, 138). Walser and Weinstein responded to what has become known as the Parents 
Music Resource Center (PMRC) senate hearings in 1985.
27
 This event stretched beyond just heavy 
metal to controversial content in other musical genres including work by pop artists Prince, Madonna, 
and Cyndi Lauper, with the PMRC‟s goal being the clear labelling of albums with “explicit” content. 
Sociologist Amy Binder (1993) argues that in the battles over popular music‟s social benefits 
discussions are often framed to resonate with different constituencies. Gore‟s appeals drew upon the 
corruption, danger to society, and protection frames, arguing that explicitly sexual and violent content 
in music could corrupt children who needed protection from these ideas (758). The PMRC‟s 
opponents framed their rebuttals as no harm, generation gap, and freedom of speech (759). These 
defendants portrayed themselves as entertainers protecting free speech from overprotective parents 
who did not understand why their children liked the music. This allowed them to present their music‟s 
content as something harmless that needed protection from the vicious assaults of people who did not 
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 The hearing‟s official name is Record Labeling. See trial testimony from Susan Baker, Dr. Joe 
Stuessy, and Dr. Paul King for arguments in favour of record labelling. Testimonies from John Denver, Dee 
Snider, and Frank Zappa exemplify musicians‟ rebuttals (U.S. Congress 1985). 
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understand them and who wanted to shape American culture to their particular moral order. Each side 
reached different audiences and furthered different arguments. 
The PMRC hearings demonstrate that the clash between popular culture‟s producers and their 
critics revolves around popular culture‟s content, that is, what it communicates (or, rather, what 
people claim it communicates). Other scholars have discussed popular culture censorship at a variety 
of levels and the PMRC trials serve as another example in a long series of confrontations between 
what people portray in popular culture and what cultural gatekeepers deem acceptable content.
28
 The 
Simpsons‟ portrayal of religion reflects, is shaped by, and comments on the forces that compete for 
the power to shape the United States‟ social, cultural, political, and religious orders. Arguments about 
popular culture‟s content recognize that its meanings are not only established in discourses about it, 
but that popular culture is created with particular audiences in mind and its content is generated by 
selecting and organizing significant symbols from its host culture.
29
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 Black‟s Hollywood Censored (1994) tells the Production Code of America‟s story and how it 
affected the content of Hollywood movies. Especially important here is the fact that pressures from religious 
groups and state film boards acted as incentives to have Hollywood producers conform to this imposed standard 
of morality. A similar influence can be found in Brook‟s (2003) discussion of how Jewish groups forced the 
cancellation of certain programs such as Bridget Loves Bernie and Chicken Soup for their depictions of Jewish 
life. Bridget Loves Bernie was problematic for its portrayal of ethnic intermarriage between Catholic Bridget 
and Jewish Bernie, which the community felt would inspire exogamy (48-54). Chicken Soup was pulled 
because the star, Jackie Mason, was deemed too Jewish and Jewish lobby groups felt that he would be too much 
of a stereotype (68-73). Black and Brook demonstrate that pressure on popular culture‟s producers (in this case 
Hollywood studios and television networks) can be enough to have popular culture‟s content conform to 
cultural power brokers‟ standards. Waldron and Bradford Wright each bring the elements of moral panic to the 
forefront of their discussions. Waldron outlines the crusade against role-playing games‟ history and failure, 
noting that while their arguments were compelling to some Christians (like heavy metal, role-playing games 
were accused of promoting suicide and occult activities) they failed to stand up to academic scrutiny and 
eventually faded away (2005a). Wright‟s discussion of Frederic Werther‟s 1950s crusade to have comic books 
censored for their content is also relevant, as this movement fell apart once the state of New York deemed that 
censoring comic books would not stand on constitutional grounds (2003, 86-108). This decision echoes 
Binder‟s freedom of speech frame and shows the repetitive nature of these arguments about popular culture‟s 
content and that censorship support (arguing that youth are corruptible, that popular culture‟s content is immoral 
and dangerous, taking legal action against popular culture) continues in a cyclical pattern. 
29
 One interpretive direction this can take is to view popular culture as propaganda, which Cowan 
defines as “a systematic, ideologically driven, action-oriented manipulation and dissemination of information, 
which is (a) designed for a specific target audience, and (b) intended to influence the beliefs and behaviors of 
that audience in a manner consonant with the aims and objectives of the propagandist” (2004, 259). The 
successful propagandist repeats a message which resonates with pre-existing prejudices in the audience, framing 
the argument consistently and using simplified arguments and solutions for their own purposes (259; see also 
Cowan 1999, 127-270; 2003a; 2003b). Propaganda should, therefore, be seen as a useful tool in the popular 
culture theorist‟s toolkit. However, The Simpsons‟ creators are aware that their audience is diverse and will not 
agree with everything they find humorous. Seeing their humour exclusively as propaganda removes its 
argumentative and persuasive elements as it tries to confront opposing viewpoints. As Cowan‟s work 
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The Simpsons‟ commentators note that it depicts established American cultural trends and 
critiques some of the United States‟ most fundamental institutions. Media scholar Jonathan Gray 
analyzes television through The Simpsons‟ perspective. He argues that their advertisement parodies 
are effective because they are “constantly making ads appear fundamentally unnatural, foreign, and 
invasive. To laugh at many of these jokes is to accept and share the criticism of advertising‟s modes 
of address, for the jokes are not just on the internal absurdities but also, externally and intertextually, 
at ads that we have all seen before” (2006, 82; emphasis in original; see also Knox 2006). Political 
scientists Nicholas Guehlstorf, Lars Hallstrom and Jonathan Morris (2008) also contend that The 
Simpsons criticizes the status quo, suggesting that the program consistently depicts the American 
political scene as populated with corrupt and incompetent political elites, apathetic voters, and a 
tendency on the part of the populace to turn into an unthinking mob. Temple University graduate 
Margaret Hull (2000) also endorses this position, finding similarities between Michel Foucault and 
Simpsons creator Matt Groening in their opinions of school as an institution which destroys 
individuality and teaches conformity, and in their resistance to this characteristic of primary 
education; Henry (2004, 2007, 2008) also supports the program‟s oppositional stance, noting that The 
Simpsons challenges common assumptions about gender roles and behaviours. These studies suggest 
that analyzing The Simpsons‟ content as a critique of American society‟s dominant institutions can 
lead to valuable insights into the program‟s ideology. My analysis follows by investigating how the 
program uses satire to critique America‟s religious institutions.  
2.3 Religion and Popular Culture: A Diversity of Approaches 
With definitions of religion and popular culture in place, my next step is outlining my 
methodological approach. There are different ways to map the relationships between religion and 
popular culture, but religious studies scholar Bruce Forbes‟ is the most useful (2005). Drawing on 
theologian Richard Niebuhr‟s framework from Christ and Culture (1951), Forbes proposes four 
relationships between religion and popular culture: religion in popular culture, popular culture in 
religion, popular culture as religion, and religion and popular culture in dialogue (10).
30
 This project 
                                                                                                                                                                    
demonstrates, propaganda is often directed “in-house,” while The Simpsons is directed to all viewers. Therefore, 
it is as much about reifying certain viewpoints as it is about actively engaging and challenging opposing ones. 
30
 Niebuhr‟s original categories were: Christ against culture, the Christ of culture, Christ above culture, 
Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ the transformer of culture. They were frameworks for explaining the 
different ways people have thought about Jesus‟ cultural role throughout history. Forbes also proposes a fifth 
category “Religion as Popular Culture” in a footnote (2005, 18-19 fn. 14), but the articles in Religion and 
Popular Culture in America do not address it. This relationship between religion and popular culture is worth 
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uses cultural analytical methods for analyzing religion in popular culture, specifically the way that 
The Simpsons portrays different American religions in order to criticize them, drawing heavily from 
work that is categorized under Forbes‟ religion in popular culture and religion and popular culture in 
dialogue categories. As I previously acknowledged, some religious groups use The Simpsons for 
religious reasons. However, cultural analysis of religion in The Simpsons is relevant because there are 
four hundred and sixty-three episodes of The Simpsons, with only eight having no religious references 
(another fifteen episodes have only questionable references). Furthermore, religious groups have been 
commenting on the program for years. Studying the depictions of religion in The Simpsons helps us 
understand why the program has been both influential and controversial. 
Forbes describes religion in popular culture as “the appearance, explicitly or implicitly, of 
religious themes, language, imagery, and subject matter in elements of popular culture” (2005, 10). 
Studies taking this approach demonstrate an array of theoretical and methodological approaches that 
can be applied to contextualize and interpret popular culture‟s content (e.g., Beal 2002; Clanton Jr. 
2003; Cowan 2005b, 2008b; Hendershot 2004; Howard and Streck 1999; Hulsether 2005; Iwamura 
2005; J. Knight 2005; K. McCarthy 2001; McDannell 1995; Plate 2003; Rowmanowski 2007; Shuck 
2004; Siegler 2001). Through an analysis of different religions‟ depictions in The Simpsons we can 
see how the show has been crafted to represent America‟s religious culture in such a way that these 
renderings convey particular ideologies about religious beliefs and actions in contemporary life. That 
is, we will examine how the program‟s spoken texts, characters‟ actions, and other visual elements 
reference different religious traditions and socially relevant events in American religious life through 
cultural intertextuality. These investigations reveal underlying cultural and ideological patterns for 
further analysis and criticism. 
Other scholars analyze the dialectic between popular culture‟s contributions to culture at 
large and culture‟s influence on popular culture in different ways. Varying approaches to horror films 
illustrate this point. Religious studies scholar Timothy Beal‟s exploration of monsters in the biblical 
and Western cultural traditions reveals that they are used as warnings (from the Latin monstrum: “a 
message that breaks into this world from the realm of the divine” [2002, 7]). Monsters are symbols 
that direct our attention to the unseen order, representing the world‟s supernatural elements at the 
boundaries of our consciousness. In response to this unsettling presence in our world, Beal argues that 
“the monster is an envoy of the divine or the sacred as radically other than „our‟ established order of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
exploring further, but it is not something I will be addressing in this work because it does not answer my 
significant questions which are based in religion in popular culture and religion and popular culture in dialogue. 
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things” (6). To protect our worldviews we can either demonize or deify the monster, rejecting it or 
incorporating it into our established order. Beal finds this unsatisfactory and argues that we are often 
ambivalent about monsters (6). Through critiques of Dracula, ecomonsters (e.g., Godzilla), and the 
work of H.P. Lovecraft, Beal‟s examples illustrate that monsters reveal latent patterns in our unseen 
orders. They either protect it (e.g., angels) or try to destroy it (e.g., demons), but a monster‟s presence 
invites us to think deeper about said order.  
Cowan expands Beal‟s argument to all cinematic horror. Using the concept of sociophobics 
(“our culture teaches us in a variety of ways what to fear, and through a variety of cultural products 
reflects and reinforces the fears we have been taught” [2008b, 59]), he demonstrates how horror films 
illuminate Peter Berger‟s point that “All socially constructed worlds are inherently precarious” (1967, 
29). Cowan argues that each society has its own religion and people‟s horror stories relate directly to 
what endangers their unseen order. For example, in his discussion of our fear of death and dying 
badly Cowan compares the films Ju-on and its American remake, The Grudge, to demonstrate the 
differences in Japanese and American sociophobics. In Japanese society ghosts are part of the cultural 
milieu. Especially frightening are the angry and vengeful ghosts who have died bad deaths and are 
untended by their families. However, ghosts exist in the background of American consciousness. 
Some people believe in them, but they rarely come to the forefront of our attention. In its story about 
a house haunted by a vengeful ghost, Ju-on did not need extensive narration and instead focussed on 
the common Japanese themes of the cursed house and the entrapped spirit. Japanese audiences 
understood what was happening as part of the unseen order. On the other hand, The Grudge 
introduced narrative elements that would help explain the Japanese cultural elements to Americans, 
contextualizing the haunted house and fitting the story into an American sociophobic and narrative 
framework by focussing on the characters and allowing audiences to identify with them (2008b, 128-
133). This model of examining how a film (and, by extension, The Simpsons) draws from underlying 
social assumptions about reality is used consistently throughout this dissertation because what we 
find humorous is socially contextualized and dependent upon our learned assumptions.
31
 
Horror films demonstrate the importance of what Cowan calls “cultural intertextuality.” He 
uses this concept to discuss how disparate cultural elements intertwine in horror films‟ production 
(11-12), but this concept can be extended to any popular culture production, especially The Simpsons. 
The concept of intertextuality is important for this project because it refers to “a set of conventions—
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 For further discussions of religion and horror films see, Beavis (2003), DeGiglio-Bellemare (2005), 
Humphries-Brooks (2004), Paffenroth (2006), B. Stone (2001); cf. Bellin (2005). 
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social norms, religious practices, artistic products, folk wisdom, different parts of the taken-for-
granted information that Berger and Luckmann call „a body of transmitted recipe knowledge‟” (11).
32
 
Significantly, audiences can recall this information quickly and easily (12). Cultural intertextuality 
builds upon already assumed norms, beliefs, and practices. The more esoteric standards of 
theologians are not nearly as important for people as the assumptions which frame their interactions 
with other people. To put things in more concrete terms, people who fear Muslims do not usually do 
it because they have read the Qu‟ran, hadith, and works of Islamic theologians who have inspired 
contemporary Muslim terrorists. They are scared because they have seen repeated viewings of the 
9/11 attacks and carefully edited footage of Osama bin-Laden meant to inspire fear.
33
 These patterns 
of cultural reinforcement are then replicated in popular culture because the quickly available 
information is easily employed for the popular artist‟s purposes.  
Cultural intertextuality facilitates humour in The Simpsons and intertextuality is a common 
theme among Simpsons commentators. Gray uses the term “critical intertextuality” to analyze The 
Simpsons‟ parodies (43-68; see also Henry 2003).
34
 Contending that parody disrupts genre 
conventions, Gray writes that The Simpsons transmits a critical framework that inverts ideologies 
normally conveyed through particular media (44-48). For example, the sitcom has historically been “a 
mouthpiece for a contemporary fairytale of patriarchal, middle-class, consumerist suburban morality 
and for the myth of the American Dream” (53), a fairytale The Simpsons draws upon and subverts. 
Gray‟s argument illustrates the fact that The Simpsons exists in a cultural context that people already 
know how to interpret. Juxtaposing meanings allows audiences to reinterpret habitual patterns of 
media consumption (although they may not get the joke) (47; see also K. Richardson 2008, 
Weinstock 2008). Television scholar Simone Knox argues that The Simpsons double-codes itself to 
be both commercial and critical, having things both ways. Furthermore, its jokes do not have singular 
meanings, allowing for broad interpretations among audience members (2006). Humour‟s 
intertextuality allows people to use it as a means of communicating ideas and as a critical reflection 
on their world. By referring to a broad array of religious and cultural assumptions, therefore, The 
Simpsons helps us recall relevant bits and pieces of our unseen orders, and reinforces or challenges 
the conjectures upon which they are built. Among other things, it allows us to remember ideas, 
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 The Berger and Luckmann quote is from (1966, 83). 
33
 See chapter 7 for a further discussion of Islam‟s treatment in The Simpsons. 
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 Gray also includes a helpful review of intertextuality theory (2006, 19-40). 
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presumptions, and emotions we associate with these cultural artefacts and to re-evaluate our 
ideological positions.  
To access the ideas, assumptions, and emotions The Simpsons parodies, I employ a 
hermeneutic approach informed by the theoretical insights of the phenomenological branch of 
symbolic interactionism.
35
 Building from the insights of the University of Chicago‟s social 
psychological tradition, most famously represented by George Herbert Mead (1934), sociologist 
Herbert Blumer framed symbolic interactionism‟s three basic premises as: (1) human beings act 
according to the meanings that things (e.g., physical objects, other people, institutions, ideas) have for 
them, (2) those meanings arise from social interaction, and (3) these meanings are used and changed 
through an individual‟s interactions with others (1969, 2). Contemporary symbolic interactionist 
David Snow extends Blumer‟s model to include four further principles: interactive determination (a 
continued focus on how our contexts give objects their meaning); symbolism (symbolic meanings are 
not given, but constantly negotiated and reworked); emergence (symbolic interactionists frequently 
investigate those historical moments where something in a culture changes); and human agency 
(symbolic interactionism allows us to see the dynamic tension between social structure and human 
agency) (2001; see also Mihata 2002).  
Symbolic interactionist theory is often applied in ethnographic research (see, e.g., H. Becker 
1963, Fine 1983a, Garfinkel 1967, Goffman 1959), and, closer to this project, it informs the work of 
religion and media scholars Stewart Hoover (2006) and Lynn Schofield Clark (2003; see also Alters 
2002). Specifically, they use audience reception studies to illustrate how mass media is used to shape 
people‟s religious lives. This is important and insightful research, as they demonstrate that a 
program‟s audience is often diverse and does not passively consume media. However, audience 
reception studies have a different focus from an undertaking such as this. Audience research does not 
necessitate a rigorous analysis of the cultural and political ideas being transmitted through mass 
media. Indeed, how the audience uses media may have very little to do with any of the ideas it 
transmits. Therefore, appropriately, insights gained from audience reception research focus on the 
audience‟s reactions and how they use media, to the exclusion of cultural content transmitted through 
said media. In the study of religion and popular culture the audience is but one part of the picture—an 
important one to be sure, but just a part. Furthermore, in the case of an audience as broad and 
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 While there are many methods and theoretical approaches to the study of religion and popular 
culture, I follow Morgan‟s (2007b) advice and build a solid foundation within one tradition rather than trying to 
do everything and accomplish nothing. 
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international as The Simpsons‟, any audience research study is necessarily incomplete and tells us 
little about the program. The audience and their social interactions with mass media, rather than a 
detailed engagement with the media‟s content, become the focal point of the study (see Alters 2002).  
If someone wanted a complete picture of The Simpsons‟ audience they would need to conduct 
a widespread international survey. I have neither the resources nor training to conduct such a study. In 
a project such as this one, which focuses on the representations of religion in The Simpsons, any 
small-scale audience reception material I included would be limited by geography, sample size, and 
demographics. Gray‟s audience reception section in Watching with The Simpsons illustrates this 
problem (2006, 119-168, 174-175). His sample consists of thirty-five people, all of whom have at 
least a bachelor‟s degree, and only five of whom had not at least started post-graduate studies at the 
time they were interviewed. They were found through snowball sampling and by advertising near 
London‟s Goodenough College, a dormitory catering to foreign graduate students (120). Gray does 
not claim any sense of representativeness and instead uses these interviewees to illuminate his work 
on the problems of interpreting parody (119-120). However, using such a biased sample to frame our 
understanding of the audience of such a widely popular program as The Simpsons only illustrates the 
incomplete nature of trying to understand the significance of putting forth a depiction of religion in 
the United States through mass media by interviewing a handful of fans. The educational bias in his 
sample led to a variety of insightful engagements with the program‟s parody, but The Simpsons is 
watched by people of all educational levels. The significant question of what do viewers learn from 
interpreting The Simpsons‟ parodies? remains unanswered because “viewers” are not representative 
in this case. This is not to say that Gray implies that his audience reception study is authoritative and 
representative of all Simpsons fans, but it demonstrates the difficulty of performing audience research 
on such a popular program. I find Gray‟s audience reception elements to be more of a methodological 
exercise than a useful explanation of how The Simpsons‟ fans interpret its parodies. Concerned that 
the same problems would arise in this work, and having no way to improve upon Gray‟s methods 
with my own resources and training, I have decided not to use audience reception methods. 
My decision not to enter the field does not mean that symbolic interactionist theory is 
inapplicable to material culture. The theoretical insights remain valuable, but we need to apply a 
different methodology. To do this I turn to symbolic interactionism‟s phenomenological branch. I 
follow Austrian sociologist Alfred Schutz who formulated social phenomenology in his The 
Phenomenology of the Social World (1967) and Collected Papers (1962). Drawing on sociologist 
Max Weber‟s problem of human action as directed towards ideal types, in Phenomenology of the 
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Social World Schutz argues that Weber did not pay close enough attention to the problem of 
meaning‟s construction and conveyance. Human beings live in an environment rich in sensory data. 
However, we cannot focus our attention on everything we experience. Instead, we pay attention to 
certain events and give them significance. We then act upon these significant impressions in our 
everyday lives. Also, when we establish patterns over time we can create ideal types which allow us 
to understand others‟ actions and behaviour quickly, based on our expectations of how they enact 
their social roles and on our interactions with them in the past.
36
 The less intimate our relationships, 
the more we rely upon our rationalized assessments of people‟s roles and their enactments because, 
while no two people are exactly the same, we can hopefully convey our meaningful experiences to 
those around us. Socially constructing meaning relies upon constantly rationalizing role behaviours so 
that we can understand and anticipate how others will perform when encountering them for the first 
time (1967; 1962, 3-47, 118-139).  
Schutz‟s insights are helpful for two reasons: First, human communication is imperfect. One 
of sociology‟s great questions is how people come to live together in the first place. Schutz takes this 
even further, asking how we can even communicate when we are so different. This is a significant 
question which gets to the heart of popular culture and humour. How do we reach a point where we 
can convey ideas about the social world and understand each other? Why can we understand some 
people and not others? How do we know if we really understand the other person? How are my 
personal meanings, built from my own experience and projected through my assumptions about the 
world, interpreted by somebody else who does not have the same framework? That popular culture 
conveys messages that people find meaningful suggests that there is something profoundly human 
about transmitting ideas through these media, even if interaction constantly reshapes those meanings.  
Second, approaching popular culture as the products of people‟s meaningful construction and 
communication of ideal types gives us a hermeneutic framework. Schutz‟s phenomenology facilitates 
identifying historical patterns, biases, ideas, and arguments, and asking about how these complex 
concepts have been simplified into a communicable ideal type. The Simpsons employs ideal types 
drawn from American culture. Interactionism and phenomenology provide us with the sociological 
hermeneutics to identify and analyze these ideal types. They also keep us connected to the fact that 
ideal types are socially shared and communicated. Lived religion, popular culture, taste, and cultural 
intertextuality are all concepts used to explain how humans formulate and communicate these 
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 36 
meaningful ideas and, in turn, construct their worlds. The next chapter discusses humour‟s role in this 
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 This is not to characterize Berger as solely a phenomenologist. As many commentators have noted, 
Berger is indebted to the Schutzian tradition for some of his terminology, concepts, and orientation; but he 
incorporates other sociological traditions, especially Weberian sociology. Berger admits he never really studied 
phenomenological philosophy and instead relies on Schutz, leaving him somewhat outside phenomenology 
proper (1986, 223-224; see also Ainlay 1986; Wuthnow et. al 1984, 23). 
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Chapter 3—Are Catholics Funny? Religious Comedy in The 
Simpsons 
Catholics have inhabited the Americas since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when 
Spanish and French explorers and colonists crossed the Atlantic. While historians of the United States 
often emphasize Protestantism‟s role in nation shaping, Catholics have a long history in America. 
They are unquestionably a significant religious group in that country.
38
 Yet, Catholicism is rarely a 
source of The Simpsons‟ humour, and when it is, their jokes focus on the papacy, Irish clergy, and the 
church‟s position on birth control. Pinsky suggests that Catholicism‟s treatment in The Simpsons has 
“an undeniably hostile, sometimes gratuitous edge to it. At times, the tension between writers and 
producers and the denomination has assumed some aspects of an intimate, deep-seated family feud” 
(2007, 129). Because some writers and producers, including major contributors Mike Scully and 
George Meyer, are lapsed Catholics, there is clearly some bias there (The Believer 2004; D. Owen 
2000; Pinsky 2007, 129). Considering Catholicism‟s internal ethnic diversity, elaborate hierarchy, 
political positions on controversial issues including abortion and euthanasia, and rich tradition of 




Answering this question requires a theoretical framework that enables us to analyze how The 
Simpsons‟ creators have portrayed Catholicism, what they have decided their audience would find 
humorous, and why they frame their jokes the way they do. In this chapter I demonstrate how aspects 
of Peter Berger‟s sociology, with its emphasis on the social roles of knowledge, religion, and humour, 
offer a solid theoretical base for interpreting The Simpsons. Although I will refer to the works of other 
scholars, I do so as they clarify Berger‟s positions. Selecting only a few elements of Berger‟s thought 
is important because his oeuvre is broad and deep, covering everything from global religious trends 
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 According to The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life‟s most recent “U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey” (2008a), America is 78.4% Christian, 23.9% of which are Catholics. This makes Catholics the single 
largest Christian denomination in America (Protestantism is divided into three “umbrella groups”: 
evangelicalism [26.3%], mainline [18.1%] and historically black churches [6.9%], but each of these categories 
contains multiple smaller denominations and independent churches) (5). The University of Chicago‟s General 
Social Surveys (GSS) over the last eighteen years have shown Catholics to be roughly the same percentage of 
the population (e.g., 1990 GSS: 23.8% of Americans are Catholic; 2000 GSS: 24.1%; 2008 GSS: 23.2% [Davis, 
Smith, and Martin 1990, 2000, 2008]).  
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 See, e.g., Dolan (1985), Gillis (1999), Marty (1995), and Morris (1997) for introductions to 
American Catholicism‟s history. For examples of lived Catholicism see Ferraro (1997), Orsi (1985, 1997, 
2005), Primiano (2009), Skerrett (1996), and Tobin (1999). 
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(1999; Berger, Davie and Foaks 2008), to Third World modernization (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 
1973), and manifestos for studying sociology (P. Berger 1963). He has written about religion in the 
United States (1961a, 1961b), religion in the modern world (1967, 1979, 1998, 2001b), and the way 
societies are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966). When we include his theological 
works (e.g., P. Berger 1970, 2004), we encounter a mind broadly engaged with human life‟s various 
facets. This chapter emphasizes his work in the social construction of society and religion because it 
effectively explains how people construct religious worlds and are, in turn, shaped by their creations 
(1967; Berger and Luckmann1966).
40
 
This foundation is Berger‟s base for analyzing humour, which he interprets as one of the 
signals of transcendence that allow us to see something of the supernatural—the divine—in human 
experience (1970, 69-72; cf. 1961b, 209-218; 1997). Humour is one of the more understudied 
elements of his thought, and this project allows us to investigate religion and humour‟s relationship in 
his theories. To accomplish this, I discuss the significant elements of Berger‟s sociologies of 
knowledge, religion, and humour, augment them with insights from other scholars, and over the next 
five chapters demonstrate how his theories frame my analysis of religion in The Simpsons. This 
chapter discusses Catholics not because they are the most important religion in The Simpsons‟ debate 
about religion‟s role in public life, but because the sample size is small enough to facilitate a first 
application of the theoretical framework before going deeper into religion‟s depcitions in The 
Simpsons. 
3.1 The Sociologies of Knowledge, Religion, and Humour: Interwoven 
Elements in Berger’s Thought 
When Berger published The Social Construction of Reality (hereafter Construction) with 
Thomas Luckmann in 1966 he was already an established sociologist, having written what is arguably 
his first classic in sociology, Invitation to Sociology (1963). The latter book demonstrates some of the 
key elements that would inform his later work, namely his interest in Alfred Schutz‟s theories about 
“the world as it is” (24) and the importance of the sociology of knowledge for explaining everyday 
life (110-118). It allowed Berger to promote sociology and sociological thinking as a powerful tool 
for liberal arts scholars and the “educated public,” but Construction synthesizes the thought of 
                                                     
40
 For further summaries and critiques of Berger‟s sociologies of knowledge, religion, and culture see 
Ahern (1999), Hunter and Ainlay (1986), Woodhead (2001), and Wuthnow et. al (1984, 21-76). 
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preceding great sociologists of knowledge, providing an interpretive framework that allows for 
complex analysis of human cultures and their products. 
In Construction Berger and Luckmann argue that reality is based on institutions—“a 
reciprocal typification of habitualized action” (1966, 54)
41
—that a society‟s members share. We exist 
in a dialectic tension with our institutions; we shape them as they shape us. Institutions can be 
anything from the legal system with its recognizable buildings, rules, and procedures, to the family 
roles that we adopt—all of which carry behavioural expectations we are expected to fulfil. Key to this 
argument is that people who are socialized into particular institutions adopt the roles embodied and 
legitimated therein, and contribute to their completion and ongoing legitimation.  
Central to Construction‟s argument is the idea that people encounter social institutions as if 
they were objective reality. While they are not objective, and only objectivated through human 
interaction, we treat them as though they are both real and absolute. Institutions are human creations 
built from our externalized ideas and behaviours, which gradually come to constitute patterns of 
action. Once these thoughts and actions become habituated, subsequent generations encounter them 
as reality. But all institutions have a developmental history. They are not separate from the history of 
people interacting with the rules and roles institutions prescribe, and changing them over time. 
Institutions are dynamic, and as we are socialized into the world we internalize already existing social 
roles and structures, then externalize our subjective interpretations of them through our actions for 
others to internalize, repeating the cycle (53-66).  
According to Berger and Luckmann, these socialization processes create “knowledge” which 
“is at the heart of the fundamental dialectic of society. It „programs‟ the channels in which 
externalization produces an objective world. It objectifies this world through language and the 
cognitive apparatus based on language, that is, it orders it into objects to be apprehended as reality. It 
is internalized again as objectively valid truth in the course of socialization” (66, emphasis in 
original). There are also many different kinds of knowledge, each serving a particular purpose in 
reality‟s maintenance and comprehension. The important types of knowledge in our discussion are the 
social stock of knowledge which is comprised of knowledge of everyday life, commonsense 
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 Berger and Luckmann describe the process of institutionalization as occurring “whenever there is a 
reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an 
institution. What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only 
the actions but also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions 
are always shared ones. They are available to all the members of the particular social group in question, and the 
institution itself typifies individual actors as well as individual actions” (1966, 54 emphasis in original).  
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knowledge, recipe knowledge, and legitimations—arguments used to explain the institutional order 
(P. Berger 1967, 29). 
Knowledge of everyday life consists of what is taken for granted in society—a world that 
enables me to communicate subjective experience to others (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 19-46; cf. 
Schutz 1967). Preexisting social institutions and objects imply the objectivated reality others have 
projected and which they can use to communicate their subjective experiences. Much of this 
constitutes “commonsense knowledge” because “I share [it] with others in the normal, self-evident 
routines of everyday life” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 23). Language is a favourite example of 
Berger and Luckmann‟s because it forces us to shape our thoughts and feelings to its structures if we 
wish to communicate with others. In our lives we also have unshared subjective experiences—“finite 
provinces of meaning”—which are inaccessible in everyday life but can be translated into its 
framework.
42
 For example, I can only share a dream with you if I translate it through language, 
making it part of everyday life rather than letting it remain a separate finite province of meaning (40). 
 Our social stock of knowledge, including recipe knowledge, further conditions our everyday 
knowledge. While the everyday world is available to everybody, we do not access everything in it. 
Pragmatic needs guide knowledge accumulation, leading to a social stock of knowledge which 
“includes knowledge of my situation and its limits” (41). Because everybody‟s situation is different 
we build individualized stocks of knowledge that assist with our routine problems. Berger and 
Luckmann call these pragmatic solutions “recipe knowledge” (42). However, because socially 
constructed worlds are under the constant threat of having their arbitrariness exposed, people develop 
legitimations to defend institutionalized knowledge (P. Berger 1967, 29-51).
43
 Although I will discuss 
                                                     
42
 Berger and Luckmann take “finite provinces of meaning” from Schutz (1962, 340-347). It is a 
significant concept because it refers to “the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the 
objects, which constitutes reality” (341). 
43
 I use the word arbitrary here not to imply that institutions are insignificant, but to highlight the fact 
that they develop in a random, unplanned fashion rather than a fixed, fated pattern. Understanding that society is 
both constructed and very difficult to deconstruct and change, is essential to understanding Berger and 
Luckmann‟s theories because it explains why socially constructed worlds are hard to alter (P. Berger 2001b, see 
also Hacking 1999). Furthermore, while socially constructed worlds are arbitrary, they are also built out of the 
social and natural materials that history and environment provide. This has been missed by some commentators. 
For example, Smart‟s major error in his interpretation of Berger was assuming that Berger did not adequately 
account for the natural world and its impact on human society‟s development, and therefore calls Berger‟s 
original inability to account for the numinous‟ existence into question (1973, 74-91; see Otto 1950 on the 
numinous). The natural world exists and influences us, but its significance is constructed through the dialectic 
process of externalization, objectivation, and internalization. As for the numinous, it may exist, but we only 
come to know it through our interactions with objects people have already created, even if they are 
interpretations of natural objects that have been given sacred significance. 
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legitimations further when I focus on religious conflict, it is important to note that all of our 
knowledge is legitimated in some way, even if it is at the most basic level of legitimation: a 
pretheoretical, incipient explanation such as “we have always done things this way” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966, 94; cf. P. Berger 1967, 30).  
3.1.1 Berger’s Sociology of Religion: Legitimating Sacred Canopies 
To understand The Simpsons‟ jokes about Catholicism, we need an understanding of religion 
in American culture. America‟s religious life has always been diverse. From the wide array of Native 
American traditions that predated Columbus, to the many Protestantisms that arrived from Europe, to 
the influx of Catholics and Jews during the colonial period and beyond, to the variety of new religions 
that arrived from other countries after the Oriental Exclusion Act was repealed in 1965, there has 
never been a single, overarching religious tradition in the United States.
44
 When he published The 
Sacred Canopy (hereafter Canopy) in 1967, Berger was invested in explaining a dramatic shift in the 
United States‟ religious culture. Canopy is a book in three parts. The first two parts are the most 
significant, with the first part discussing religion‟s role in constructing a meaningful world against the 
threat of meaninglessness and the second part explaining the process of secularization in modern 
societies. The third part is comprised of two appendicies, one on sociological definitions of religion, 
and the other on the relationships between sociological and theological approaches to religion‟s study. 
Human society is an unfinished product, always undergoing the process of externalization, 
objectivation, and internalization Berger and Luckmann explained in Construction. Because it is 
incomplete, it is also precarious. That is, society‟s construction needs protection through 
legitimations. As explanations for why society exists the way it does, legitimations reassure us that 
the worlds in which we live are stable. Religious legitimations connect mundane institutions, 
including family structures and political leadership, to the unseen order in the popular imagination 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, 92-116; P. Berger 1967, 29-51). For example, Christian Smith provides 
the following quote from an evangelical Minnesotan woman which illustrates the connections she 
makes between national identity and religious cosmology: “We are founded on the Bible, and as a 
Christian nation we are to honor God and the Lord Jesus Christ. Just rolling back the things that 
they‟ve done to take God out of the country. Our country did very well back then, with God in 
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 Following Albanese‟s typology of methods for studying American religious history (2002), I employ 
the “contact model” where different religious groups develop in relation to others around them (see, e.g., 
Albanese 1992; 2002, 6-7; Tweed 1997b). Sometimes this contact is peaceful, sometimes it is conflictual, but it 
importantly highlights the fact that historically American religions have not developed in isolation. 
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everything. I just don‟t like what they‟ve done to take God out of things. I think it just worsens 
society” (2000, 63). While Smith stresses that this woman is not representative of all evangelicals, her 
statement is important because it links social organization, prosperity, and religion, and legitimates a 
Christian morality system against contemporary pluralism. Locating America‟s mythical golden age 
in a time of “Christian America,” she affirms an ideal government that favours her interpretation of 
religious doctrines and their corresponding moral codes. As society appears to worsen, she can appeal 
to religious explanations for answers. 
This quote also points to a significant element in Canopy‟s second part: secularization theory 
and the weakening of religious plausibility structures. Plausibility structures are the social base upon 
which religious worlds are built. They consist of all legitimations that justify the socially created 
world‟s continuation (P. Berger 1967, 45). Catholicism is a socially constructed world inhabited by 
saints, miracles, and an elaborate church hierarchy. Legitimating itself through tradition and doctrine, 
the Church has developed an extensive framework for transmitting explanations over the last 2000 
years. However, the very fact that there are others nearby who do not inhabit the Catholic world 
challenges its legitimations and its taken-for-grantedness. Berger interpreted diversity as a major 
problem for religions (see also Berger and Luckmann 1966, 116-128). Religious plausibility 
structures are threatened because they can no longer provide an entire society with a series of 
legitimations for its institutional order. Ultimately, Berger argued that in such a situation our options 
become either a secular world or meaninglessness. Those who hold out against secularization‟s 
oncoming tide do so in subcultures which Berger thought were inherently precarious because of 
doubt‟s persistence in society at large and the fact that their legitimations were no longer taken for 




I say that Berger used to think this way because by the late 1980s America‟s robust 
religiousness called secularization theory into question. America is one of the most modern societies 
on the planet and it is also one of the most religious. These two facts appear paradoxical under the 
secularization paradigm because it was assumed that as societies modernized religion would become 
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 Berger would revisit this problem in A Rumor of Angels (1970) and The Heretical Imperative (1979), 
where he advocated for the strong personal religion favoured in liberal Protestantism against neo-orthodoxy‟s 
dogma and modernism‟s reductionism as a way of preserving religion in the modern age. As I will discuss in 
relation to comedy, Berger‟s post-Canopy work stresses the continuing importance of the transcendent in 
human life, even if his classic work supported secularization theory.  
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privatized and then disappear (Hadden 1987).
46
 However, as counterevidence was gathered, some 
scholars adopted what sociologist Stephen Warner called “the new paradigm” (1993). Whereas 
previous studies had focussed on the European idea of “one church” with state support, voluntary 
association without state interference characterizes the situation in the United States. In other words, 
it is a religious free market. While this free market ideology has not found total acceptance in the 
academy, it is shaping the debate about religion‟s future.
47
 After reviewing this evidence Berger 
famously changed his position on secularization, adopting the new paradigm (1998).
48
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 The concept of a paradigm is used here in Kuhn‟s sense. That is, a paradigm “is an object for further 
articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions” (1996, 23). Paradigms can be helpfully 
compared to institutional structures which make research productive and meaningful. However, data which 
challenges the theories upon which they are built threatens them. In this sense Kuhn‟s paradigm theory can 
usefully be incorporated into the larger theory of the sociology of knowledge discussed here because paradigms 
demonstrate the ways people fruitfully restrict intellectual possibilities to further already established agendas. 
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 Whether or not secularization is inevitable is an ongoing debate within the sociology of religion. 
Rational choice theory‟s (RCT) acceptance among some sociologists of religion over the last twenty-five years 
has led to arguments over whether or not secularization is ongoing. Positing the question in terms of supply and 
demand, leading RCT advocates Bainbridge, Finke, Iannaccone and Stark argue that religion is a supply issue. 
That is, everybody is potentially religious, but if an appropriate religious provider is unavailable they will be 
religiously unsatisfied. According to this body of theory, religions survive by meeting their adherents‟ desires. 
A free religious economy allows for the broad creation of religions that can then meet a diverse population‟s 
many needs (see, e.g., Finke and Stark 2005; Iannaccone 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Iannaccone, 
Olson, and Stark 1995; Stark 1997, 2000, 2001; Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994, 1995; for criticisms of RCT see Bruce 1999; Bryant 2000; Chaves 1995; Demerath 1995a; 
Ellison 1995; Mellor 2000).  
Opposing the supply-side argument against secularization are theorists who see religion losing social 
influence, and therefore declining, for various reasons (Tschannen 1991). Sociologist Bruce (2002) is a leading 
proponent of secularization theory, arguing that as religions are forced into a situation of relativism and 
diversity they lose the ability to command loyalty and people become apathetic towards them. Other scholars 
approach secularization through different lenses, emphasizing the fact that secularization happens in different 
ways in various contexts. For example, Casanova (1994) argues that religions can still make significant 
contributions to modern societies by becoming engaged in political activities favouring human rights and other 
social issues other groups of people are not championing (see also Halman and Draulans 2006, Lechner 1991, 
Yamane 1997). Chaves (1994) echoes similar concerns when arguing that secularization is a result of power 
differentiation—and religions are losing power to other social institutions. The important thing to note about 
works published shortly before or after Hadden‟s (1987) article is that they stress religion‟s declining social 
influence, not religion‟s disappearance. This means that categorizing “secularization theory” as the belief that 
religion will disappear is an incorrect assessment. Instead, it helps explain declining religious power to the point 
where religion may become irrelevant in people‟s lives. On a related note, Beyer (1997) offers an interpretation 
of Canada‟s religious scene that integrates insights from both theories, demonstrating that this is not a zero-sum 
theoretical debate. 
48
 Bruce has called this recantation “unnecessary” because he finds Berger‟s original theory still 
applies to the first world (2001). Berger refutes this, saying that it is European style state religion that leads to 
secularity, citing Sweden as an example (2001a, 194-195). Berger now promotes the idea that Europe is the 
exception to the rule because of its high degree of secularity. America‟s robust religiousness, conversely, is 
more reflective of humanity‟s religious norm (Berger, Davie, and Foaks 2008). 
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Christian Smith adapts Berger‟s original ideas to explain religion‟s persistence in diverse 
societies. Arguing against the notion that accommodating modernity is a zero-sum game for religion, 
Smith suggests that the sacred canopy is not the proper metaphor for religions in a religiously diverse 
situation. Instead, he proposes the concept of “sacred umbrellas” which are “small, portable, 
accessible relational worlds—religious reference groups—„under‟ which their beliefs can make 
complete sense” (Smith et al. 1998, 106). Translated into Berger‟s language: Plausibility structures do 
not have to work for the entire society, just for a group‟s members. If we do not care about what 
people outside our reference group think about us, then the sacred umbrella provides a meaningful 
plausibility structure against an outside world that undermines its legitimacy (89-119). Smith‟s 
reformulation means that religions can survive by embedding themselves within a modern framework 
and thrive by distinguishing themselves from, and engaging, relevant outgroups (118-119; see also 
Cowan 2003a). Furthermore, because many religions legitimate themselves not only against society‟s 
secular elements, but also against competing religions, their legitimations are known not only to 
themselves, but also to others in society who engage them. This means that legitimations are available 
not only to a religion‟s adherents, but to their opponents who can use their arguments against them—
something comedians do with considerable skill.
49
 
Whether or not secularization is happening, the new paradigm‟s stress on religious diversity 
and contact between religions is important for this project. The Simpsons re-presents a wide array of 
religions that frequently engage each other. Sometimes they encounter each other benevolently, but 
often they engage each other in ways that emphasize differences and conflict.  
3.1.2 Humour and Knowledge in The Simpsons 
Berger‟s sociologies of knowledge and religion form a useful framework for analyzing 
humorous interpretations of different religions. When people tell jokes about different religions, the 
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 Ahern (1999, 4-5) argues that A Rumor of Angels dismantled the sociology of knowledge‟s 
plausibility structure detecting mechanism by locating knowledge of the divine in individual induction based on 
everyday knowledge. Smith‟s reformulation allows us to reintegrate the importance of plausibility structures 
into the sociology of knowledge and religion because now we can theorize plausibility structures that involve 
small groups, or even solitary individuals working under a sacred umbrella, an important development because 
it allows us to return Berger‟s theorizing to the analytical framework offered in his sociology, without recourse 
to his theological assumptions. To push this further, while Berger argues that even the sociology of knowledge 
itself depends upon a plausibility structure, thus relativizing the relativizers (1970, 28-48), that does not change 
the fact that once a person moves an insight from a finite province of meaning into social discourse—thereby 
making it a theology and a legitimation of their unseen order—it can be analyzed through the sociology of 
knowledge because it has become a social object. The difference is not in the question of the ontology of 
inductive truths, but in the problems of socially communicating those truths. 
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various plausibility structures interact with each other‟s legitimations. In Redeeming Laughter (1997) 
Berger identified benign humor, tragicomedy, wit, and satire as different forms of comic expression. 
While The Simpsons employs all these techniques, satire is the most significant for our discussion 
because it is “the deliberate use of the comic for purposes of attack” (157; see also Feinberg 1963, 
1967; Kercher 2006; P. Lewis 2006). Acknowledging satire‟s near omnipresence in humour, Berger 
contends that satirists employ all comic elements for their purposes (1997, 157). If we return to the 
above discussion about the sociologies of knowledge and religion, we have to acknowledge that 
satirists stand within their own plausibility structures. They have assumptions about the world that are 
reified through the institutional legitimations to which they subscribe. The Simpsons‟ creators project 
and legitimate their worldview through satiric jokes and parodies by attacking perspectives with 
which they disagree. The Simpsons takes religious groups‟ legitimations and uses them to frame jokes 
which reflect the program‟s perspective, regardless of whether or not these jokes support the 
religions‟ plausibility structures (see also P. Lewis 2006; cf. Mulkay 1988).
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Although Berger‟s sociologies of knowledge and religion are powerful theories, his theory of 
humour is ultimately less useful because it is based in his theology rather than in his sociology. For 
Berger, humour does religious work. Accepting his theory of humour means integrating a distinctly 
religious perspective into one‟s analysis. This proves difficult because it requires proving the 
existence of something beyond the natural world, a requirement which empirical methods cannot 
meet.
51
 That said, reaction to Canopy‟s stark take on religion‟s plausibility started Berger toward lay 
theologizing in A Rumor of Angels (1970), in which he posits the concept of signals of transcendence: 
“phenomena that are to be found within the domain of our [human] „natural‟ reality but that appear to 
point beyond that reality” (53). There are experiences we can have in our everyday worlds which 
suggest to us that there is more to life than our socially constructed realities. Signals of transcendence 
alert us to a cosmic reality beyond our everyday lives. Berger gives five signals: the propensity 
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 Mulkay (1988) poses a similar argument in his distinction between serious and humorous modes of 
discourse. For Mulkay, our everyday lives are shaped by a serious discourse which presents the world as unitary 
and consistent, while the humorous mode presents us with the differences and paradoxes born from juxtaposing 
different perspectives. The main difference in our approaches is that I treat diversity as an acknowledged and 
problematic element of everyday life, while he only discusses it in relation to the humorous mode of discourse 
(see also M. Davis 1995; cf. Fox 1990). 
51
 In Canopy Berger argues that sociological inquiry based on empirical evidence cannot make 
statements about the ontological status of the supernatural, a position he calls “methodological atheism” (1967, 
100; emphasis in original). However, my position is not atheism in the strictest sense because I do not deny the 
existence of a god or gods. Instead, following Smart, it is methodological agnosticism because I suspend any 
(dis)beliefs I may have about the subject (1973, 54). For a critique of methodological agnosticism‟s history and 
contemporary relevance, see James Cox (2003).  
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towards order, the argument from play, the argument from hope, the argument from damnation, and 
the argument from humour (49-75). For Berger, comedy alerts us to the incongruities of this life and 
in those incongruities we realize that there is more to existence than our current state. Because 
comedy reveals that socially created forces (rather than ontological ones) oppress us, it allows us to 
relativize our situation and reach beyond it to something greater (69-72). While A Rumor of Angels 
makes humour a universal signal of transcendence, Berger‟s Christian perspective haunts his analysis. 
In The Precarious Vision Berger argues for a similar perspective of the comic (1961b, 209-218). 
There he contends that the comic reveals what is really human in light of society‟s trappings. When 
comedy relativizes the seriousness of social institutions, he asserts that it offers Christians a promise 
of redemption (214). He maintains this position throughout Redeeming Laughter (1997).
52
  
In claiming that incongruities causing laughter reveal the sacred, Berger builds upon the 
incongruity theory of laughter, which is one of the three general theories of laughter upon which 
humour studies is established (1961b, 209-218; 1970, 69-72; 1997). Philosopher John Morreall (1983, 
1987) maps them as superiority, incongruity, and relief. Briefly, superiority theory posits that we 
laugh at a perceived fault in an opponent, incongruity theory contends that we laugh when an event 
occurs that does not match our expectations, and relief theory argues that we laugh to release built up 
tension. As Morreall (1983) wisely observes, each of these theories is an inadequate explanation by 
itself for why we laugh. Each theory can apply to different jokes in different contexts, but taken 
together they form a tripartite framework for understanding the various reasons why human societies 
have humour. Sociologist Murray Davis captures the interrelationship of the three sources, 
summarizing the humour process as “an individual (1) who perceives through humor an „incongruity‟ 
in the outer world, (2) expresses through laughter the „release‟ or „relief‟ of being subjectively 
unaffected by this objective contradiction, and (3) consequently feels his laughingly sustained 
subjective integration manifests his „superiority‟ to the humorously disintegrated object” (1993, 7). 
This work takes incongruity as a starting point, and investigates cases where The Simpsons asserts the 
superiority of one religion over others through the jokes it makes about different religions. Relief 
theory is under-emphasized because, like the presence of the divine in comedy, we cannot prove that 
people will be relieved by laughing at a joke, and if they are relieved, we cannot prove of what they 
are relieved. However, we cannot discount relief as a significant physiological benefit of laughter, and 
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 For a different analysis of Berger‟s theology, see Ahern (1999) who argues that Berger‟s combined 
theology and sociology provide a broad base for studying religion which helps avoid reductionism and enables 
religious scholars to understand the everyday world as a site of transcendent reflection.  
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that it has important functions in certain situations. The methodology employed in this dissertation, 
however, does not allow us access to audience sensations and, therefore, we cannot speculate about 
whether or not Simpsons viewers experience relief when laughing at the jokes. 
Berger is not the only religion scholar claiming that humour born in incongruity reveals the 
sacred. Theologian Conrad Hyers‟ early edited collection of writings on the topic, Holy Laughter 
(1969), contains essays by a variety of scholars who argue that humour opens the way to the divine. 
In his own work (1981, 1987, 1989, 1996), Hyers consistently argues that the comic spirit within the 
world‟s religions inverts tragic seriousness, revealing our humanity and humbling people, allowing 
for a greater development of the human spirit. He proposes three types of laughter (which can be 
taken as three types of comedies or humour): the laughter of paradise, which is childlike joy arising 
from frivolity in the world; the laughter of paradise lost, which strikes back against injustice and 
provides hope; and the laughter of paradise regained, which comes from inclusiveness and a vision of 
the unseen order that reflects redemption (1981, 33-39). As will become clear, I favour interpreting 
humour through the framework of “paradise lost” as I cannot prove the reconciliation offered by the 
vision of paradise regained is really reconciling or if people only think it is. In Hyers‟ work, paradise 
regained is too often discussed in terms of feelings that extend to others (e.g., 1981, 29). The problem 
is that feeling you are being inclusive, gracious, and humble before others can lead to pride, 
exclusion, and nastiness. Hyers interprets humour through what Cowan and Bromley call the “good, 
moral, and decent fallacy” (“the popular misconception that religion is always a force for good in 
society, and that negative social effects somehow indicate false or inauthentic religious practices” 
[2008, 11]). Avoiding this fallacy requires that we do not assume humour leads to an ultimate evil or 
good, and focus instead on its use in concrete situations rather than its assumed ends. Hyers‟ theory is 
a matter of comic faith, which literature scholar Robert Polhemus describes as “a tacit belief that the 
world is both funny and potentially good; a pattern of expressing or finding religious impulse, motive, 
and meaning in the forms of comedy; and an implicit assumption that a basis for believing in the 
value of life can be found in the fact of comic expression itself” (1980, 3). This works if we are 
discussing humour religiously, but when we are discussing humour‟s social role we have to 
investigate the social consequences of the feelings Hyers emphasizes instead of assessing their moral 
standards. 
Berger‟s and Hyers‟ theories both rely on untestable insights. That is, how do we know that 
humour reveals a “separate world” with any ontological existence apart from what we have learned as 
socialized human beings? Certainly, jokes illustrate the inconsistencies between ideology and praxis 
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in our lives. Our highest ideals, which are themselves socially constructed institutions, are always at 
risk of falsification or threatened by those who stand to improve upon our claims. Sociologist Peter 
Blau argues that oppressed groups can push our ideologies to their logical limits, revealing the 
extremes to which we do not normally extend ourselves in order to subvert dominant power structures 
(1986, 224-252). This argument indicates our ideologies‟ precariousness, as the internal logic of the 
ideological systems that serve groups heavily invested in their maintenance can overthrow their 
maintainers.
53
 However, the utopias our ideological extremes present are still social constructions. In 
other words, while Berger and Hyers see a redemption for humans beyond the socially constructed 
world—a divine revelation within a finite province of meaning—I see humour based within our 
ideological systems‟ dialectical limits. That is, we may be seeing heaven, but the discussions of 
heaven permeating our culture shape that vision. Berger proposes that through seeing that human life 
is more than our socially constructed worlds, we escape constructions all together and encounter a 
qualitatively different existence. The problem is that we cannot test for something beyond the 
material world. Berger may be correct and humour might give us a glimpse of a transcendent reality, 
but we have no way of proving it. Instead, what we can know is that the world could be different than 
it is, but our social stock of knowledge shapes our ability to imagine that difference. In this sense, 
humour‟s revelation is not divinely derived, but a product of our ideologies. We can only know 
incongruity based on what we see as congruous—it has to be comprehensible within our plausibility 
structures. Therefore, if we are not looking for the divine in humour, what are we looking for?
54
 
That said, Berger‟s sociology of knowledge is a strong foundation for a working theory of 
humour. Dutch sociologist Anton Zijderveld recognized this when he applied Berger and Luckmann‟s 
arguments to humour (1983; cf. Mulkay 1988). Building on their Weberian roots, Zijderveld contends 
that scholars and societies construct ideal types (“rational constructions of human beings, social 
processes and cultural institutions” [1983, 4]) which rarely, if ever, match the reality they purport to 
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 Blau is not the first to take this tension into consideration. It is also a significant element of Weber‟s 
“ethical prophet,” a figure who offers new ethico-religious directions through their preaching (1991, 55), a 
concept which demonstrates the way religion can significantly contribute to social change. The way people 
manipulate existing ideologies to their own purposes, reshaping them in the process, is a significant element of 
the sociology of knowledge (see also Cowan 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Mannheim 1936). 
54
 Another way to phrase this difference is that Berger and Hyers are offering theories on humour‟s 
religious work, looking at it from the perspective of believers who want to contribute to different religious 
traditions or individuals‟ spirituality, while I am studying how outsiders use humour to criticize religious 
beliefs. These are two different kinds of theories, one working from inside the tradition and the other outside. 
For further studies of laughter and humour in religion see, e.g., Arbuckle (2008), Gilhus (1997), L. Gross 
(2002), Joeckel (2008), Laude (2005), Morreall (1999), and Saroglou (2002). 
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explain. They are useful heuristic tools, but should not be mistaken for the thing itself. Jokes build 
upon the discrepancies between ideal types and reality. For example, Christians claim that their 
tradition teaches them to love others as they love themselves. When local minister Timothy Lovejoy 
tells Ned Flanders that “there‟s more to being a minister than not caring about people” at the end of 
“In Marge We Trust,” the joke explicitly plays upon the incongruity between a man who, ideally, tries 
to love others and the fact that he openly acknowledges he does not care about them. The 
juxtaposition between the ideal type of a minister who embodies Christian teaching and the character 
of Rev. Lovejoy demonstrates how our rationalizations lead us to expect one thing, but that these 
rationalizations are approximations of behaviour, not descriptions. That this depiction is familiar, in 
the sense that viewers will likely know a minister who has stopped caring about their flock, facilitates 
the way the incongruity between ideal type and lived reality resonates with the audience. 
Humour exists when we play with institutionalized meanings in a situation defined by 
laughter (Zijderveld 1983, 9; see also Paolucci and Richardson 2006a, 2006b). Juxtaposing ideal 
types with familiar social examples which do not meet expectations allows us to see our taken-for-
granted existence as something relative and constructed, rather than permanent and given (Zijderveld 
1983, 4). However, understanding humour requires a deep understanding of the world in which the 
jokes are told. People have to share values and plausibility structures—the same stock of 
knowledge—in order to play with jokes‟ meanings (6-27, 41-54; see also Gardner 2002). 
Psychologist Victor Raskin‟s semantic script theory of humour (SSTH) (1985) and his 
general verbal theory of humour (GVTH) (Attardo and Raskin 1991) helpfully explain the basic 
psychological principles behind activating knowledge in humour. Building upon theories developed 
in cognitive linguistics, Raskin argues that “the script is a large chunk of semantic information 
surrounding the word or evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure internalized by the native 
speaker and it represents the native speaker‟s knowledge of a small part of the world. Every speaker 
has internalized rather a large repertoire of scripts of „common sense‟ which represents his/her 
knowledge of certain routines, standard procedures, basic situations, etc.” (1985, 81). This directly 
relates to Berger and Luckmann‟s institutionalization of everyday life through recipe knowledge. 
Scripts are institutionalized ideal types, upon which we draw when solving our daily problems. They 
are another concept scholars use to explain how we access everyday knowledge. Raskin argues that 
jokes cause laughter because they are compatible with two different, opposing scripts (99)—a fact 
that leads Morrell to classify both the SSTH and GVTH under the larger rubric of incongruity theory 
(2004, 397). Put differently, juxtaposing different “scripts” which contain everyday knowledge 
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creates meaning through humour. The problem with Raskin‟s work is that it is directed towards 
canned jokes with fixed texts and which circulate freely in society (e.g., knock-knock jokes). These 
jokes may be useful for understanding the cognitive elements that are at play in deciphering jokes and 
how they work, but they lack context. They may tell us what scripts we are juxtaposing, but not about 
how the scripts reflect social realities or why joke tellers feel it is appropriate to tell certain jokes in 
certain situations (cf., Douglas 1975, 90-114). Raskin‟s theories also do not work with non-verbal 
humour which is a significant element in The Simpsons‟ humorous construction of religion. Although 
his theory is very influential in humour studies, it complements the more complete social theories 
upon which I build my theoretical approach.
55
 
Once we have a basic understanding of our world, we can see that joking serves a variety of 
social functions. It can reconfirm reality, assuring us that our assumptions about reality are stable 
(Zijderveld 1983, 11-12). Reinforcing reality forges solidarity within a group (47-52) and allows 
humour to be used to exclude others (53-57).
56
 Humour‟s role in conflict situations (see, e.g., 
Ferguson and Ford 2008, Zillmann 1983), with the need to reinforce an in-group‟s reality against an 
out-group‟s, is significant because this dynamic is at work in The Simpsons.
57
 While Zijderveld did 
not emphasize conflict, it is an imperative component of Berger‟s theories (cf. R. Collins 1975, 108; 
E. D. McCarthy 1996, 2). Legitimations exist for offensive and defensive purposes. They are 
intellectual tools meant to protect plausibility structures against opponents (see, e.g., Cowan 1999, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004). Jokes are, therefore, legitimations. They employ meanings, playing with them 
within a plausibility structure‟s logical confines. Even if jokes relativize reality, making us aware of 
our world‟s precariousness, in a pluralistic situation they can become effective tools for determining 
who resides under our “sacred umbrellas” and who is left out in the rain (see Fine 1983b, 169). 
The sociology of humour offers us a variety of useful tools for connecting humour to the 
“seen order.” Sociologist Giselinde Kuipers argues that humour is “a form of communication, a 
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 See volume 17 (4) of Humor for an extended critique of Raskin‟s theories (Brock 2004, Davies 
2004, Morreall 2004, Norrick 2004, Raskin 2004, Triezenberg 2004, Veale 2004). On Raskin‟s theories‟ 
applicability to religion and humour see Hempelmann (2003). 
56
 For additional studies on humour as a means of solidifying group solidarity and reinforcing symbolic 
universes see Fine (1983b, 1984); Fine and de Soucey (2005);  Francis (1994); Lowney and Best (1996); 
Sanford and Eder (1984); and Zillman and Cantor (1996). For critiques of sociological approaches to the study 
of humour see M. Davis (1995) and Fine (1983b). Fox (1990) gives a good example of how humour can disrupt 
a social group to the point that its taken for granted reality is brought into question (cf. Garfinkel 1967). 
57
 See Randall Collins (1975), Coser (1956), and Dahrendorf (1959) for foundational statements on 
conflict‟s role in forging alliances and creating opponents in modern society. Coser and Dahrendorf also 
provide insight into conflict‟s role in maintaining social stability while allowing for social change.  
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question of taste, a marking of social boundaries” (2006, 10). Building on Bourdieu‟s work (1977, 
1985) she argues that humour conveys standards and works as a form of symbolic capital, always 
marking social and moral boundaries between groups (Kuipers 2006, 13-18). British sociologist 
Christie Davies (1990, 1998, 2002) theorizes that there are two general types of ethnic jokes in the 
world: stupid and canny. Stupidity is “a general and universal quality and has come to include and to 
refer particularly to an inability to understand and cope with those technical aspects of the modern 
world that are common to most countries rather than simply to a lack of understanding of local 
customs, practices, or forms of speech” (1990, 15). Ethnic groups which are marginal in society, but 
also closely related to the dominant group, are often considered stupid. Canadian “Newfie” jokes are 
a good example of this. Jokes about canniness, on the other hand, imply “cleverness and rationality, 
but it is a shrewd cleverness, and a calculating rationality applied in the pursuit of personal advantage. 
Indeed, jokes about „canny‟ groups often depend . . . on their alleged disposition to use these qualities 
in ways and in contexts that others find ludicrously inappropriate and excessive” (15). Scots and Jews 
have historically been these jokes‟ main targets.  
Davies contends that these jokes help the dominant ethnic groups who tell them deal with the 
tensions of modernity by deflecting their anxieties onto peripheral groups (1998, 164). Jokes are 
minor social controls because they implicitly praise majorities while explicitly ridiculing minorities 
(165). However, Davies has argued elsewhere that jokes do not start wars and are not reasons to fight 
(2002, 201-227).
58
 He metaphorically argues that jokes are “not social thermostats regulating and 
shaping human behaviour, but they are social thermometers that measure, record, and indicate what is 
going on” (1990, 9). This analogy is useful because jokes and popular comedies such as The 
Simpsons can give us a sense of the cultural climate. They can tell us who is dominant, stupid, and 
canny in society. For example, the fundamentalist Ned Flanders, who follows the Bible to the point 
that he keeps kosher “just to be on the safe side” (“Hurricane Neddy”), is portrayed as stupid because 
of his inability to think apart from Christian dogma (see chapter 5). The Hindu Apu is canny because 
he represents the model minority stereotype applied to high achieving Indian Americans, and the 
stereotype of a greedy convenience store clerk who applies an exorbitant mark-up to his goods (see 
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 This does not mean that jokes are not threatening to political orders. The satirical trial of late night 
comedian Jon Stewart, held at the 2007 National Communication Association‟s annual meeting in San Antonio, 
illustrates cynicism‟s problems and potential in a democratic society (Bennett 2007, Hariman 2007, Hart and 
Hartelius 2007, Lule 2007). On contemporary satire and politics, see Baumgartner and Morris (2008) and Lamb 
(2004). Conversely, Oring and Raskin argue against any political significance of humour in their contributions 
to Humor‟s forum on the caricatures of Muhammad (P. Lewis 2008, 21-30, 37-42). 
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Chapter 7). The Simpsons is a thermometer that measures a certain set of values. Those who 
understand The Simpsons‟ jokes need to understand the way the program manipulates everyday 
knowledge through cultural intertextuality to craft the program‟s humorous arguments, even if 
viewers do not agree with these arrangements. 
However, Davies ignores a volatile and important element in his sociology. Omitted from his 
survey are jokes about hated groups. Folklorist Elliott Oring‟s study of cartoons in the White Aryan 
Nation‟s periodical WAR exemplifies the extremes humorists will go to (2003, 41-57). Arguing 
against Freud‟s (2003) contention that humour is a sign of repressed attitudes and that if the attitudes 
were aired humour would disappear, Oring demonstrates that the racist group openly uses humour to 
further its agenda. He presents a variety of cartoons from the magazine, including one depiction of a 
smiling African American with a stocking cap, large mouth with thick lips and a missing tooth, wide 
nose, and a sign that says “Will Make Excuses for Food” (2003, 48). This caricature combines some 
of the most gratuitous stereotypes of African Americans in contemporary society; including the ideas 
that they are lazy, refuse to work, and make excuses while expecting handouts. The joke itself works 
on the association between the man‟s sign and some homeless people‟s signs which read “Will Work 
for Food” (46-47). These jokes reflect a particular worldview, and Oring contends WAR‟s founder 
Tom Metzger would include such depictions “to imagine—rightly or wrongly—other laughers like 




In a pluralistic society, religious objectivations and legitimations compete with each other. To 
emphasize the competitive element that augments Berger‟s earlier theories, sociologist Randall 
Collins‟ use of microsociology helps us understand how competition between different definitions of 
reality characterizes knowledge‟s use in society. Collins combines Durkheim‟s theory of the socially 
unifying power of ritual with sociologist Erving Goffman‟s dramaturgical theory of interpersonal 
                                                     
59
 Using humour for derisive and controlling purposes is not exclusive to Oring‟s thought. Bergson 
shares this theory, arguing that “laughter is always the laughter of a group” (1956, 64) and “Any individual is 
comic who automatically goes his own way without troubling himself about getting into touch with the rest of 
his fellow-beings. It is the part of laughter to reprove his absentmindedness and wake him out of his dream” 
(147). Cowan (2005b) finds that third parties can also use humour to reinforce their worldviews. His example of 
countercult evangelicals using South Park‟s episode “All About Mormons” to marginalize Mormons and 
reinforce their Christian worldview demonstrates that these programs can reach a variety of audiences, and be 
used for a variety of reasons in the process of competitive world building. Arthur Berger summarizes humour‟s 
ambiguity as both world builder and destroyer when he writes “laughter is a two-edged sword. It can be used by 
those in power, or those who accept their view of things, to force acquiescence. But it also can be used by those 
out of power to resist domination” (1993, 134; see also pages 1-11). 
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interaction to explain how our everyday interactions bind us into specific power relations in society 
(1975, 90-152; see also Durkheim 1995, Goffman 1959). Collins favours the face-to-face interaction 
central to Goffman‟s studies and the interactionist paradigm as a foundation for macrosociological 
theorizing. Moving from microsociological to macrosociological perspectives, Collins sees the 
influence of larger institutional forces derived from behavioural patterns born in unequal relationships 
in people‟s small, everyday interactions. He reveals an important element in understanding symbols 
and their social exploitation; namely, the power to create, manipulate, use, and interpret symbols is 
unequally distributed among different social parties. Powerful social institutions and actors, including 
government, mass media, cultural and economic elites, and others who have the ability to create and 
control the distribution and interpretation of socially significant symbols have an advantage in 
interpreting reality for their own benefit and making their definitions of reality seem “normal” (1975, 
103-111).  
In the sociology of knowledge, conflict theory finds its best articulation in Karl Mannheim‟s 
classic Ideology & Utopia (1936). Mannheim‟s important contribution to this argument is his 
dualistic conception of political thinking‟s extremes (ideology and utopia) which he uses to 
summarize the differences in political knowledge worlds. Ideology implicitly contains “the insight 
that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of 
society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it” (40). Conversely, “utopian thinking 
reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are 
intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of 
society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it . . . Their 
thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a direction for action” (40; 
emphasis in original). These two positions represent the extreme ends of a competitive political 
spectrum where political conflict “is from the very beginning a rationalized form of struggle for social 
predominance” (38).  
Mannheim‟s analysis works with The Simpsons‟ depiction of religion. Because knowledge 
workers pursue and use knowledge for the benefit of those with similar perspectives, in a pluralistic 
society knowledge is inherently contentious. It is not just a way of coming to know “the truth,” but it 
is also a weapon with which to discredit opponents (Cowan 2003a). For example, The Simpsons 
frequently attacks Christianity because Christians fail to meet their tradition‟s presumed moral 
standards. Homer once summarized Christianity as “the one [religion] with all the well-meaning rules 
that never work out in real life” (“Homerpalooza”). This demonstrates how The Simpsons 
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incorporates opposing viewpoints into its humour as a means of criticizing them. While Christians 
may advance ethical principles based on doctrine and tradition, The Simpsons emphasizes the 
disjunction between ideal type and lived reality. It relies on a cultural familiarity with the basics of 
Christian belief and exposes the basics‟ faults for comedic advantage. 
Religious groups can retaliate, provided they have sufficient means. The episode “Sunday, 
Cruddy Sunday” contains a parody of outrageous Super Bowl commercials. In The Simpsons‟ ad, a 
man pulls his car into a desert gas station where three scantily clad women come out and “service” his 
car to an instrumental reminiscent of ZZ Top‟s “Legs.” At the end, one of the women leans over the 
car‟s hood and a cross dangles in front of her cleavage. A voiceover says “The Catholic Church: 
We‟ve made a few changes.” This raised the ire of The Catholic League, a group dedicated to 
attacking anti-Catholicism (Catholic League 2009; 1999b). Already upset at a joke earlier that season 
in which Bart asks Marge “Mom, can we go Catholic so we can get communion wafers and booze?,” 
to which she responds “No, no one‟s going Catholic. Three children is enough thank you.” (“Lisa 
Gets an A”), the League used its newsmagazine Catalyst and other media outlets to pressure FOX 
into censoring the episode. In response to Bart‟s request to convert for communion wafers and booze, 
FOX spokesperson Thomas Chavez responded that Marge‟s statement was simply a statement about 
why she did not wish to join the Catholic Church and “Bart sees the wafer merely as food and wine as 
a forbidden drink. . . . it is not atypical that a child would pose a question such as this unknowingly” 
(quoted in Catholic League 1999a). However, through a successful Catholic League email campaign, 
FOX eventually changed “Sunday, Cruddy Sunday” so that the syndicated voiceover now says “The 
church,” after executive producer Mike Scully refused to change Catholic to another religion. Scully‟s 
point was that that would be insulting another religious group just so that FOX could appease 
Catholics; for the Catholic League, this was a way of getting a perceived Hollywood double standard 
to work in their favour (1999c; Pinsky 2007, 130-135).  
This demonstrates how Catholicism‟s meanings are contested and that pressuring the FOX 
network can have them change their content to suit a particular interpretation of Catholic tradition. 
Scully‟s fury is also understandable, because The Simpsons‟ writers thought they were just making a 
joke about Super Bowl commercials. “The Catholic Church: We‟ve made a few changes” was the line 
that got the best laughs during the production process and, therefore, became the punch-line. The 
Simpsons‟ creative staff thought the Catholic League overreacted (“Sunday Cruddy Sunday” DVD 
Commentary). For the Catholic League, on the other hand, the joke exemplifies a persistent bias 
against Catholicism in American mass media that they felt it necessary to attack. However, satirists 
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also do not miss an opportunity to attack their targets. In “Sunday, Cruddy Sunday‟s” DVD 
commentary, after making fun of the Catholic League‟s letter writing campaign as merely a series of 
form letters (implying that these Catholics were not fans and did not understand the show), Matt 
Selman jokes that now the Catholic Church is trying to get priests to watch the video of the sexy 
ladies—a cruel joke based on the Church‟s recent pedophilia scandals.
60
 However, the fact that one 
particular voice within Catholicism was able to alter The Simpsons‟ content through a letter writing 
campaign speaks to satire‟s contentious nature and the fact that the interpretation of jokes can lead us 
into sensitive and contested arenas. 
To summarize the theoretical argument thus far, Berger‟s sociology of knowledge implies 
conflicting definitions of reality‟s existence. Collins adds the concept that institutional power is 
maintained in patterns of deference and continually exchanging signs and symbols in everyday 
interaction reifies and affirms the institutional orders and power differentials in society. In other 
words, we know how to behave through continuous performances of particular rituals which reaffirm 
shared significant symbols‟ meanings. When we abstract these actions to generalized behavioural 
patterns we have institutions in Berger and Luckmann‟s sense. Mannheim‟s theoretical insights direct 
us both to access social institutions‟ history and also to see that the ideas people share can be used for 
opposite-purposes. To put this in more concrete terms, a religious tradition such as Catholicism is 
interpreted by different people for different purposes. While the “data” of Catholicism is based on 
what practising Catholics do and what they claim to believe, each group interprets those claims and 
actions through their particular plausibility structure and assess Catholicism accordingly. When The 
Simpsons tells jokes about Catholicism, it employs culturally intertexual knowledge about the 
tradition and frames it according to a symbolic system that shapes an interpretation of the religion.  
This theoretical framework also rejects Berger‟s moralistic interpretation of humour in 
Redeeming Laughter. While humour—especially satire—inverts social norms and reveals different 
ways of living, that interpretation‟s moral direction needs contextual evaluation. Berger‟s analysis 
lacks this contextualization. Although he is aware of humour‟s critical capabilities, in emphasizing a 
finite province of meaning‟s universality Berger departs from an empirically testable theory of 
humour. Throughout his oeuvre, Berger theorizes humour as something that is universal not only in 
the sense that every society experiences humour, but that those experiences have similar content. By 
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framing his analysis in theological terms he takes us away from looking at what actual humorous 
instances signify. As anthropologist Mary Douglas writes, “all jokes are expressive of the social 
situations in which they occur” (1975, 98). Therefore, in a study of The Simpsons and its religious 
comedy, we have to identify the social situations that the program represents, the institutionalized 
bodies of knowledge it draws upon, and the critical position it takes on different social issues. 
Whether or not it directs us towards a universal truth is something unavailable to the sociologist. 
3.2 Catholicism in The Simpsons: A Preliminary Theoretical Application 
We can apply Berger and Luckmann‟s theories to interpret Catholicism in The Simpsons 
when we examine everyday life, see it structured by commonsense knowledge, and then further distill 
it into useful stocks of recipe knowledge. This allows cultural intertextuality to work. Viewers cannot 
be expected to have an intimate knowledge of Catholic doctrine, popular Catholicism—which is too 
broad for anybody to know comprehensively—or even Catholicism‟s basics. Instead, the program 
uses popular sentiments and concepts regarding Catholics, and Catholic symbols that are widely 
available. If the quantity of jokes is any indication, the Pope, as the Church‟s leader and most visible 
spokesperson, is a good example of a symbol which is treated as a relevant cultural reference point. 
Because The Simpsons communicates symbolically through words and images, it references 
institutions such as the papacy and utilizes common assumptions about the person who fulfils that 
role to generate its satirical perspective.  
In “The Mansion Family,” billionaire capitalist Charles Montgomery Burns visits Rochester, 
Minnesota‟s famed Mayo Clinic. While he and his assistant Waylon Smithers wait for his 
appointment, a man wearing white with a gold sash and a cross exits the doctor‟s office, receiving the 
advice, “It‟s nothing serious, just lay off the chili and you should be fine.” Fidel Castro, who is also 
waiting, starts chuckling and the man says, “Don‟t you laugh, Fidel, I‟ve been in the car with you,” 
while waving his hand in front of his nose. While this is a fairly tame joke, it intertextually identifies 
the man as the Pope. Referencing Pope John Paul II‟s trip to Cuba in January 1998 and the fact that 
the Pope and Cuban President Fidel Castro spent much time together during the five-day excursion, 
this joke depends upon people making these connections and drawing on these common stocks of 
knowledge. It also relies on knowledge about John Paul II‟s failing health, which was the topic of 
much speculation when this episode aired in January 2000 (he died in 2005). This joke devalues the 
papacy‟s sacredness because it makes the Pope out to be human. In a sense, The Simpsons is saying 
“everybody farts.” The papacy‟s sacredness is downplayed, casting the Pope as just another man.  
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Secondly, in “The City of New York vs. Homer Simpson,” bartender Moe Szyslak has his 
regulars select a designated driver “the same way they pick the Pope.” Each patron reaches into a jar 
of pickled eggs and whoever picks the black one has to stay sober. Choosing a new Pope can appear a 
bit mysterious. It is a secretive event in which the College of Cardinals is locked in the Sistine Chapel 
until a Pope is elected and a plume of white smoke rises from the chapel‟s chimney. That said, the 
College deliberates their choice, rather than engaging in random selection as The Simpsons insinuates. 
However, the event‟s secrecy and the fact that it is relegated to the Catholic hierarchy‟s upper 
echelons can make the whole process appear arcane and, therefore, it is easier to ascribe to random 
selection than to other ways of determining group leadership like democratic voting.  
Finally, in “All‟s Fair in Oven War,” Marge claims that a pizza she‟s sabotaging in a baking 
contest will be so bad “even the Pope couldn‟t forgive this pizza, and he‟s letting a lot of things slide 
these days.” This joke references the fact that John Paul II was politically controversial inside and 
outside the Church. Inside, he was seen as a political liberal who was doctrinally conservative. 
Supporting the global spread of democracy, peace, and social justice, he also refused to admit women 
into the priesthood and upheld the Church‟s doctrine forbidding contraception (see Allen 2003a, 
2003b). Conservative critics accused him of weakening Catholic positions on interfaith issues because 
of his willingness to engage in interfaith dialogue with Jews and Muslims. Also, while John Paul II 
stood by the controversial encyclical Humanae Vitae and its provisions against birth control which 
angered liberals, his conservative critics argued that he did not do enough to remove the liberal voices 
in American Catholicism that explicitly challenged those teachings and have worked hard to 
modernize the American Church (Cuneo 1997).  
While Pinsky thinks Marge is referring in this episode to the priestly sex scandals (2007, 130; 
see also P. Jenkins 2003, 133-156), there are numerous issues people could reference when 
interpreting her statement. This joke‟s significance lies in the fact that for it to be funny you have to 
think the Pope has become lax on certain issues, or that he had softened on issues Marge would 
support. This leads to the concept of ignorant familiarity.
61
 That is, we often gather incomplete 
information about others that we place in our personal stocks of knowledge as a way of rationalizing 
our interactions with them. In The Simpsons‟ case, the jokes assume the Catholic Church is an 
inherently conservative institution. We are familiar with a variety of religions, but we are also 
hopelessly ignorant of them. Knowledge that is unimportant in our everyday lives becomes little more 
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than trivia upon which we can construct ideal types when the need arises. This knowledge is 
necessarily incomplete and is often incorrect. Our ignorance also requires effort to overcome—effort 
which most people do not invest. In this case, ignorance of the papacy‟s inner workings facilitates 
jokes about how the Pope is selected, while general familiarity with controversies surrounding the last 
Pope allowed for culturally intertextual jokes drawing on his health and doctrinal standards. However, 
the jokes are framed on the assumption that the audience shares the joke‟s general sentiment, but do 
not need to know all the controversial details to participate in the worldview it promotes. 
One episode dedicated to Catholicism demonstrates how The Simpsons utilizes ignorant 
familiarity to criticize some of Catholicism‟s more controversial elements. “The Father, The Son, and 
The Holy Guest Star” draws upon Catholic stereotypes of Irish leadership, strict nuns, ethnic 
debauchery, arcane rules, and unequal treatment of women. It also portrays Catholicism through the 
lens of pre-Vatican II lived religion, which does not reflect the reality of contemporary Catholicism in 
the United States. As biblical scholar and former priest John Dominic Crossan puts it, “The level and 
accuracy of satire in the episode would have been very appropriate against classic movie targets like 
Going My Way and The Bells of St. Mary‟s in the 1940s. But as contemporary Roman Catholic and/or 
Protestant satire, I found it too shallow” (quoted in Pinsky 2007, 145). Yet, drawing upon familiar 
stereotypes and not engaging more arcane controversies makes perfect sense when appealing to a 
wide audience. Portraying the church as antiquated and opposed to liberal values is a useful way of 
denigrating the institution (P. Jenkins 2003). This episode‟s portrayal of Catholicism is one that relies 
on these intertextual keys that have become a part of the American religious narrative. 
The episode‟s plot is fairly straightforward. After Bart is expelled from Springfield 
Elementary school, he gets sent to Saint Jerome‟s Catholic School. There the priest, Fr. Sean, gives 
Bart gory comic books about the saints, convincing him to convert. Homer then challenges the priest, 
but once he realizes that the sacrament of confession will absolve his sins he decides to convert as 
well. This upsets Marge and she refuses to join the Church. However, once she starts attending the 
Protestant First Church of Springfield (FCOS) by herself, Rev. Lovejoy and Ned convince her they 
need to rescue Bart from the Catholics, arguing that Catholic Heaven is different from Protestant 
Heaven. They take him from first communion class to a Protestant youth festival where Homer and 
Fr. Sean come barging in to re-rescue the boy. Before a fight can break out, Bart stops the 
commotion, saying, “It‟s all Christianity, people! The little, stupid differences are nothing compared 
to the big, stupid similarities!”—which leads to a peaceful resolution. 
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I consider three Catholic elements in this episode. First, Fr. Sean is characterized as Irish, a 
fact emphasized by having Irish actor Liam Neeson voice him. Fr. Sean is also assisted by Sister 
Thomasina, a nun of indeterminate age who speaks with a thick Irish accent, hits Bart with a 
yardstick, and, as punishment, makes him hold out his arms “like our Lord on the cross” and balance 
dictionaries.
62
 Drawing on a history of Irish Catholicism and pre-Vatican II stereotypes of clergy, The 
Simpsons assumes that viewers are familiar with this ethnic variant of American Catholicism. It is 
also this variation which was promoted in classic American Catholic films. This is not surprising 
considering the history of Irish Catholic leadership in America, even though there are many different 
ethnic groups in the American Catholic Church. Yet, to watch The Simpsons one would not know that 
other ethnic groups exist in church leadership (see, e.g., Ahlstrom 2004, 527-568, 998, 1107-1109; 
Dolan 1985; Gillis 1999; on Irish leadership in American Catholicism see, e.g., Dolan 1985; Finke 
and Stark 2005, 143-145; McCaffery 1992; Morris 1997). One could also be forgiven for assuming 
that Catholic nuns in habits were still dominating parochial school classrooms. However, Catholic 
religious membership has been in decline ever since Vatican II and parochial schools are closing 
because they can no longer rely upon the cheap labour religious orders formerly provided. This 
episode presents a remnant, a mythologized vision of pre-Vatican II Catholicism when ecclesiastical 
hierarchy was revered. Today‟s American Catholics show much greater independence from church 
doctrine such as official bans against divorce and contraception. Indeed, Catholics are divorcing and 
remarrying (after acquiring annulments on their previous marriages), and in many cases using birth 
control.  
When referencing pre-Vatican II Catholicism with its Irish leadership and respect for 
ecclesiastical authority, The Simpsons does not treat it idyllically. Instead, the nun‟s brutality and the 
school‟s punishments (beating with yardsticks, holding up dictionaries) portrays Catholicism 
according to lapsed Catholic, and influential writer-producer, George Meyer‟s memories of Catholic 
school: 
People talk about how horrible it is to be brought up 
Catholic, and it‟s all true. The main thing was that there was no sense 
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 This same voice and caricature is used in The Simpsons‟ DaVinci Code (D. Brown 2003) parody 
“Gone Maggie Gone,” in which an entire convent of similar nuns fosters Maggie in order to fulfil a prophecy 
about finding a gem child and bringing peace to the world. Nuns in the program have been depicted as strict and 
Irish, the only exceptions being a Latina nun in “Blame it on Lisa,” in which the family goes to Brazil; and 
French nuns in “Bart‟s Friend Falls in Love,” in which Bart‟s best friend‟s girlfriend is sent to St. Sebastien‟s 




of proportion. I would chew a piece of gum at school, and the nun 
would say, „Jesus is very angry with you about that,‟ and on the wall 
behind her would be a dying, bleeding guy on a cross. That‟s a 
horrifying image to throw at a little kid. You really could almost 
think that your talking in line, say, was on a par with killing Jesus. 
You just weren‟t sure, and there was never a moderating voice. 
(quoted in D. Owen 2000) 
Meyer‟s experiences have been instrumental in shaping The Simpsons‟ humour. By drawing on his 
lived experience, and projecting that towards an audience that contains a variety of Catholics and 
non-Catholics through ideal types, Meyer and other writers are able to shape the program‟s 
impression of Catholicism to one that criticizes it as an archaic institution that has little sense of 
proportion. Even the questions in math class are morbid as they focus on how many years people will 
have to spend in hell for swearing. As Homer says to Bart in this episode regarding parochial school 
“you don‟t just get bad grades, you go to Hell.”
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Second, while the Irish are depicted as Church leaders, two significant montages in this 
episode focus on other ethno-Catholic stereotypes. The first depicts Bart and Homer‟s consideration 
of conversion, and shows them doing “Catholic” activities such as lighting candles before an image of 
a saint, and going to a seafood restaurant on Fridays. In the other we see Catholic heaven from 
Marge‟s vantage point in Protestant heaven. The Irish are fighting and dancing, the Latinos are 
singing, drinking, and dancing, and the Italians are drinking and kissing at a banquet table. These 
ethnic stereotypes are contrasted with the WASP heaven where yuppies play croquet and badminton. 
In Catholic heaven, Homer and Bart enjoy themselves by breaking open a piñata and then Irish 
dancing with the other Catholics. Drawing on negative stereotypes of ethnic groups that have been 
marginalized, in part because of their religion, The Simpsons associates those activities with 
Catholicism. While it is true that American Catholicism is composed of densely interwoven ethno-
religious cultures, ignorant familiarity requires reduction to stereotypes for quick humour. It is easier 
to portray the Irish as drunken brawlers and Latinos as piñata-whackers than to depict them as varied 
populations that have rich religious and ethnic traditions beyond those that can be conveyed in a 
montage. The montages‟ problem and power lie in the fact that they can quickly reference a variety of 
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pulls a prank, principal Seymour Skinner stands before an auditorium filled with students and says “When I 
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a child in a shirt, tie, and shorts who is tied to a cross. This continues the theme of disproportionate strictness 
and cruelty in parochial schools. 
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behaviours which appear negative (drunken brawling) or exotic (lighting prayer candles). This 
emphasizes Catholicism‟s differences from the American religion normally depicted in The Simpsons, 
which is a combination of American individualism and Protestantism. Making Catholicism appear 
incongruous requires explanation, and The Simpsons draws upon negative stereotypes to resolve the 
incongruity, casting the Church in a less than desirable light for cultural behaviours essentialized as 
“Catholic.” 
Third, there is the issue of birth control and women‟s rights in the Catholic Church. When 
Homer comes home after meeting with Fr. Sean, Marge refuses to join the Church because there is no 
way she is having a dozen children. Homer laughs and says that nobody is asking for twelve kids, just 
“nine, ten tops,” and hands her a pamphlet entitled “Plop ‟Til You Drop” which depicts a priest 
rubbing his hands while looking at a man and a pregnant woman. This plays on common assumptions 
about Catholics and birth control. Humanae Vitae is one of the most significant and controversial 
documents in American Catholic history. Historian R. Scott Appleby notes that “it was the first time 
in the history of the modern church that a papal teaching had been openly defied in such a widespread 
fashion” (quoted in Burke 2008; see also Tentler 2004). Today, sixty-one percent of Catholics believe 
individuals have the final say on contraception and seventy-five percent think you can be a good 
Catholic and deny the teachings (Burke 2008; see also Gillis 1999, 106-108). In other words, while 
the Catholic Church‟s highest levels uphold the controversial encyclical, only a significant minority 
of laypeople adhere to it.  
Attacking the Catholic Church on this teaching is a way of assaulting an institution and 
discriminating against Catholics who actually agree with The Simpsons‟ implied position. Historian 
and sociologist Philip Jenkins suggests that anti-Catholic rhetoric attacks the Church‟s stance on birth 
control as a way of promoting an agenda derived from contemporary feminist arguments. That is, a 
significant number of Americans (including Catholics) think the church‟s teachings on women, their 
bodies, and their reproductive rights are wrong (2003, 70-72). The Simpsons appears to support this 
agenda by having Bart tell Marge, “this is the Catholic Church, chicks don‟t have any authority here” 
when she comes to take him from first communion class. Projecting the assumption that this prejudice 
is essentialized in Catholic doctrines ignores the millions of Catholics who continue to find meaning 
in the Church‟s doctrines and structures and marks them as ridiculous for adhering to them even 
while they oppose Humanae Vitae‟s teachings. 
Jenkins‟ research raises a critical question about The Simpsons‟ portrayal of Catholicism: Is it 
anti-Catholic? Contemporary anti-Catholic sentiment is difficult to pinpoint. After all, many people 
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believe they are not attacking other people but an institution. Yet, for committed Catholics this 
institution is symbolic of their faith (5-6). Jenkins contends that  
the institution of the Church is fundamental to the Catholic 
religion, and it is disingenuous to pretend otherwise. . . . The Pope 
may be the institutional head of a gigantic political and corporate 
entity, but for hundreds of millions of people, he is also a living 
symbol of their faith. Moreover, if the Catholic Church as an 
institution is so wicked, so homicidal, what does that say about the 
people who believe deeply in it, for whom it provides the vital 
organizing principle of their lives, the basis of their social identity? 
Anti-Church sentiment leads naturally to contempt for practicing or 
believing Catholics, whose faith must reflect emotional weakness, 
internal repression, or unnatural subservience to authority. (6) 
But does anti-Church sentiment lead to contempt for practicing Catholics? Furthermore, is the 
episode even anti-Church? At what point does criticism of an institution become hatred rather than 
satirical commentary? Is there even a difference? This episode is not a clear denunciation of 
Catholicism, showing some positive elements (Homer notes that the church has time tested values and 
is intrigued enough to join) along with the negative ones. If it is not fair in all its portrayals, it at least 
projects an understanding that Catholicism provides a compelling worldview for its adherents. 
In The Simpsons‟ writers‟ eyes, they are equal opportunity lampoonists and this is frequently 
repeated in interviews and popular commentary as an explanation and legitimation for their attacks on 
a variety of social institutions. They are certainly aware that some people will take offense at their 
jokes, as their experience with Donahue and the Catholic League demonstrates, but that does not 
mean that they have a hateful agenda. Indeed, one of the problems with identifying discrimination in 
satire is the fact that if humour is employed with the intention of correcting peoples‟ behaviour we are 
dealing with conflicting interpretations of reality (see also Bergson 1956, 147). Orthodox Catholics 
see no problems with their adherence to Church doctrines, or if they do they still respect and revere 
the unseen order the Church transmits through its sacred symbols and rituals. Outsiders and former 
Catholics who cannot abide the Church‟s dogmas see themselves attacking a corrupt institution. It is 
where benevolence and discrimination mix that we find ourselves in the delicate world of intergroup 
critique. The Simpsons is not offering unique critiques of Catholicism. Criticisms of women‟s rights 
in the Church and papal authority are nothing new, but that does not mean that the critiques do not 
hurt people who feel their religion is being attacked from the outside. Bearing the equal opportunity 




At the same time, this episode echoes the assumption that Catholics are bound by their 
institutional teachings. Catholicism is a separate world from the normally Protestant Springfield, and 
“The Father, the Son, and the Holy Guest Star” does not deal with the difficulties of reconciling 
Catholic teachings and the modern world in characters‟ lives. As such, the jokes in this episode and 
others which reference Catholicism draw upon the intended audience‟s superficial knowledge about 
Catholicism such as the sacrament of confession (which Homer thinks makes God absolve his sins), 
clerical and religious authority, and the fact that ethnic stereotypes are frequently Catholic. 
Ultimately, the institution is attacked for its archaic qualities and doctrinal strictness, with Homer 
claiming Catholics have “more crazy rules than Blockbuster Video.” When we look at jokes from 
other episodes, we see that this pattern holds.  
Furthermore, unlike recurring secondary characters, Fr. Sean and Sister Thomasina are guest 
characters who lack multidimensional personalities developed over time. One dominant pattern is that 
when a religion is marginalized in The Simpsons it lacks a recurring character to voice its concerns 
and ethical struggles, to speak on its behalf. Instead, these religions exist as ideal types that draw 
upon the religious tradition‟s most controversial elements to generate humour based in ideological 
differences. The Simpsons assumes that people are not familiar with the Church‟s internal doctrinal 
debates, nor with the fact that part of being a contemporary Catholic often involves ongoing 
discussions about which doctrines to follow and which to ignore. Indeed, as Catholic priest, 
sociologist, and novelist Andrew Greeley demonstrates, the Catholic perspective is strong and keeps 
potential dissenters within the Catholic world despite their differences with the hierarchy and certain 
doctrines. They remain Catholic because they like being Catholic and find the unseen order (what 
Greeley calls the “Catholic imagination”) spiritually fulfilling (1990). The Simpsons ignores this and 
resorts to ethnic stereotypes and prejudices about institutional influence for humorous purposes, 
meeting Jenkins‟ criteria for anti-Catholic rhetoric and portrayals even if they appear mild and did not 
directly attack the Church on issues such as the “pedophile priest” scandals.
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3.3 Where Do We Go From Here? 
This chapter built upon the concepts of lived religion and cultural intertextuality introduced in 
the previous chapter and incorporated them into a theoretical framework based in Peter Berger‟s 
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ever.” Then he, Homer and Lisa look around nervously with an awkward silence. This can be interpreted as 




sociologies of knowledge and religion. It then integrated major theories of humour, based in the way 
it utilizes institutionalized knowledge circulating throughout society to activate differences between 
different “sacred umbrellas.” This theoretical framework was then qualitatively applied to 
Catholicism‟s depiction in The Simpsons to illustrate how it employs ideal types within a satirical 
framework for political purposes using the concept of ignorant familiarity. The Simpsons works from 
a position of anti-Catholic prejudice, viewing the institutional Catholic Church as essentially corrupt 
and ridiculous. This ridicule reveals what The Simpsons portray as positive religious behaviour. The 
Simpsons clearly sees Catholicism as outside the appropriate boundaries of religious practice. 
From this trial application we move to a discussion of what The Simpsons deems positive in 
American religion. “Spirituality,” channelled through the New Age, Native American religions, and 
Buddhism, is tempered by scientific rationalism to create the foundations of The Simpsons‟ unseen 




Chapter 4—Spirituality and Science: Acceptable Religion in The 
Simpsons 
Every satirist attacks from an underlying, foundational ideology. This position gives them 
their moral authority and allows their audience a common ground from which both to identify with 
the satirist and to assess others, differentiating ideological insiders from outsiders. While this 
discussion of The Simpsons‟ satirical criticism of American religion starts with an assessment of 
Catholicism—found to be “unacceptable” in terms of the program‟s unseen order—what does The 
Simpsons present as “acceptable” religious practice in the United States? In this chapter, we will 
investigate the concept of “spirituality” in American religion, the appropriation of Buddhism and 
Native American religions, and scientific rationality‟s importance in shaping an implied centre from 
which to criticize other religions. Of concern here is what these groups have in common that make 
them the “centre” of The Simpsons‟ perspective on religion. 
4.1 “Spirituality” in The Simpsons 
In the literature regarding religion in The Simpsons, no episode is more discussed than 
“Homer the Heretic.” In this episode Homer skips church on a cold, snowy morning. While his family 
attends church and freezes miserably because the heater is broken, Homer stays at home where he 
dances in his underwear (parodying Tom Cruise in Risky Business), watches football, and eats a 
waffle wrapped around a stick of butter and served on a toothpick. After such a great morning he 
declares that he owes it all to missing church and vows never to go again. Marge is upset, but Homer 
is adamant. Later, when God visits him in a dream and accuses Homer of forsaking his church, 
Homer defends himself, saying, “I‟m not a bad guy. I work hard and I love my kids. So why should I 
spend half my Sunday hearing about how I‟m going to hell?” God agrees that Homer has a point and 
allows Homer to worship him in his own way before disappearing to appear in a tortilla in Mexico. 
After this encounter Homer is convinced he has made the right choice. He walks around his back yard 
dressed like St. Francis of Assisi; he creates fake holidays to get out of work; he is chased by the 
Flanders clan, who try to bring him back to the church by singing the Sunday school song, “The Lord 
Said to Noah;” he refuses to give money to local entertainer Krusty the Clown for the Brotherhood of 
Jewish Clowns; and he insults Apu by offering his murti of Ganesha a peanut. Falling asleep the next 
Sunday morning, he sets his house on fire, only to have Ned and the Springfield Volunteer Fire 
Department, featuring Krusty and Apu, rescue him. Homer‟s explanation for the fire is simple: “The 
 
 66 
Lord is vengeful.” Rev. Lovejoy disagrees, saying that God “was working in the hearts of your 
friends and neighbours when they went to your aid, be they Christian, Jew, or miscellaneous 
[Hindu].” Lovejoy convinces Homer to return to the church and Homer is there the next week, front 
row centre—asleep and snoring loudly. 
 Pinsky argues that this episode is built around the question of how God wants to be 
worshipped (2007, 20), and intrafamily struggles about how to raise children when parents are 
unequally committed (23). In the small group study guide he co-authored with Parvin, this episode is 
used to argue for the importance of having a relationship with God and belonging to a faith 
community (2002, 57-62). Journalist Steven Keslowitz suggests the episode demonstrates that 
morality can be achieved apart from religion, but that religion is useful for binding communities 
together (2006, 207-211). Lynch treats it as a discourse on American civil religion, arguing that it 
promotes different religions working together for the common good (2005, 154-160).
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 Romanowski 
uses Homer‟s decision to stay home to capture American religious individualism (2007, 174-175), 
while Heit employs this episode to illustrate how Americans are leaving Christianity for 
individualized spirituality, a position he deems perilous (2008, 14-15, 104-106). Turner, on the other 
hand, thinks this episode is an attempt to strike a balance between fundamentalist and faithless 
extremes and, in contrast to the Flanderses, in the Simpson household “faith is flexible, responsive, 
debatable, alive” (2004, 267; emphasis in original). Henry writes that the episode is an extended 
critique of fundamentalist, institutionalized religion (2008, 250-255). For Dalton and his associates 
this episode coalesces the program‟s many religious themes: “Against the backdrop of declining 
religious authority, increasing personal choice, and „flattening‟ of doctrines into more palatable 
themes, television presents revamped morality plays such as this in which personal piety, religious 




“Homer the Heretic” is an early and classic example of how The Simpsons challenges the 
commonly held assumption that religion is a moral necessity and that people cannot be fulfilled 
without it—a contentious issue in today‟s United States. The phrase “I‟m not religious, I‟m spiritual” 
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example of his larger argument that churches are corrupt and inessential. 
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captures the tensions between those who adhere to traditional doctrines and others who draw upon 
various religious and esoteric traditions when crafting their spiritual identities (cf. C. Smith 2005). 
Part of the problem in this debate is determining what constitutes “spirituality.” While many 
people consider themselves both spiritual and religious (see, e.g., Marler and Hadaway 2002, Roof 
1999, Wuthnow 1998) the two terms are not necessarily synonymous or even complementary. 
Definitions of spirituality are heavily dependent upon the religious tradition or social group one is 
studying. For example, historian of American religion Catherine Albanese writes that “spirituality in 
the metaphysical movement, especially in its present-day New Age manifestation, means working 
with the energies of the moment, „going with the flow,‟ and seeking, as earlier metaphysicians, to 
combine all of the cultural currents that act as catalysts in our time” (1999, 321; cf. S. Rose 1998, 13). 
From a survey that religion scholar Stuart Rose distributed to religious leaders in the United 
Kingdom, he identified three traits commonly associated with spirituality: it has to have a significant 
experiential element to it—an experience of something beyond oneself; there has to be continuous 
ethical practice; and it is altruistic (2001, 204). Sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow (1998) 
identifies two types of spirituality. The spirituality of dwelling “emphasizes habitation: God occupies 
a definite place in the universe and creates a sacred space in which humans too can dwell; to inhabit 
sacred space is to know its territory and to feel secure” (3-4). This is spirituality that develops within 
a religious tradition. The lived religion of Orsi‟s Italian Catholics is a good example of the spirituality 
of dwelling. Conversely, the spirituality of seeking “emphasizes negotiation: individuals search for 
sacred moments that reinforce their conviction that the divine exists, but these moments are fleeting; 
rather than knowing the territory, people explore new spiritual vistas, and they may have to negotiate 
among complex and confusing meanings of spirituality” (4). It captures the common assumptions 
associated with the phrase “I am spiritual,” which, in contemporary America, categorically separates 
religion and spirituality. Whether one embraces or rejects this distinction, it is key to understanding 
“spirituality” in popular culture.
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 In common parlance “spirituality” now often means something 
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 For further theories which distinguish between religion and spirituality, viewing spirituality as 
something individualistic and “religion” as a social phenomenon which is unnecessary for spirituality‟s practice, 
see, Belzen (2005), Hanegraaff (1999), Hyman and Handal (2006), Shimazono (1999); for those that see them 
as interrelated, see, S. Rose (2001), Schneiders (2003), Zwissler (2007). Also, note Stark, Hamberg, and 
Miller‟s (2005) point that people draw upon many sources when crafting their religiousness/ spirituality and 
stringent distinctions between the two categories which favour institutionalized interpretations can harm 
analyses of people‟s behaviour. Zinnbauer et. al (1997) demonstrate that the way people use the two terms is not 
hard and fast, with some separating the two and others seeing them as integrated (see also Roof 1999). On the 
socialization processes involved in learning how to be “spiritual” see, Aupers and Houtman (2006), and 
Houtman and Aupers (2007). 
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desirable, while religion is considered negative. At the centre of this distinction is a dispute between 
the individual and religious organizations (Roof 1999, 46-76; Roof et al. 1999, 145). While this 
dispute does not capture the full range of spiritual practices, it is instrumental in shaping the way 
people think about spiritual practice. In The Simpsons‟ case it is important not to see the separation of 
religion and spirituality as a “zero sum proposition” (Marler and Hadaway 2002), in which these two 
facets of life are always separate and never co-exist. Instead, in the program spirituality and religion 
are often intertwined, allowing The Simpsons‟ creative staff to work their criticism in more nuanced 
ways.  
However, we live in a world where people can be spiritual without being religious. Central to 
this development is the idea that spirituality is something people craft for themselves by drawing from 
the world‟s religious traditions. According to sociologist of religion Wade Clark Roof they are 
bricoleurs, they “cobble together a religious world from available images, symbols, moral codes, and 
doctrines, thereby exercising considerable agency in defining and shaping what is considered to be 
religiously meaningful” (1999, 75; see also Besecke 2001; P. Jenkins 2004, 198). Personal spirituality 
can draw from any number of sources. For example, in Habits of the Heart sociologist Robert Bellah 
and his associates provide the classic example of Sheilaism, named after interviewee Sheila Larson‟s 
private faith, which was crafted from various external sources and her personal experiences and 
constituted belief in God without attending church (2008, 221, 235). Yet, most conceptions of 
spirituality share three common characteristics. First, spirituality tends to be immanentist. That is, it 
finds its meaning and authority within the individual and not in institutional doctrines and dogmas. 
Second, these conceptions often feature a “connection” between a supernatural force or power and the 
individual, a perspective that is frequently termed “metaphysical.” “Supernatural force” can mean a 
conception of God matching a religious tradition‟s teachings, or it can be a more ambiguous concept 
such as a “force of nature.” The most important element of this conception is that there appears to be 
contact beyond oneself with a greater force that imparts some special teaching and insight. Third, the 
teachings are often seen to apply to the this-worldly concerns of everyday life (Aupers and Houtman 
2006; Bellah et al. 2008, 219-245; Fuller 2001, 75-77; Heelas 1996, 2008; Heelas and Woodhead 
2005; Hyman and Handal 2006, 278; Hanegraaff 1996, 1999; Roof 1999, 81-86; S. Rose 1998, 13; 
2001, 204; Stark et al. 2005; Sutcliffe 2003a, 2003b; Wuthnow 1998; Zinnbauer et al. 1997).
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Although spirituality tends to be concerned with everyday life, whether or not its practitioners, 
especially those in highly eclectic forms of spiritual practice that are frequently categorized as “New Age,” are 
effective at engaging people in social life is debated. Bruce (1998, 2002) argues that New Age spirituality is too 
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One place where spirituality has developed apart from traditional religious institutions is in 
the “New Age” movement, which is is difficult to characterize. Sociologist Paul Heelas argues that “It 
has come to be used to designate those who maintain that inner spirituality—embedded within the self 
and the natural order as a whole—serves as the key to moving from all that is wrong with life to all 
that is right” (1996, 16; emphasis in original). Religious studies scholar Steven Sutcliffe (2003a) 
argues that the term is used too broadly as a catch-all concept for people‟s opposition to “organized 
religion.” This prevents deeper analysis because there is no way of identifying concrete boundaries 
for what constitutes New Age. His own research (2003b) demonstrates that while there is a well 
developed “seeker culture” that outsiders categorize as “New Age,” his interviews with Reiki healers, 
firewalkers, and other practitioners of the broad range of “spiritual” activities in today‟s spiritual 
marketplace reveal that “New Age” is not a term that they use. However, that does not mean it is not 
a useful ideal type in the popular imagination, it is just so broad that anything that does not fit into an 
institutionalized religious tradition gets categorized under New Age. Albanese demonstrates this 
categorical utility in her work on nature religion, locating many of the concerns of healing, eco-
spirituality, and Native American shamanic insight that circulate in the wider modern spirituality 
movement as part of an ongoing tradition of American existential engagement with nature and its 
revelatory role in the country‟s debates about the unseen order (1990). Without the general movement 
known as New Age in the popular imagination, the significant patterns of behaviour among spiritual 
practitioners would be much more difficult to describe. Later, she would locate New Age as the most 
recent phenomenon in America‟s metaphysical religious stream (2007). Metaphysics, for Albanese, is 
“an American religious mentality (thought, belief, emotional commitment, symbolic and moral 
behavior) organized in terms of an identifiable set of themes” (13). She highlights four themes: “a 
preoccupation with the mind and its powers” (13), “a predisposition toward the ancient cosmological 
theory of correspondence between worlds” (13), thinking in terms of movement and energy (14), and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
personal to be useful in binding people together and that the movement is largely based around a consumer ethic 
which stresses the individual and their personal development, thereby weakening people‟s ability to work 
together because they have weakened ties to each other. Heelas (1998) refutes Bruce, saying it needs to be 
proven not in terms of classical sociological theory, but rather in terms of how people actually use the materials 
they purchase (cf. Heelas 1996, 2008; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; see also Aupers and Houtman 2006, 
Houtman and Aupers 2007). Chandler (2007) contends that in practice people who are “spiritual but not 
religious” form social bonds that lead them to work together while not being tied together by a shared doctrine 
or religious institution. For the purposes of our argument, people‟s spiritual orientations can at least lead them 
to feel that they should be more socially engaged (although not necessarily with a religious group). Whether 
they are engaged or not is entirely different. 
 
 70 
“a yearning for salvation understood as solace, comfort, therapy, and healing” (15).
69
 Noting that the 
“new spirituality” is broader than what has been called New Age, Albanese traces American 
metaphysical thought‟s historical branches, demonstrating its breadth and pervasiveness in the 
country‟s religious history. “New Age” may be analytically unhelpful for academics, but that does not 
prevent people from using it as an organizing concept (496-516; see also Lewis and Melton 1992, 
Sutcliffe and Bowman 2000). Also, as Albanese argues, while New Age‟s material trappings—the 
channelers, crystals, pyramids, and reincarnations from the lost continents Atlantis and Lemuria—
have become less conspicuous, the metaphysical act of combining different ideas and practices from a 
wide swath of traditions continues unabated (2007, 515). In this case, New Age becomes the most 
recent ideal type in an ongoing series of loosely connected, but highly significant, metaphysical 
impulses in American religious history. 
Therefore, it is helpful to draw upon scholarship about New Age, but to classify our concerns 
under “new spirituality.” Again, we are faced with a broad, metaphysical drive in American culture 
that has strong family resemblances only at the most abstract levels. Although Albanese‟s four themes 
are helpful guides, as she illustrates, we can find these drives in many different places including 
Theosophy, the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, and contemporary spiritual practitioners who live 
in nature communes. What we need is a way of capturing how this metaphysical stream of thought in 
American culture has found its way into popular culture. Berger and Luckmann again provide a 
helpful concept in “sedimentation”: 
Only a small part of the totality of human experiences is 
retained in consciousness. The experiences that are so retained 
become sedimented, that is, they congeal in recollection as 
recognizable and memorable entities. Unless such sedimentation 
took place the individual could not make sense of his biography. 
Intersubjective sedimentation also takes place when several 
individuals share a common biography, experiences of which 
become incorporated in a common stock of knowledge. 
Intersubjective sedimentation can be called truly social only when it 
has been objectivated in a sign system of one kind or another, that is, 
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 This can helpfully be compared to Hanegraaff‟s five major trends in New Age religion: Channeling 
(which is contact with spirits and forces in the cosmos which give us direction in daily life), healing and 
personal growth, New Age science, Neopaganism, and the New Age as a millennial vision (1996). While we 
can divide these themes either way, the concern with individual growth, healing, a sense of contact with a vast 
unseen order, and an understanding that these beliefs can lead to actions which will change the world broadly, 
characterizes New Age and previous metaphysical movements. That said, I agree with Albanese that 
Neopaganism is its own separate religious tradition, even if it shares many of the same themes that characterize 
the New Age (2007, 512). 
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when the possibility of reiterated objectification of the shared 
experiences arises. Only then is it likely that these experiences will 
be transmitted from one generation to the next, and from one 
collectivity to another. (1966, 67-68) 
In other words, over time particular ways of thinking and behaving find their way into society through 
shared experiences which have been given specific meanings. Creatively punning on this concept, it 
is helpful to think of metaphysical thinking not as “sedimentation” because the particular ways people 
think and act are so diverse, but there is a general sentimentation going on in contemporary spiritual 
culture. While ideas about the mind‟s power, cosmological correspondence, movement and energy, 
and yearning for salvation through healing are general patterns of behaviour (Albanese 2007, 13-15), 
Albanese‟s concepts capture sentiments more than habitualized thoughts and behaviours which can 
easily be transmitted symbolically (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 68). I treat each historical 
manifestation of these sentiments as a sedimented institution which is part of the larger web of 
metaphysical sentiment. However, the idea of personal revelation which comes from the beyond and 
has specific outcomes in this world is such a strong sentiment in American culture that it influences 
everybody, whether they accept or refute it. In this light, “spirituality” is a concept that captures the 
sentimentation of Albanese‟s metaphysical themes. It builds upon and moves beyond the New Age 
material which was its most recent historical manifestation. 
In this light, “Homer the Heretic”‟s significance lies in the fact that Homer finds spiritual 
awareness within himself and legitimates it through his desires. When God approves of Homer 
worshipping in his own way, Homer has all the reasons he needs to not do things he deems 
undesirable—like going to church. Jokes in this episode further promote the relativism which 
facilitates spiritualities of seeking. For example, after Homer makes his decision he asks Marge “what 
if we picked the wrong religion? Each week we‟re just making God madder and madder.” Bart, who 
is also on the not-going-to-church bandwagon, claps his hands and says “Testify!” in a parody of 
evangelical revivals. On the DVD commentary Al Jean suggests that this is a good question to ask, 
but its importance lies in relativism‟s corrosive effects on religious certainty. If you think you are 
correct beyond a shadow of a doubt, this is an irrelevant question. You already know that you are 
right. However, it is hard to maintain such certainty in the face of great and legitimate religious 
diversity. The First Amendment‟s right to religious freedom ensures that there will always be 
challenges to religious plausibility, and through jokes such as this The Simpsons suggests that we 
should embrace relativism and find our own ways. It is this seeking, searching, and the ability and 
willingness to change traditions that legitimates spirituality in their jokes because it appears more 
 
 72 
authentic than the rote repetition that characterizes church. As Roof demonstrates (1999), this is 
characteristic of baby boomer religion, which is little surprise when we consider that The Simpsons‟ 
writers and producers are boomers or boomers‟ children. The Simpsons draws upon common social 
ideas which undermine religious exclusivity, and in the process says that all religions are equally 
valid—even ones concocted by lazy egoists who want to stay at home, drink beer, and watch 
television as their highest goals in life. 
Homer‟s actions capture the sentiments of a segment of Americans. Religious studies scholar 
Robert Fuller argues that roughly forty percent of Americans are unchurched (meaning they attend 
church services six times or less every year) (2001, 1). In spite of people leaving churches because of 
negative experiences, religion‟s pervasiveness in American culture makes it hard to avoid contact 
with ideas derived from institutionalized religious traditions. Homer‟s vision of God is clearly a turn 
towards an unchurched spirituality that is free from institutionalized constraints, but is still firmly 
grounded in the intellectual tradition from which Homer (and by association the writers who create 
his actions) comes. George Meyer, the lapsed Catholic who wrote the episode, drew upon his heritage 
when crafting the character of God as powerful and intimidating. Artistically, God‟s depiction falls 
squarely within the tradition of Christian representations of him as an old, powerful, white bearded 
man—the most famous depiction of which is Michaelangelo‟s portrayal on the Sistine Chapel‟s 
ceiling (see also Pinsky 2007, 21-22). Drawing on these intertextual elements, The Simpsons puts its 
own spin on God by putting words in his mouth. Instead of a deity who demands institutional and 
traditional allegiance, God is merciful, allowing Homer to change his path and undermining the 
demands that traditionalists claim God requires of us. In this we see how The Simpsons draws upon 
religion, but interprets it through the lens of spirituality, promoting a view that undermines the 
sacredness with which God is treated and emphasizing a relativistic worldview. 
4.1.1 Spiritual Appropriation in The Simpsons 
4.1.1.1 Native American Religions 
“Homer the Heretic” is not Homer‟s only experience with immanent spirituality. In “El Viaje 
Misterioso de Nuestro Jomer” (The Mysterious Voyage of Homer) he takes a vision quest after eating 
extremely spicy peppers at a chili cookoff. Explicitly modeled on “anthropologist” Carlos 
Castaneda‟s writings about his alleged experiences with Yaqui shaman don Juan Matus, Homer 
hallucinates and finds himself in a mysterious desert with giant butterflies and a constantly changing 
environment (e.g., a pool of water turns into a giant rattlesnake). After following a tortoise to a giant 
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pyramid, Homer climbs to the top and thinks he finds Marge, but she dissolves into a pile of sand. 
Homer then encounters his spirit guide, a coyote voiced by Johnny Cash who forms himself out of the 
sky. The coyote tells Homer he is on a quest for knowledge and gives him advice such as “The 
problem, Homer, is that the mind is always chattering away with a thousand thoughts at once” and 
“Clarity is the path to inner peace.” These suggestions could come from any number of New Age 
books, but when Homer asks, “What should I do? Should I meditate? Should I get rid of all my 
possessions?”, the coyote laughs, saying, “Are you kidding? If anything you should get more 
possessions. You don‟t even have a computer.” This embraces both the anti-materialist and 
consumerist elements that can be found in different sectors of the contemporary spirituality 
movement. Some New Age practitioners eschew personal improvement for worldly possessions, but 
the means for personal growth are found in a competitive economic marketplace that includes a 
variety of gurus, seminar leaders, and producers of New Age material culture (e.g., crystals, books). 
Homer‟s discussion with the coyote captures this apparent logical tension, and resolves it in a way 
that reaffirms spirituality‟s consumption (Carrette and King 2005; cf. Heelas 2008). After gnawing on 
Homer‟s leg, the coyote sends him on a journey to find his soul mate. Homer claims it is Marge, the 
coyote asks if it is, and the rest of the episode involves Homer coming to realize that he was right in 
the first place. 
While Heit argues that this episode supports seeker spirituality, which he finds less 
substantial than the spirituality of dwelling (2008, 100-104), the important thing about it is the way it 
draws upon appropriated imagery from both Native American traditions and a debunked 
anthropologist to frame a contemporary seeker‟s story without any consideration of the cultures from 
which the story is taken. Castaneda has been accused of fraudulently presenting fiction as 
ethnography, but in that act he also tapped into a deep-seated sense among anthropologists and 
spiritual seekers who argued that his reported experiences express a greater truth about the world.
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Telling how, among other incredible events, his head turned into a crow (1968, 120-123), he saw 
giant moth shadows (1971, 231), and was chased by the wind (1972, 83-89), Castaneda‟s work tapped 
into the countercultural zeitgeist and became standard reading in courses on Native spirituality. The 
Simpsons has taken this general theme of inner spiritual exploration, in some cases facilitated by the 
use of natural hallucinogenics (in Homer‟s case a Guatemalan insanity pepper; in Castaneda‟s a 
combination of peyote, Jimson weed, and psylocybia), and revealed another world to people. The 
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 See de Mille (1980) for an extended debate about Castaneda‟s legitimacy and veracity in his work 
(see also de Mille 1976, Hardman 2007, W. Rose 1992). 
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problem is that The Simpsons‟ creators take Castaneda‟s creation as a basic truth, treating it as an 
accurate account of the spiritual insight people assume Native American traditions possess. 
Once people assume Native American traditions can facilitate great spiritual insight, they 
start treating them as consumer products. Native American scholars have argued that Native 
spirituality cannot be separated from the local community‟s reciprocal networks, customs, and 
politics (see, e.g., Aldred 2000; P. Deloria 1998; V. Deloria 1992a, 1992b, 1999a; Grim 2000; 
Hernández-Ávila 2000; Jocks 2000; S. Owen 2008; W. Rose 1992; see also P. Jenkins 2004). 
However, The Simpsons‟ creators—and Castaneda—do just this. Homer does not contribute to any 
Native American community, but he undertakes a spiritual quest within the framework of Native 
American spiritual traditions. Appropriating these traditions contributes to a legacy in which the 
insights, practices, and values of Native American communities are treated as something available to 
everybody. Even if we believe Castaneda is a fraud, the salient fact is that many people see his 
interpretation of Native spirituality as more real than that practiced by Native Americans. As Lisa 
Simpson says in the episode “Little Big Girl,” “Native Americans are a proud people with a noble 
heritage—a noble heritage that anyone can claim.” Although she ends up suffering as a fraud by the 
episode‟s end, when we examine Homer‟s mystical journey there is explicit support for the spiritual 
appropriation of Native American religious traditions without recourse to the people from whom they 
are taken. Decontextualized, commercialized, and individualized, these religions are now a part of the 
spiritual marketplace, another brick in the bricoleur‟s wall.
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Philip Jenkins, on the other hand, argues that this does not delegitimate the religious lives of 
those who appropriate Native American religions—and he is correct—although their appropriations 
have serious consequences. Furthermore, Jenkins argues Native Americans have benefitted from the 
fascinations of New Agers who want to draw insight from these traditions, especially in terms of 
political support for Native legal causes (2004, 254-255). That said, New Age appropriation of Native 
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 The Simpsons satirizes Native American religious practices conducted by Native Americans in 
“Milhouse Doesn‟t Live Here Anymore,” when Bart and Lisa discover an ancient Native burial mound with 
arrowheads and pictographs. Lisa later researches the “Mound Builders” and discovers that they “worshipped 
turtles, as well as badgers, snakes, and other animals.” Bart flippantly remarks, “Thank God we‟ve come to our 
senses and worship a carpenter who lived 2000 years ago.” While this is also an attack on Christianity, it is a 
way of saying “Native American religions are stupid, but Christianity is really stupid.” Furthermore, in “Dude, 
Where‟s My Ranch?” Bart asks a Native who has been flooded off his land why they are selling cheap junk. 
The Native responds, “We used to live and farm in a bountiful valley.  Then the river was dammed to make that 
lake by our ancient enemy, the beaver.” Marge asks why they do not chase the beavers away, to which the 
Native replies, “Because the beaver is also our god.  In retrospect it was a poor choice.” Again, there is a theme 
of stupidity in selecting animals as divine representations. 
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spirituality creates identity issues that shape Natives‟ lives in ways they cannot control. Parkhill 
summarizes the dangers of the “Indian” stereotype (1997, 82-87). Even though it is positively 
associated with ecological spirituality and a sense of deep connectedness with the world, it creates a 
romanticized notion of how Native Americans should, and did, live (see also Gill 1987). Reproducing 
stereotypes creates expectations that can deprive Native Americans who do not meet those standards 
of their dignity and ability to participate fully in society. Parkhill quotes Smithsonian Institution 
ethnology curator Rayna Greene, a Cherokee: “I cannot tell you how many times I‟ve gone into a 
classroom or lectured in front of a group of little children, who are deeply unhappy because I don‟t 
wear a costume every day, who think that what the Boy Scouts do is real stuff, real Indian life, and 
then they want us to live that life. And, when we don‟t live that life for them, they‟re brokenhearted” 
(quoted in Parkhill 1997, 85; see also V. Deloria 1999b). The positive image of Native Americans 
ultimately leaves real people burdened with unrealistic expectations and roles which marginalize 
them into romantic “noble savages” who live in the countryside being spiritual. Native dreams and 
aspirations which do not meet appropriators‟ standards are crushed under the unequal distribution of 
the ability to define reality. Those who claim knowledge of Native American religions through 
reading books, participating in sweat lodges or other ceremonies, and trying to gain insights like 
Castaneda‟s through the use of natural hallocinogenics or meditation practices, have a 
disproportionate power to shape Natives‟ reality. That is, those Natives who do not conform to their 
expectations fall outside their sacred umbrellas. They are either “inauthentic” or unimportant. The 
paradox Native communities face is that without the financial and social capital middle-class spiritual 
seekers bring in exchange for Native spirituality, Native communities suffer economically and 
politically (see also P. Deloria 1998, 154-180). However, when they do put a price on their traditions, 
they change them in such a way that they are no longer tied into the community which gave them 
meaning. In short, they can either suffer economically, or they can suffer spiritually. Homer‟s 
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 In The Simpsons Movie (Silverman 2007), Homer receives an epiphany after engaging in Inuit 
throat-singing which teaches him that others are more important than himself. He has a similar experience in 
“Boy Meets Curl,” in which he calls the woman his therapist and has another pyschedelic vision through throat 
singing. This continues the theme of finding spiritual revelation in Native American religions without a serious 




If Homer‟s mystical journey appropriates Native American religions, and “Homer the 
Heretic” reflects a superficial seeker spirituality, his daughter Lisa characterizes the introspective and 
ethical practices commonly associated with spirituality. Put differently, if Homer uses “spirituality” to 
get out of church or realize what he already knew, Lisa‟s spirituality is a significant aspect of her 
character, driving her personal development and influencing her involvement in many social causes. 
Lisa is a vegetarian, environmentalist, and feminist. Belonging to MENSA, she is also the family‟s 
voice of reason. As writer David Cohen says on “Lisa the Skeptic”‟s DVD commentary, “When you 
have an episode which has a real moral or philosophical point, I think Lisa is your go-to character. 
And I think you really buy her as caring about it” (see also Gray 2006, 58; Henry 2007; Skoble 2001). 
Not only is Lisa positively associated with these liberal causes, but in late 2001 she made a significant 
religious change—she became a Buddhist after the FCOS burned down and plutocrat C. Montgomery 
Burns, with his business consultant Lindsey Neagle, turned it into “a faith-based emporium teeming 
with impulse buy items” (“She of Little Faith”). She felt that this change cost the church its soul, she 
looked for a “church that is free from corruption” and found the Springfield Buddhist Temple where 
she met Richard Gere and decided to become a Buddhist (“She of Little Faith”). While Turner 
characterizes this as moving from one commodified religion to another (2004, 274), I disagree. 
Having Lisa choose Buddhism, and remaining a Buddhist in subsequent seasons, reflects this 
religion‟s influence on seeker culture. 
Lisa‟s conversion to Buddhism should seem vaguely familiar, as it is a story which has been 
told many times in the post-1960s world. Building on the themes of immanentism, connections to the 
metaphysical, and everyday concerns, spiritual seekers appropriate Buddhist ideas, and thrive in a 
cultural context where people feel alienated from North America‟s traditional religious institutions.  
Sociologist Steve Bruce (2002), theologian Harvey Cox (1977), and Wuthnow (1998), have all 
argued that Westerners have looked to the East to cure themselves of spiritual malaise. Cox (1977) 
called this “turning eastward,” where spiritual seekers borrow from Eastern traditions to overcome the 
problems of modern Western life. Cox and Bruce both argue that completely adapting to the 
conventions of another culture is something incredibly difficult for Westerners, let alone those who 
want to have their spiritual fulfillment along with their American consumer culture. Bruce writes that 
people may look to the East for “authenticity, spirituality and holism” (2002, 134), but instead they 
take eastern traditions, strip them of their humility and discipline, and inflate those traditions with 
Western self-centeredness (132). Cox argues that the process of adopting Eastern religions for 
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Western purposes gets them caught in the consumer culture they were originally adopted to critique 
(1977, 130). These criticisms aside, it has become common to see the East as a locale of spiritual 
salvation from Western consumerism, and this positive portrayal shapes “She of Little Faith” (see 
Iwamura 2005). The episode does not depict Buddhism‟s adoption satirically, even though Turner 
reads this into the episode.
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While North Americans have a fascination with Buddhism dating back to at least the mid-
nineteenth century, Lisa is drawn to the Buddhism that developed in the 1950s Beat culture and the 
1960s counterculture. Her political consciousness, feminism, and ecological concerns are shared by 
North American Buddhists practicing a range of traditions from Zen to Tibetan Buddhism. Lisa‟s 
values resonate with “socially engaged Buddhism,” which practitioner-scholar Donald Rothberg 
argues covers “a broad range of approaches unified by the notion that Buddhist teachings and 
practices can be directly applied to participation in the social, political, economic, and ecological 
affairs of the nonmonastic world” (1998, 268). These values, although present in other Buddhist 
traditions (Queen 2002, 324-5), have been given special interest in the study of North American 
Buddhism (see e.g., Queen 2000, 2002; Seager 1999; Wetzel 2002). Buddhism scholar Kenneth 
Tanaka (1998, 293-5) argues that Americans want to see results from their religious beliefs and 
engaged Buddhism lets American Buddhists connect their religious beliefs to actions (Powers 2000). 
Because Lisa engaged left-leaning political, economic, and social concerns leading up to “She of 
Little Faith,” her conversion to Buddhism is consistent and compatible. 
However, since America has a long tradition of socially engaged Christianity, why should 
Lisa‟s critique of consumerism take her to Buddhism rather than a more politically active 
Christianity? In his first edition of The Gospel According to The Simpsons, Pinsky suggests that Lisa 
echoed Jesus because of her ethical concerns with social justice and challenging the status quo (2001, 
39-46). He maintains this point in the updated 2007 edition, although he recounts “She of Little 
Faith” at length and includes positive reviews from a pair of Buddhist pundits (2007, 171-180). 
Treating Lisa as a character who acted according to the values Jesus preached was a valid 
hermeneutic to analyze Lisa before 2001, so why make her Buddhist instead of emphasizing her 
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 There is a much longer history of appropriating Buddhist and East Asian traditions in America going 
back into the nineteenth century. However, Buddhism‟s popularity was dramatically increased by Japanese Zen 
thinker D.T. Suzuki‟s books and broader immigration laws after 1965 which allowed Buddhist teachers to enter 
the country. For general histories of Buddhism in North America see Fields (1986), Layman (1976), Prebish 
(1979, 1999) and Seager (1999). For more focussed studies see, e.g., Albanese (2007, 373-393), Lopez (1998), 
Tweed (1992), and Wilson (2009). See also Tweed and Prothero (1999). 
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Christian ethics? At the end of “She of Little Faith”‟s second act, after experiencing the commercial 
changes to FCOS (e.g., corporate advertising in the lobby, the church‟s new Jumbotron, a rotating 
billboard on the pulpit, and a man yelling “Money changed! Get your money changed! Right here in 
the temple!”), Lisa is near her breaking point. She finally loses her calm when the Noid, a character 
used to advertise Domino‟s Pizza in the 1980s, delivers a sermon on “the sanctity of deliciousness.” 
She claims that FOCS‟ directors have dressed the church like the Whore of Babylon, she leaves, and 
refuses to have her hand stamped so she can get back in, a reference to both hyper-commercial 
amusement parks where one has to pay for admission and to the Mark of the Beast that Revelation 13: 
16-17 claims will be “marked on the right hand or forehead, so that no one can buy or sell unless he 
[sic] has the mark, that is, the name of the beast or the number of its name” (NRSV). Suspicions of 
the Mark and consumerism and currency circulate throughout American culture, making this an 
ignorant familiarity that people can reference. But if we follow Lisa‟s explicit disgust with 
consumerism, and treat it as what drove her away from Christianity, why turn to Buddhism? The turn 
East explains this decision through its emphasis on the East‟s spiritual purity in the face of Western 
materialism. The episode does not even consider alternate forms of Christianity and Christian 
activism which would also be in line with Lisa‟s character. It does, however, portray her in such a 
way that her decision is consistent with other North American converts to Buddhism, a pop culture 
example of what Bruce, Cox, Roof, and Wuthnow discussed. She is seeking, and finding, what she 
wants in another religious tradition without the “cultural baggage” accompanying its lived forms.
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 When Buddhism is mentioned apart from Lisa, it is often without any sustained commentary on the 
religion. In “Black Widower,” the homicidal Sideshow Bob quotes the first two noble truths to explain why he 
tried to kill Krusty. Lisa‟s Buddhism also inspires jokes and plot twists in other characters. In “„Tis the Fifteenth 
Season,” Lisa tells Homer that she thinks Christmas has become too commercial, and, as a Buddhist, she thinks 
people would be “happier without presents.” Homer then imagines a car, a sweater, and the Buddha. The 
images coalesce into a scene where the Buddha wears the sweater, drives the car down a road, and says 
“Presents are material goods and attachment kills the soul.” This is certainly a Buddhist teaching, but the scene 
takes a “Homeric” twist as the Buddha suddenly hears police sirens and says he is not going back to prison. The 
fantasy ends and Homer decides to take away everybody‟s presents, thanking Buddha in the process. His 
fantasy starts again, and we see the Buddha bent over the hood of the car, covered in prison tattoos, and 
threatening the police officers. This scene combines the spiritual wisdom of the Buddha with a parody of 
contemporary thug life, mixing a variety of meanings for humorous effects. However, it conveys the original 
Buddhist message, and the prison joke comes off as one of Homer‟s strange comedic fantasies. In other words, 
the disconnection lies in Homer, not Buddhism. Similarly, in “I-(Annoyed Grunt)-Bot,” when Marge comforts 
Lisa after her third cat dies, she says, “it‟s ok, you‟re a Buddhist, so you know your cats are now reincarnated as 
a higher form of life.” Homer then chimes in, “Like a dog or a snowman.” The joke is not on Buddhism, it is on 
Homer the idiot. In “She Used to be My Girl,” Lisa hides in journalist Chloe Talbot‟s car trunk when a nearby 
volcano erupts. Frantically she prays to “Buddha, Jesus, Spongebob! There‟s no time to be picky!” The next 
scene has Buddha, Jesus, and Nickelodeon cartoon character Spongebob Squarepants standing on a cloud in 
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Despite engaged Buddhism‟s conflicts with economic and environmental exploitation, 
Buddhism in the West is big business. Speakers hold large seminars; hundreds of books on meditation 
(which has become the primary activity and means of religious identity for many North American 
Buddhists) or piggybacking on Zen‟s popularity are available for purchase;
75
 and spiritual retreats, 
lasting from days to months, are open to those who can afford them. This is connected to the greater 
presence of lay leaders, especially women, in American Buddhism as compared to its Asian 
counterparts. German Buddhist activist Sylvia Wetzel argues that this is because of the general 
affluence of North American converts to Buddhism (2002, 281). According to her, “Life in Western 
societies allows many members of the (mainly white) middle class to work a relatively few hours for 
their livelihood and to dedicate the rest of their time to intensive Buddhist studies and practices” 
(2002, 281). American Buddhist converts‟ affluence is known within Buddhist circles as religious 
studies scholar Douglas Padgett (2000) demonstrates in his study of the meditation cushion market. A 
decade ago cushions sold from $27 to $50 to elite North American Buddhists to help facilitate their 
practice. Today those same cushions cost between $50 and $100, suggesting that prices have 
increased because people are willing to pay that much for a meditation pillow. While some American 
Buddhists question whether or not this commercial aspect has tainted North American Buddhism 
(Seager 1999, 245), there is little doubt it exists. 
“She of Little Faith” acknowledges Buddhism‟s and consumer culture‟s relationship in North 
America only in so far as it uses movie star Richard Gere as its guest celebrity. While looking for a 
new religion, Lisa happens upon Springfield‟s Buddhist temple (designed to look like a Chinese 
temple). Inside she meets Homer‟s co-workers, Lenny and Carl, who we learn are both Buddhists. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
front of pearly gates. The Buddha looks down towards the Earth and says, “Perhaps we should help.” 
Spongebob chimes in with “Screw her!”, and starts laughing maniacally. This twisted joke does not demean 
Buddhism, noting the Buddha‟s goodness. 
The one time Buddhism is referenced apart from Lisa in a way that advances the plot is in “Goo Goo 
Gai Pan,” in which the family goes to China so that Marge‟s sister Selma can adopt a Chinese girl. In order to 
sneak into an orphanage, Homer is spray painted gold and positioned as a Buddha. He is then dragged inside by 
the orphanage‟s guards, who complain that the statue is too heavy and that they should cut him up and worship 
the chunks instead. Considering that this is directed to a Western audience, it confuses the concept of a 
Bodhisattva—a being who stands just on the verge of enlightenment in order to help others—and the 
enlightened Buddha, with gods and other divine beings. It works within a Western religious system where 
divine beings are worshipped, but incorrectly captures the Eastern mindset for comedic purposes working 
within ignorant familiarity. That is, people know that there are Buddhists, but may not realize that the Buddha is 
more of a role model than a divine being. This joke works in a Christian influenced unseen order rather than a 
Buddhist one. 
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 Tweed (2002, 21) cites the 2000 Books in Print list which included 218 titles that begin with Zen, 70 
of which are how-to books which apply Zen concepts to other aspects of life. 
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Lisa says, “I‟m looking for a new faith. One that isn‟t so materialistic.” At this point Gere‟s voice can 
be heard from off camera, “Well, you‟ve come to the right place. Buddhism teaches that suffering is 
caused by desire.” Buddhist studies scholar Charles Prebish has noted celebrity Buddhism‟s mass 
popularity in the 1990s, and Gere‟s guest appearance on The Simpsons follows in this vein (1999, 
255; see also Iwamura 2005). When Lisa, Lenny, and Carl see Gere (a Tibetan Buddhist who is 
tending a Zen garden), Lenny and Carl have the following exchange: 
LENNY 
 
Ooh! The world‟s most famous Buddhist. 
GERE 









It‟s a good thing Buddhism teaches freedom from desire 
because I‟ve got the desire to kick your ass. (“She of Little Faith”) 
Lenny is clearly taken in by Gere‟s celebrity, and his knowledge of Buddhist celebrities is 
limited to Hollywood‟s practitioners, regardless of the Dalai Lama‟s fame (cf. Iwamura 2005: 34-38). 
However, Gere‟s celebrity promotion of Buddhism is not the butt of their jokes, only Lenny‟s 
ignorance.  
Once again ignorant familiarity is at work, this time playing on positive themes. This episode 
associates humility, peacefulness, and freedom from desire with Richard Gere and Buddhism. It is 
assumed people know the Dalai Lama and Gere, and positively connect them with the promotion of 
peace and enlightenment. The common perception of socially engaged Buddhism is that it grapples 
with material desires, or at the very least their manifestations in global injustice. Rothberg‟s summary 
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of socially engaged Buddhism‟s ethics finds people taking a stand against capitalist exploitation and 
environmental degradation such as clear-cutting (1998, 274-5). When we combine these North 
American concerns with celebrity Buddhism‟s promotion of human rights in Tibet (a cause for which 
Gere and the Dalai Lama are both well known), Lisa‟s attraction to Buddhism is consistent with her 
character.  
Buddhism, in short, is frequently characterized as the idealized leftist religion. This public 
face of North American Buddhism does not make Buddhism‟s consumerization irrelevant, but it does 
make Buddhists appear more active and engaged in their practice. This characterization also helps us 
distinguish between different North American Buddhists. Thomas Tweed‟s category of Buddhist 
sympathizer or “night-stand Buddhist,” those people who “have some sympathy for a religion but do 
not embrace it exclusively or fully” (2002, 20), helpfully draws the boundaries between the Buddhism 
that Lisa adopts (an anti-materialistic, meditation intensive position where she self-identifies as 
someone who follows the Buddha‟s teachings and continues her socially engaged politics), and those 
who might be considered “insincere” or “fake Buddhists.” Tweed himself does not do this, noting that 
sympathizers may not fulfill the normative categories for defining who is a Buddhist, but they still 
play a significant role in the creation of Western Buddhism. He warns against using normative 
categories because they exclude those who may not be a part of the religion but whose interest helps 
promote the religion in a given culture. Rather, he suggests that scholars categorize Buddhists 
according to Buddhist self-identification (2002, 22-27). While Tweed‟s points deserve consideration, 
socially engaged Buddhism requires that people place themselves within the tradition. Having a 
category such as “night-stand Buddhists” and the knowledge that there are Americans who are 
interested in Buddhism but who do not consider themselves Buddhist, allows popular conception to 
locate “real” or “authentic” Buddhism in those who actively claim the title, which is usually 
accompanied by socially engaged Buddhists‟ ethics (at least among converts). Hence, celebrity 
Buddhists such as the Dalai Lama,
76
 and the politics of Richard Gere, can become Buddhism‟s public 
face rather than those Buddhists who have detached themselves from social concerns and who spend 
their time reading popular Zen books and meditating. But if commercialization and Buddhism 
accompany each other in North America, and if, by locating the voice of Buddhist knowledge in “She 
of Little Faith” in a celebrity follower of the Dalai Lama rather than the teacher himself, why should 
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 Iwamura notes that the Dalai Lama‟s entry into American popular culture “transformed [him] into a 
celebrity; that realm then exploits the reception of his physical and spiritual presence by marketing it for mass 
contemplation and consumption” (2005, 35). 
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we see this episode as a critique of Christian consumerism rather than an attack on materialism and 
religion in general? The answer lies in how “She of Little Faith” uses comedy to satirize the irony of 
Christian materialism while not extending the same treatment to Buddhism. 
4.1.2 Spirituality and Consumerism 
“She of Little Faith”‟s second act concerns the revamping of the FOCS under Mr. Burns‟ 
guidance. Taking the fire-gutted building and expanding it with an ornate lobby and placing a large 
neon sign of Jesus holding a lasso outside the church, he turns the once-floundering institution into a 
profitable business. People appear happy in the new accommodations. Local businessman Comic 
Book Guy loves the giant seats, and Marge‟s sister Patty is pleased that Burns put ice in the urinals. 
In the words of Krusty‟s assistant Sideshow Mel, “He [Mr. Burns] restored it [FCOS] from nave to 
narthex!” However, as already noted, Lisa argues that consumerism has cost the church its soul. The 
relationship between sacred institutions and religion as a consumable commodity is problematic for 
many people. 
 However, religion and consumerism are intimately linked in America‟s history, and making 
money from Christianity is nothing new. Historian Laurence Moore‟s Selling God (1994) is the 
classic discussion of this phenomenon. Moore works his way through the market for evangelical 
novels in the eighteenth century, to battles over appropriate film content (see also Black 1994), and 
the contemporary religious marketplace in which Christian bookstores sell CDs, books, and “Jesus 
junk”; televangelists populate the airwaves; and New Age stores sell an assortment of “spiritual” 
goods and guides to those who can afford entry into these literary and material mysteries (see also 
Hendershot 2004; Howard and Streck 1999, 149-220; McDannell 1995; Morgan 2007a; Schmidt 
1995). Moore stresses the fact that religious people enter the market to promote their values and shape 
others‟ perspectives (1994, 10). In other words, mass-produced goods are mediated religious ideals, 
instead of being things that inherently destroy the sacred elements in people‟s lives. This competitive 
drive is constantly being revised, and the market is seen as a legitimate place to argue for one‟s 
religious position. At the same time, Moore worries that religion‟s normativeness in everyday 
American life makes it vulnerable to the market‟s overriding forces and prevents religion from 
becoming a serious critical force which can elevate people beyond their everyday lives (272-277; cf. 
Kline 2007, V. Miller 2003). 
This was Einstein‟s concern (noted in chapter two), that “religion isn‟t supposed to be 
comfortable, and it is through discomfort that we find new parts of ourselves” (2008, 210). There is a 
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latent assumption here that other scholars have criticized which could be called the God and 
Mammon fallacy, that is, there is a false assumption that religion, consumption, and financial profit 
cannot coexist (see Moore 1994, McDannell 1995, Morgan 2007a, Schmidt 1995). Through Lisa‟s 
claim that the new accommodations have “cost the church its soul” and dressed it up like the Whore 
of Babylon, The Simpsons suggests people are aware of the sentiments behind the God and Mammon 
fallacy, and these sentiments resonate with what viewers believe (“She of Little Faith”).
77
 Moore 
critiques the fallacy, writing, “the mystery of agency haunts us because we want to judge the quality 
of the product the past has served up and to wonder whether anything we might do from this point 
will matter. Many who do not like the business and commercial side of religion nourish the thought 
that it is never too late to do something” (1994, 269). Building on Marxist notions of alienation, 
religion scholars Jeremy Carrette and Richard King‟s Selling Spirituality (2005) attacks the 
consumption of “spiritual” goods and services.
78
 They assert that spirituality is neoliberalist 
ideology‟s tool and that selling “spiritual” products numbs people to modern life‟s pains rather than 
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 Another relevant joke is told in “Bart Sells His Soul.” After Bart protests that the soul does not exist, 
Milhouse counters with, “but every religion says there‟s a soul, Bart. Why would they lie? What do they have to 
gain?” The scene shifts to Rev. Lovejoy‟s office where he is pouring money from the collection plates into a 
coin sorter. This episode is based around Bart selling his soul for five dollars, and then experiencing a variety of 
strange occurrences including automatic doors not working for him, a dream in which he cannot get to an island 
paradise because he has no soul to help row him there, and his loss of laughter. Eventually he reacquires his 
soul after a night of searching and prayer. See Koenigsberger (2004) for an extended discussion of Bart‟s soul 
in the marketplace. 
78 Consumerism and religion are intertwined in Marx‟s thought because while his definition of 
religion—“the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless 
situation. It is the opium of the people” (2008, 42; emphasis in original)—has become famous, in popular 
discourse it is often unaccompanied by the next paragraph: “The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness 
of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about its condition is the 
demand to give up a condition which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the 
criticism of the vale of woe, the halo of which is religion” (42; emphasis in original). Marx‟s critique of religion 
introduces his theory of the proletarian‟s capitalist exploitation. But consumption is different from alienation 
from the results of one‟s labour. Marx‟s foundation for his theory of alienation lies in the products of our 
economic labour. He argues that in a capitalist system we produce goods because they own us. We consume 
goods in order to prove status, but while this may work for the capitalist who can accumulate enough capital to 
make it work for themself, the proletarian is paid enough to live a subsistence lifestyle. Proletarians work to 
survive while capitalists benefit from the fruits of their labour. Marx finds this alienating because he thinks we 
produce goods for their intrinsic beauty, not for their value to others. Being unable to create for our own 
aesthetic benefits, we are forced to create beautiful objects for others. We use those objects to project our 
identities within the social system, rather than projecting what is authentic within us (2007, 70-78; cf. mass 
culture critiques above). Here we can see that the fear that consumer products corrupt religion is horrifying 
because their very existence necessitates religion to alleviate the pain. If religion is demeaned by consumerism, 
then where are we to find alleviation of our suffering? However, the fact remains that under Marx‟s theory 
religion cannot cure the displacement from our work, it can only treat the symptoms and not rectify the 
underlying social injustices. 
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challenging them to change their circumstances.
79
 Drawing upon religious traditions for its material, 
contemporary spirituality dehistoricizes religions, using their cultural capital to sell products that run 
counter-intuitive to what Carrette and King see as the world‟s religions‟ vital, prophetic role. For 
them, “the most troubling aspect of many modern spiritualities is precisely that they are not troubling 
enough. They promote accommodation to the social, economic and political mores of the day and 
provide little in terms of a challenge to the status quo or to a lifestyle of self-interest and ubiquitous 
consumption” (5). In other words, the search for a self-fulfilling spirituality divorces us from 
community, tradition, and history, and we are easily divided so that corporate capitalist enterprises 
continue to exploit us as individuals who cannot thus overthrow the system (see also V. Miller 2003). 
Conversely, Heelas contends that although the diffuse spiritualities lumped under the term 
“New Age” are commodified, this does not exhaust their meaning. He writes, “my answer to the 
question „When is an act of consumption?‟ is that acts . . . are never simply a matter of consumption” 
(2008, 14; emphasis in original). This is an important point because it leads to Heelas‟ main argument 
that the activities I have grouped under “spirituality” are also life-affirming and important to people. 
Heelas criticizes scholars such as Carrette and King for reducing all consumption to something 
negative, rather than seeing it as complex human activity that is part of a larger meaning making 
process (2008, 8). 
Another issue with consumerism is its role in identity construction.  French sociologist Jean 
Baudrillard (1996, 1998) argues that we now live in a consumer society in which we buy the signs 
and symbols associated with objects, rather than purchasing something for its utility. Consumer goods 
are produced for status rather than need. This creates a society in which we constantly consume to 
maintain the impression of affluence. Baudrillard sees this leading to a narcissistic society where 
individualism only leads to our self-interest as consumers. For Baudrillard, because they are making 
money from others‟ consumption patterns, consumerism replicates power and class differences within 
society and helps maintain the elite‟s power. Meanwhile, because they have to work to pay for what 
they have already consumed, credit keeps the poor in their social location and maintains their 
alienation (1998, 37-86).  
While he has a point about consumerism maintaining social distinctions within a capitalist 
society, Baudrillard assumes there is an “authentic” humanity beneath the projected signs and 
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 Neoliberal ideology “puts profits before people, promotes privatisation of public utilities, services 
and resources, and is in the process of eroding many individual liberties that were established under its 
forerunner—political liberalism” (Carrette and King 2005, 7). 
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symbols. Sociologist Anthony Giddens highlights this problem in Modernity and Self-Identity (1991), 
arguing that in late modernity (contemporary society) people‟s identities are not fixed but constantly 
in flux. Alleviating the risks which accompany life in a global society (e.g., a war in India can have 
significant economic impacts in North America) requires us to sequester our experience, making sure 
that our everyday actions rarely connect to major existential issues (8, 156). We are searching for 
“authentic” relationships. These relationships exist when we are true to ourselves (78), but the 
problem is that our identity is not fixed. Instead, it shifts over time as we reinterpret our identity in 
light of changes in our lives. Getting married, having children, divorcing, losing parents, natural 
disasters, and triumphant celebrations as we move into new stages in life—these demonstrate the 
breadth of changes that can affect a person. So, while there is a sense of being true to ourselves, our 
“authenticity” is subject to constant revision as we try to understand ourselves in the face of 
constantly changing circumstances. Just like the consumer who constantly purchases to maintain their 
identities, we are also changing constantly—even if we talk about authenticity as if it were something 
static.  
The assumption that “authentic” identity is crushed beneath a tide of consumer goods is a 
fallacy of limited alternatives. There is no absolute proof that consumer products shape people 
completely according to some underlying ideologies, but at the same time we cannot say that people 
are not affected by ideological currents embodied in consumer goods. Furthermore, there are 
problems with the assumption that religion is the key to solving this predicament. Returning to Berger 
and Luckmann‟s point about externalization, objectivation, and internalization (1966, 92-116), it is 
more useful to see religion and the products people create, use, and discard as part of a process of 
redefining their identities in changing circumstances without arguing for an essential humanity that is 
lost in the process. Giddens suggests that our authentic self (and how we understand who we are) is 
constantly changing, and we continue to shape it throughout our lives. Therapy is the product he 
highlights (1991, 70-108), but we can see how other consumer goods provide consumers with 
ideological direction. The Simpsons is no exception, providing viewers with a lexicon of humorous 
interpretations of reality they can use to explain their lives. However, in “She of Little Faith,” The 
Simpsons embraces the God and Mammon fallacy in its treatment of Buddhism. 
Christianity‟s denigration and Buddhism‟s endorsement suggest that The Simpsons‟ creators 
embrace the notion that money has corrupted Christianity and that Buddhists are free from material 
desires. Of course, as religious studies scholar Jane Iwamura (2005) demonstrates, this ties into the 
consumption of Buddhism. Her concept of the “oriental monk” describes characters who “represent 
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future salvation of the dominant culture—they embody a new hope of saving the West from capitalist 
greed, brute force, totalitarian rule, and spiritless technology” (32). However, once Westerners learn 
from the East, they are empowered to save impotent Asian cultures (32-33). This reinforces the 
inequality between East and West and leaves Westerners feeling superior now that Eastern wisdom 
has sanctified their way of life (33-38). The East provides the philosophical and spiritual insight to 
conquer the failures of the West, and Lisa‟s Buddhism follows closely along this path. For example, 
her recognition of Tibet‟s plight under communist China‟s rule can be seen in episodes where she 
takes the opportunity to yell “Free Tibet!” after a school spelling bee (“I‟m Spelling as Fast as I 
Can”), or, when the family goes to Springfield‟s Chinatown, she remarks, “I love Chinatown, 
although I wish they would stop picking on Tibet town” while Chinese people push around bald men 
in red robes (“A Hunka Hunka Burns in Love”). She also introduces the Dalai Lama to Springfield in 
“Simple Simpson” as, “The Elvis of enlightenment, the lean, serene, chanting machine.” Iwamura 
calls the Dalai Lama a celebrity (2005, 25-26; cf. Lopez 1998), and he is certainly that, but he 
remains a valued spiritual teacher and political leader as well. 
What are we to make of these uses of Buddhism? Certainly there is a pattern of social 
engagement and assuming spiritual enlightenment. It is also positively juxtaposed next to 
Christianity. Yet, Gere‟s celebrity status remains unsettling for some (i.e., Turner). Gere is well 
known as a Buddhist and has consistently used his star status as a way to promote Tibetan 
independence and Buddhist causes (McLeod 1999). He founded the non-profit Tibet House, and 
famously spoke out against China at the 1993 academy awards. In short, while he is a celebrity, he is 
also a Buddhist practitioner whose religious politics may have hurt his career. This is not somebody 
adopting a religion for trendy purposes. To suggest that because he is a celebrity his Buddhism is 
somehow demeaned is an inaccurate assessment. For Turner, Buddhism must be demeaned because 
Gere is a celebrity and celebrities are consumer objects. However, if we look at this in light of 
Moore‟s argument, we see an active Buddhist voice using the marketplace to further his religious 
agenda. Religious competition in the marketplace allows Gere a chance to share what is meaningful 
to him with millions of other people, and The Simpsons expanded his platform, supporting him in the 
process. In Buddhism‟s case, the God and Mammon fallacy does not apply in The Simpsons because 
the religion‟s values and political actions are supported in Lisa‟s behaviour. 
That said, The Simpsons is not above lampooning spirituality‟s consumption. New Age 
spirituality‟s association with consumerism has been criticized, although not every scholar agrees on 
how we should approach the fact that many New Age ideas are transmitted to people through book 
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stores, specialty magazines, seminar training, restaurants, and retreats—all of which cost money (see, 
e.g., Bowman 1999, Bruce 2002, Lee 2003, Mears and Ellison 2000, Possamai 2003, Redden 2005, 
York 2001). Pagan theologian Michael York demonstrates that certain cities (e.g., San Francisco, 
Bath) have become known as cities which have developed a considerable economy around the 
appropriation of religious techniques from around the world (e.g., yoga, meditation, shamanism), and 
have repackaged them for easy consumption to people who want to relax and enjoy vegetarian cuisine 
while partaking in “spiritual enlightenment” (1999). York criticizes New Age appropriations of 
indigenous religious traditions which serve an audience that, ostensibly, does not dedicate the time or 
effort to understand the traditions upon which these ideas were founded. Sociologist Adam Possamai 
continues this argument, writing, “this consumption could easily be seen as a pastiche in which 
contradiction and confusion are glorified. Indeed by constructing their subjective myth, there is an 
eclectic—if not kleptomaniac—process of selecting culture(s) and religions in a way that gives 
immediate pleasure; in a way that „speaks to the heart‟” (2003, 40). His argument revolves around the 
first and third points I identified about common conceptions of spirituality: That it is immanentist and 
that it revolves around everyday life. The problem for Possamai is that the consumer turn in 
spirituality implies that one can achieve a desired spiritual effect without reference to deeper status 
that apparently comes from dedicated practice of a religious tradition (40). 
Other scholars do not take such a critical stance towards consumerism and the New Age. 
Religious studies scholar Marion Bowman (1999), sociologists Daniel Mears and Christopher Ellison 
(2000), and cultural studies scholar Guy Redden (2005) emphasize the interconnected networks of 
people that comprise the New Age movement and the fact that they draw upon commercial networks 
in order to develop both themselves and these interpersonal bonds. In this case, it seems inappropriate 
to pass judgement on the commodification of religious goods because without studying how people 
use the materials we cannot evaluate their religious practices. Without some way of measuring the 
spiritual states of different people, it is impossible to tell whether or not Possamai‟s and York‟s 
claims are true. The commodified religions people consume may achieve something. Assessing a 
“successful” appropriation within the New Age framework, aside from judging it pragmatically in 
light of the practitioner‟s concerns, is next to impossible. When we take factors such as these into 
consideration, what we can see in the New Age market for religious goods is a network of ideas and 
accessibility. This may or may not lead to a superficial spirituality. However, this does not matter to 
The Simpsons, as New Age‟s outward trappings are fodder for jokes.  
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In “Make Room for Lisa,” after Lisa develops stress-related stomach aches, she and Homer 
visit a New Age store called “Karma-ceuticals.” The store itself is designed to mimic many New Age 
stores. In the store windows are various symbols that have been appropriated by New Age seekers, 
including the medieval style sun and moon, and a large yin-yang. The inside is decorated with similar 
symbols, icons, and assorted New Age goods. There is an ankh on the wall, a Stonecutters flag 
hanging from the ceiling, and a statue of Ganesh on the counter.
80
 A small replica of an Egyptian 
sarcophagus can be seen at the bottom of the screen, and faint flute music can be heard in the 
background.  
While Homer‟s actions in “Homer the Heretic” support the kind of individualistic, self-
spirituality that Heelas (1996) sees at New Age‟s core, Homer does not condone many of New Age‟s 
accoutrements. New Age ideas do not appeal to him, but the movement‟s experimentation and 
willingness to appropriate ideas from other cultures entices Lisa. This is apparent after they enter the 
store in “Make Room For Lisa”, and Homer complains about buying a dreamcatcher, calls the owner 
“hippie lady,” and refuses to hear about the store specials, asking if they have something to make Lisa 
stop complaining. The answer to Lisa‟s problems comes in the form of sensory deprivation tanks. 
Spirituality in Karma-ceuticals is too easy; it is simply prepackaged sentiment with no lasting value. 
After Homer and Lisa are positioned in the sensory deprivation tanks, Karma-ceuticals‟ 
owner is visited by repossession workers who empty her store of merchandise. Her defence is that the 
I Ching told her she had six months until bankruptcy. She then tries to bargain with the workers by 
discussing things over some sympathy tea. The problem is the teas are already loaded onto the truck. 
Later, when they are driving away with the goods, one repossession worker holds up a crystal and 
looks at the other one (whose stomach bulges out over the steering wheel of the truck) and says 
“Abracadabra. The crystal says your baby shall be a girl.” The other man tells him to shut up and 
throws the crystal out the window (“Make Room for Lisa”). This joke satirizes New Age 
merchandise, and the idea that crystals have spiritual powers, as foolishness and a waste of money. 
When it comes to the treatment of the New Age goods in this episode they are just that: 
goods. That is, they are material objects that can be bought and sold in a store and repossessed when 
the proprietor cannot make payments. As Carrette and King argue, these objects are commodified 
artefacts that embody the capitalist marketplace‟s values rather than the communally resistive 
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 The Stonecutters are a parody of the Freemasons. Homer joins the group in the season six episode 
“Homer the Great.” “Make Room for Lisa” aired in season 10, which assumes a consistent audience that will 
make the connection. 
 
 89 
elements of the religious traditions from which they borrow (2005, 5-6). Instead, by labelling things 
like crystals as “spiritual,” they argue that we have fallen into one of neoliberalism‟s traps: “the term 
spirituality has now become the „brand-label‟ for the search for meaning, values, transcendence, hope 
and connectedness in „advanced capitalist‟ societies. The notion operates by compartmentalising 
questions of human values into an identifiable market space” (2005, 32). That The Simpsons saw it 
appropriate to have Homer say “Gimme a break!” to the dreamcatcher and centre a mean-spirited joke 
around the crystal suggests that the value that people find through using these materials is misplaced. 
These jokes suggest that it is misguided to try and find meaningful experience in material culture that 
is sold on ideas appropriated from other cultures. Furthermore, people have been making jokes about 
New Age spirituality for a long time. These jokes continue in this tradition and assume the audience 
shares The Simpsons‟ creators‟ sentiments. Rather than a way of accessing meaningful experience in a 
capitalist economy, this idea is a product of late capitalism and its commodification of everything 
(Possamai 2003, York 2001). These jokes are consistent with the popular view that New Age 
spirituality is not built on any solid ground and that it is associated with a cash grab.
81
 
On the other hand, business scholar Nurit Zaidman (2007) argues that New Age stores are not 
just places of business, many are also “spiritual centres” with designated sacred spaces where spiritual 
experiences take place away from the main business areas (364). When Homer and Lisa enter Karma-
ceuticals they are faced with a wide variety of items from dreamcatchers to toothbrushes. Yet, the 
back room with the sensory deprivation tanks is a stark contrast. There are two tanks (white pods with 
water in them), hooks on the walls, and a small table with a copy of New Ager magazine on it 
(featuring a man sitting in lotus position). The walls and floor are grey and there is a curtain pulled 
across the door. Here in the inner sanctuary the idea is to get people into the sensory deprivation tanks 
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 In “Bart Gets a Z,” The Simpsons parodies The Secret‟s (Byrne 2006) popular appeal. This 
book/DVD by Australian Rhonda Byrne was released on November 7, 2006, and by the time of writing had sold 
over 2.2 million DVD copies and made over $65 million (The Numbers 2010). There are also over 5.3 million 
copies of the book in print (Yoffe 2007). The Secret continues in the tradition of New Thought theories about 
positive thinking, and has been criticized for promoting an unattainable ideal of just thinking about making 
changes without taking any direct action (see, e.g., Ehrenreich 2007, Yoffe 2007; on the history of New 
Thought see Albanese 2007). Promoted by Oprah and studied in book clubs, The Secret is a bona-fide success 
in the metaphysical market. In “Bart Gets a Z,” The Secret is recast as The Answer, and “is available wherever 
dubious self-help books are sold.” Bart buys The Answer for his teacher, Mrs. Krabapple, as a way of making 
amends after he gets her fired. However, once they start using the book, (writing down her dream on “the index 
card of fate” and then breaking her dream down “into smaller wishes, then break those down into wishable 
actions”), she says it “sounds like one of those loony self-help books.” This satirical point directs our attention 
to the fact that a market for metaphysical solutions, based in the power of individual thoughts, continues to exist 
and can be quite lucrative. It also reminds us that The Simpsons treats these blatant attempts to make money 
from people‟s spirituality and metaphysical assumptions with little respect. 
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where, according to the store owner, “You‟re about to take a journey into the mind. You may see and 
experience things that are strange and frightening. But remember, they can‟t physically harm you—
though they may destroy you mentally” (“Make Room for Lisa”). 
Once inside the sensory deprivation tank, Lisa undergoes a series of hallucinations in which 
she experiences what it is like to be the family cat, a tree, and journalist Cokie Roberts. She then sees 
what it is like to be Homer and realizes that she is unfair to him when he makes sacrifices to spend 
time with her. Here, while the material culture of New Age consumerism has been satirized as 
ineffective and a waste of money, the reality of spiritual experience that can be gained through 
participating in commodified spiritual activities is affirmed. Lisa can—and does—have a meaningful, 
personal, and real spiritual experience. While being Cokie Roberts might be seen as a joke, the 
emotional centre of this episode comes through this clearly meaningful spiritual experience of 
imagining herself as her father. A New Age technique reconciles Lisa and Homer. The core of 
“spirituality” on which The Simpsons‟ religious satire stands is reaffirmed. 
The irony involved in this example makes it difficult to say The Simpsons directly criticizes 
the commodification and consumption of religion. On the one hand, we could say that it lampoons the 
New Age by having Homer refer to Karma-ceuticals‟ owner as “hippie lady,” having her appear 
flakey, and mocking the material culture of the New Age. Conversely, the pursuit of a healing 
experience through sensory deprivation works. Heelas (2008; see also Heelas and Woodhead 2005, 
82-110) argues that the pursuit of “experience” is what draws people into the New Age marketplace 
in the first place. While The Simpsons portrays much of that marketplace as ridiculous, it also 
validates New Age spiritual pursuits by having the episode‟s emotional highpoint come from Lisa‟s 
hallucination in the sensory deprivation tank. 
4.2 Science’s Rational Challenge 
Lisa is also the voice of reason, keeping religious excesses in check with her scientific 
rationality. When she is frightened because the city builds a cemetery outside her bedroom she 
reassures herself by saying, “I believe in science and rationality, not ghosts and monsters” (“The Girl 
Who Slept Too Little”). Scientific thinking, a belief in the rational order of things, and resorting to 
materialist arguments for why things happen are frequent occurrences in The Simpsons—especially 
when it looks like religion is gaining the upper hand. Delaney shapes his argument around The 
Simpsons‟ use of science as a debunking force, and a survey of two episodes—“Lisa the Skeptic” and 
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“The Monkey Suit”—illustrates how The Simpsons uses science to draw the boundaries between what 
is acceptable belief in an unseen order and what is not. 
In “Lisa the Skeptic,” Lisa finds a strange skeleton that resembles an angel while on an 
archeological dig. Homer takes the skeleton home and the townspeople, convinced it is an actual 
angel‟s skeleton, pay Homer to see the angel and pray in front of it. Lisa is thoroughly unconvinced 
there is a dead angel in their garage and takes a bone sample to the local laboratory, asking renowned 
palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould to analyze it. His results are inconclusive, which convinces the 
townspeople to take the angel away from the Simpsons. However, when a mob comes to retrieve the 
valuable artefact they find it has been taken to a nearby hilltop where it has been marked with the 
message, “The End Will Come at Sundown.” As people prepare for the apocalypse, Lisa remains firm 
in her unbelief and at sundown we learn that the angel skeleton was a promotional gimmick for the 
new shopping mall. The Springfielders change course and, instead of worrying about the angel, rush 
off to the mall. 
Similarly, “The Monkey Suit” criticizes the fight between religion and science in America‟s 
biology classrooms, from the 1925 Tennessee vs. John Scopes trial (also known as the “Monkey 
Trial”) over the right to teach evolution in school to the 2005 Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School 
District (hereafter “Dover trial”) decision to ban Intelligent Design in the small Pennsylvania town of 
Dover.
82
 After attending an exhibit at the Springfield Museum of Natural History, where creationism 
is presented as a myth, religious conservative Ned Flanders convinces the church council to pressure 
the local school to teach alternatives to evolution. After blackmailing Principal Skinner, creationism 
will now to be taught in all science courses. Lisa‟s class watches the film, “So You‟re Calling God a 
Liar: An Unbiased Comparison of Creationism and Evolution,” in which the Bible is “written by our 
Lord” and Charles Darwin is called a cowardly drunk and shown passionately kissing Satan. Every 
answer on a test is “God did it.” Eventually, the town passes a law stating that only creationism can 
be taught in schools. When Lisa breaks the law and starts reading from The Origin of Species she is 
arrested and a parody of the Scopes trial takes place. Springfield scientist Professor Frink witnesses 
for the defence, testifying that evolution tells us God has less power than the Under Secretary of 
Agriculture. Witnesses for the prosecution include a “Ph.D. in Truthology from Christian Tech” and 
Ned Flanders himself. At one point during the trial, the William Jennings Bryan parody, Wallace 
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 Moran (2002) introduces the Scopes trial, contextualizing it historically, and providing both 
transcripts and primary sources from the time. Humes (2007) and Slack (2007) offer accessible narratives of the 




Brady, holds a baby fawn in an attempt to sway the jury, saying, “Now, Bambi, who started that 
forest fire that killed your mama? Evolution?!”  Eventually Marge turns the tables by giving Homer a 
bottle of beer in the courtroom. He acts like an ape, proving that Homer is related to the missing link 
in human evolution. The episode ends on a conciliatory note with Lisa praising the separation of 
church and state while still respecting Ned‟s religious beliefs. 
These episodes consistently portray science trumping religion, while allowing for religion‟s 
continued, if marginalized, relevance. Heit and Delaney both miss this point, though from opposite 
ends of the spectrum. Heit suggests that Christianity poses questions that science cannot possibly 
answer, so assuming that it can is rationally flawed and misses the point. Naturalistic science cannot 
answer metaphysical questions such as whether or not God exists. This does not mean that 
Christianity and science must be opposed, but that they can work together to enlighten the Christian 
life (2008, 128-142). While Lisa‟s civil stance at “The Monkey Suit”‟s conclusion resembles a good 
example of this principle, we cannot forget that she also just won a trial against creationism. In “Lisa 
the Skeptic,” at the conclusion of the trial determining whether the skeleton really is an angel, the 
judge declares, “As for science versus religion, I‟m issuing a restraining order. Religion should stay 
five hundred yards away from science at all times.” Furthermore, in “HOMЯ,” Homer 
mathematically proves there is no God, causing Flanders to burn Homer‟s work. This certainly 
suggests that while Heit may be correct in arguing that science can only explain the natural world, 
only being able to rationally explain the material universe is a powerful and convincing argument 
against the existence of a supernatural reality—especially one as detailed as Christians posit. 
Neuroscientist Sam Harris‟ The End of Faith (2004) started a brief trend of highly publicized anti-
religious books which favoured an approach to understanding life based on scientific rationality 
dubbed “New Atheism” (see also, e.g., Dawkins 2006, Dennett 2006, Hitchens 2007). Harris and his 
colleagues all contend that religion and rationality cannot co-exist, and that to progress as a species 
we should do away with religion. Delaney (2008, 189-217) shares this sentiment, arguing that 
religious beliefs are “God of the gaps” arguments, providing explanations for natural phenomena until 
science can catch up. However, this argument may not be as convincing as he assumes. According to 
the 2008 GSS, 61.6% of Americans thought that the statement, “We trust too much in science and not 
enough in religious faith” is inapplicable (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2008; cf. Boyer 2001, Shermer 
2000). While interpreting this response is difficult because we do not know what respondents mean 
by “inapplicable” (e.g., that we should never trust science/religion? That they are in perfect balance?), 
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it at least suggests that Delaney and the New Atheists do not have a monopoly on science and 
religion‟s meanings in American life. 
These two episodes also focus on the most problematic scientific theory in contemporary 
America—Darwinian evolution—and The Simpsons supports the theory‟s acceptance by the scientific 
community. While evolution is almost universally accepted among professional scientists, evangelical 
and fundamentalist Christians have a long history of opposing evolution for moral (e.g., it will lead to 
the downfall of society) and religious (e.g., it is not in the Bible) reasons. Executing what philosopher 
Barbara Forrest (an expert witness for the plaintiffs in the Kitzmiller case) and zoologist Paul Gross 
call a “seduction phenomenon” (2004, 5) (although “propaganda” [Cowan 2004, 259; see fn. 28] 
would be a more appropriate term), proponents of what is now called “Intelligent Design” (ID) are 
trying to redirect the nation‟s scientific discourse.
83
 Utilizing American sympathies towards having 
every position heard in public debate, Intelligent Design proponents question evolution‟s validity as a 
theory and promote the idea that there is an intelligent designer behind the natural world.
84
 However, 
as its critics routinely attest, Intelligent Design has yet to contribute to scientific theory—especially 
evolutionary biology—with new theories and concepts that can be empirically tested. Furthermore, its 
main argument from “irreducible complexity”—“a single system composed of several well-matched, 
interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts 
causes the system to effectively cease functioning” (Behe 1996, 39; see also Behe 2000, 2001, 2007; 
Shanks and Joplin 1999)—is being heavily challenged by refutations from naturalistic scientists (see, 
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 “Intelligent Design” developed from “creation science” after the Supreme Court case Edwards v. 
Aguillard declared teaching the latter unconstitutional (see, e.g., Numbers 2007, Scott 2007). However, it 
differs in that while it posits an intelligent designer as the reason for life, it also accepts a broad range of 
scientific theories, for example, accepting that the Earth is billions of years old as opposed to the thousands of 
years that some creationists posit. For discussions against ID, see, e.g., Forrest and Gross (2004), Petto and 
Godfrey (2007), and Shermer (2006). Pennock (1999) helpfully locates ID within neo-creationism while also 
defending Darwinian evolutionary theory. For a theistic position that also endorses evolution see Francis 
Collins (2006). On another note, Gould (1999) proposes the idea of non-overlapping magisteria as a model for 
science and religion‟s relationship. That is, science provides us with the facts and theories to explain how the 
world works and religion encompasses moral questioning and ultimate meaning. Problems arise when the two 
become conflated as they do in creationism. 
84
 ID‟s foundational figure and driving force, Berkeley law professor emeritus Phillip Johnson, has 
proposed a systematic agenda for infiltrating the scientific community‟s Darwinian orthodoxy. Dubbing this 
plan “the wedge,” its goal is systematically to undermine Darwinian materialism by creating a volume of books 
and articles that generate enough publicity to draw attention to them. This will “wedge” ID into scientific debate 
and eventually break Darwinian thinking, leaving ID as the dominant paradigm (Johnson 1999; see also Center 
for the Renewal of Science & Culture 1998, Dembski 2006, Johnson 2000). The problem is that in this light the 
arguments appear less than scientific, especially once scientists start challenging them (see, e.g., Behe [1996, 
2000]; Shanks and Joplin [1999]). Rather, they start appearing as systematic attempts to influence public policy 
without adhering to accepted scientific standards. 
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e.g., F. Collins 2006, 181-195; Dawkins 2009; Forrest and Gross 2004; Petto and Godfrey 2007; 
Shermer 2006). 
The Simpsons clearly promotes scientific rationality as a means of understanding the world, 
while also allowing for the supernatural‟s presence. However, when the two come into conflict 
science often wins. In addition to the examples already given, in “It‟s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Marge” 
Marge is put before a psychiatric board to determine her sanity. While the panel of scientists 
deliberates her fate, she starts praying. When they ask her what she is doing, Marge explains that she 
was praying. One of the psychiatrists then says, “I see. And this „God,‟ is he in this room right now?” 
When Marge replies that God is everywhere they declare her insane. The Christian belief in God‟s 
omnipresence is taken as conclusive proof of insanity. Conversely, at the end of “Pray Anything,” 
after Lisa has given scientific explanations for acts of God such as a freak rainstorm and flooding, she 
is at a loss to explain why the rain stops. Her answer is, “I don‟t know. Buddha?” Our perspective 
then shifts to heaven where the Buddha is sitting with God and suggests that the people on earth have 
suffered enough, implying that God is able to manipulate the physical world. However, this can also 
be seen as a chance to use humour in a “God of the gaps” argument since Lisa was able to 
scientifically explain everything that led to the town being flooded.  
4.3 Conclusion 
With this in mind, we should ask why the two apparently contradictory positions of science 
and spirituality work at the core of The Simpsons‟ unseen order. We can use the concept of 
institutional consonance—the fact that new ideas which are considered plausible, and build upon 
already held beliefs and ideas, are integrated into already existing plausibility structures. Scientific 
thinking has brought about significant changes in the modern world, but fails to explain everything. 
At the same time, while religious institutions have lost their credibility with certain segments of the 
population, the metaphysical tradition of American religion has promoted the concept of naturally and 
supernaturally influencing the natural world through human actions, and American individualism 
makes actively selecting a religion or picking from many traditions into a personal decision. These 
institutionalized patterns directly influence the way people craft their spiritual and religious lives. The 
underlying assumptions of science and spirituality—that the natural world and its sometimes 
inexplicable occurrences (miracles) can be explained through rational means, that people have the 
ability to change the world around them, and that our religious affiliations are a matter of personal 
choice based on “what works for you”—are endorsed in The Simpsons. This endorsement shows us 
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what resonates with the habitualized (if not explicitly stated) religious assumptions in the show. With 
this in mind, we turn to the related issue of institutional dissonance, looking at what negative jokes 





Chapter 5—Protestant Contributions to The Simpsons’ Unseen 
Order 
Simpsons commentators have lofty expectations, high praise, and sharp criticisms for the 
program‟s most prominent Christian characters. According to Heit, “Christianity‟s blunted authority 
in American culture is very much the result of leaders like Reverend Lovejoy bending their faith‟s 
fundamental beliefs to fit into a secular context” (2008, 69), but “even when things are so dire that 
Reverend Lovejoy must risk his own safety, he will do so to help his flock” (82). He further argues 
that Lovejoy‟s prayers are keys to The Simpsons‟ satirical attack on Christianity (246-247), while 
Bowler thinks Lovejoy‟s “choice of Bible readings is often ill advised” (2001, 9). Pinsky writes that 
Lovejoy is “hypocritical and occasionally venal, but he is not evil or immoral, merely human” (2007, 
71). The evangelical Ned Flanders is also a popular character in Simpsons literature. Henry calls 
Flanders‟ faith “highly exaggerated” (2008, 247), while Bowler dubs him “television‟s most effective 
mortal (i.e., not an angel) exponent of a Christian life well lived” (1996/1997, 15-16). Turner argues 
that Ned and his family “serve as a constant reminder of the ugliness of organized religion‟s most 
significant trend in recent years: the rise of fundamentalism” (2004, 265). Conversely, Pinsky calls 
Ned “the fairest and most sympathetic portrayal of an evangelical Christian in American popular 
culture” (2007, 46). These characterizations point to the seriousness with which these journalists and 
scholars take The Simpsons‟ portraits of Protestant life in America, but they have not missed the fact 
that God, accessed through prayer, is also present in The Simpsons, which adds a Christian 
supernatural element to the program‟s unseen order. 
In this chapter we examine God as a character in The Simpsons, noting the ways his portrayal 
criticizes and satirizes the Christian tradition.
85
 We then visit the caricatured mainline 
“Presbylutheran” First Church of Springfield (FCOS) and examine the resident minister, Rev. 
Timothy Lovejoy, to learn about the town‟s most prominent religious institution and its 
representative‟s life. Finally, we observe the Simpsons‟ neighbours, the Flanders, who are a study in 
positive and negative evangelical stereotypes in the program. Looking at Protestantism through these 
characters helps us understand how The Simpsons‟ creators interpret the United States‟ dominant 
Christian tradition(s). Delving first into God and prayer, then mainline Protestantism and finally 
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 Throughout this dissertation I use the male pronoun for God because that is how The Simpsons 
depicts him. That said, God is not universally seen as male in American Christianity. God is seen as male, 
female, and as a genderless “it” by different individuals across the Christian traditions.  
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evangelicalism, we will move from the religious elements closer to The Simpsons‟ comedic 
sensibilities to the more marginal ones. 
5.1 God: Too Old and Too Rich to be a Class Act? 
“Homer the Heretic” not only depicts God for the first time in The Simpsons, but also 
discusses his character. After the dream where God speaks to Homer, he informs his family that God 
told him missing church is acceptable. Intrigued, Bart asks his father what God is like. Homer 
describes him as, “Perfect teeth. Nice smell. A class act all the way.” This is contrasted with God‟s 
portrayal in Homer‟s explanation for why his house almost burnt down: “God is vengeful.” Pinsky 
focuses on these two elements of God‟s character (2007, 15-31), noting that “God is not mocked. 
When characters in The Simpsons face a crisis, they turn to God. He answers their prayers, often 
instantaneously, and he intervenes in their lives” (16). Pinsky is gracious with his interpretation, as a 
significant portion of Simpsons jokes about God could be considered mocking—a fact he 
acknowledges in passing. For example, when the family watches a Biblical epic parody about Noah in 
“Das Bus,” Bart proclaims, “God is so in your face.” Homer responds, “Yeah, he‟s my favourite 
fictional character.” Furthermore, in “Homer Loves Flanders,” Homer prays for tickets to the big 
football game. Ned, having won tickets in a radio contest, arrives at the front door and offers to take 
Homer with him. Slamming the door in Ned‟s face, Homer looks toward the ceiling and asks “Why 
do you mock me, O Lord!” Homer mistakes a waffle Bart threw on the ceiling for God, and after 
Marge peels it off, Homer catches it, saying, “I know I shouldn‟t eat thee but...” He then takes a big 
bite and drools, “Sacrilicious.” Finally, in “Treehouse of Horror XIV,” God, depicted as a beam of 
light, chases Homer. After Homer crosses railroad tracks before God can catch him, God mutters, “I 
am too old and too rich for this,” before letting Homer escape, bringing God‟s omniscience and 
omnipotence into question. God is as open to ridicule and mockery as any character in The Simpsons. 
Heit has a different problem with God‟s portrayal in The Simpsons. Most of his examples 
deal with Homer‟s understanding of God, and “God thus comes to reflect cultural values rather than 
embody traditional notions of who God is. . . . The critical point here is that Homer fails to recognize 
the theologically inconsistent image he offers” (2008, 36). While Heit‟s main concern is bringing 
people back to Protestant orthodoxy, his argument misses the point: Homer‟s many misconceptions of 
God reflect different ways American Protestants have depicted God. To rebut Heit, God always 
reflects cultural values (Delaney 2008, 203-207). Traditional notions of God are cultural values that 
have become sedimented over time. Furthermore, why should The Simpsons‟ representations of God 
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adhere to traditional standards or be theologically consistent? None of the program‟s creators‟ and 
owners‟ vested interests—entertainment, cultural subversion, or profit—is concerned with upholding 
Christian orthodoxy. That said, The Simpsons mines contrasting images of God in the Biblical and 
American traditions for humorous material. The satirical newspaper The Onion once published an 
article claiming God had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder (2001). With the way God is depicted 
in American sermons, entertainment, and other cultural resources one could be forgiven for thinking 
that this fake news source printed the truth. The Simpsons certainly suggests that God transitions 
between grace and vengeance, and keeping him satisfied is in everybody‟s best interest. 
That God fluctuates between benevolence and violence has a rich history in American 
culture. Possibly the most famous American sermon, Puritan Jonathan Edwards‟ “Sinners in the 
Hands of an Angry God,” explains that “God is a great deal more angry with great numbers that are 
now on earth: yea, doubtless, with many that are now in this congregation, who it may be are at ease, 
than he is with many of those who are now in the flames of hell” and “The God that holds you over 
the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is 
dreadfully provoked” (1741). Edwards‟s wrathful depiction of God was not unique. His contemporary 
George Whitfield warned, “O obstinate sinner, whoever thou art, he [God] will by no means spare 
thee” (1738). The Second Great Awakening‟s leading voice, Charles Grandison Finney, urged the 
churches to take a proper moral stand, opposing slavery and promoting temperance because “God 
cannot sustain this free and blessed country, which we love and pray for, unless the church will take 
right ground” (1835, 274). These wrathful proclamations about God continue to the present day, 
frequently featuring in radical political sermons against liberal political actions. For example, on 
September 13, 2001 former Moral Majority leader and fundamentalist televangelist Jerry Falwell 
claimed on his colleague Pat Robertson‟s 700 Club that God withdrew his protection from America 
on September 11, 2001 because of the actions of the American Civil Liberties Union, pagans, 
homosexuals, and abortionists (see also Henry 2008, 246).  
While Falwell and Robertson do not represent all Americans, the fact remains that you cannot 
live in the United States without hearing ongoing debates about God, what he is angry about, and the 
punishment in store for sinners. Statistics show that almost 80% of Americans believe in God.
86
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 Jensen (2009) reports the 2007 Harris Poll giving 82% of respondents believing in God. The 2008 
Pew Report (2008b) shows 92% of Americans believing in God or a Universal Spirit. In the 2000 GSS: 6.5% of 
respondents believed in a higher power, 3.2% believed in God sometimes, 15% believed in God with doubts, 
and 60% believed in God without doubting (Davis, Smith, and Martin 2000). By the 2008 GSS: 10.2% believed 
in an impersonal higher power, 4.5% do not know if God exists and believe there is no way to find out, 4.2% 
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However, among believers there are also significant divides in how God is understood, which 
correlate to political positions. While the majority of Christians conceive of God as a loving, caring, 
and compassionate entity, conservative Christians also associate God with power and judgment 
(Froese and Bader 2007; Jensen 1998, 2009; J. Hunter 1991; Kunkel et al. 1999; Noffke and 
McFadden 2001; Wuthnow 1989; cf. Stark 2008, 75-78). This matters because people‟s concepts of 
God affect how they solve problems, including issues such as abortion and capital punishment 
(Gorsuch and Smith 1983; J. Hunter 1991; Maynard, Gorsuch, and Bjorck 2001; Stark 2008; 
Wuthnow 1989).
87
 In America‟s polarized political environment, differences in opinions about God 
emphasize religio- political differences. While American Protestants, who make up a little more than 
50% of American adults, can agree that God is a loving entity, conservatives are leaders in 
characterizing God as punitive.
88
 
The Simpsons is aware of this tradition, and frequently references God‟s anger for humorous 
purposes. In “I Married Marge,” Marge tells Homer that she thinks the song “You Light Up My Life” 
                                                                                                                                                                    
believe in God sometimes, 16.9% believe in God with doubts, and 60.7% have no doubts God exists (Davis, 
Smith, and Martin 2008). The 2005 Baylor Religion Survey (BRS) found 65.8% of respondents have no doubts 
God exists, 10.8% believe in God with some doubts, 1.7% sometimes believe in God, and 14.3% believe in a 
higher power or cosmic force (Baylor University 2005). I arrived at the “almost 80%” number by combining the 
Harris Poll, and the 2008 GSS, and 2005 BRS numbers for those who have no doubt God exists with the 
numbers of those who believe in God with some doubts. This averages 78.4% of the respondents to those three 
surveys. I did not include “higher power” in this number because the term is too vague, excluding the Pew 
survey from my average as they equate higher power with God. Equating the two terms may show us that 92% 
of Americans believe in a significant agent as part of the unseen order, but it tells us very little about its nature. 
For example, equating a Fundamentalist Baptist‟s God with the Hindu concept of the universal soul is erroneous 
because they are radically different beyond the fact that they are both supernatural entities. As these surveys 
were not just surveys of Christians, it is important to distinguish the different characteristics of divine beings. 
That said, other studies show that some Christians see God as a universal spirit, making my estimate likely 
conservative. The salient point is that a significant percentage of Americans believe in God or some other agent 
in the world. 
87
 Stark‟s What Americans Really Believe (2008) reports that evangelicals are similar to other 
Americans on moral issues (156-157), however, his data (collected from the 2007 BRS survey) suggests 
otherwise. For example, he reports that 94% of evangelicals think abortion is wrong. This percentage declines 
to 75% of Catholics, 60% of liberal Protestants, and 24% of people with no religion. This means that 63% of 
non-evangelical respondents think abortion is wrong. However, that is a 31% difference separating evangelicals 
from all other religious groups politically, and distinguishes them from non-believers by 70%. Secular humanist 
Gregory Paul questions Stark‟s work in interpreting the BRS data, taking issue with Stark‟s claim that the level 
of atheism has remained consistent for the last sixty years (2009a; see also Ingram 2009; Paul 2009b; Phan 
2009). However, when we look at the statistics the BRS survey represents us with, we can call Stark‟s 
interpretations into question while still seeing that the data corresponds to other survey results. Put differently, 
the data is still useful while interpretations of it can be questioned. 
88
 The Pew Survey reports that 51.3% of American adults are Protestants (2008a, 10). This number is a 
composite of evangelicals (26.3%), mainline Protestants (18.1%), and historically black churches (6.9%). The 
2008 GSS also found 51.3% of respondents were Protestants (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2008). The 2005 BRS 
respondents were 58.7% Protestant (Baylor University 2005) 
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is about God. Homer responds, “Oh, well, he‟s always happy. No, wait, he‟s always mad.” In “Mr. 
Plow,” Homer and his best friend Barney Gumble start competing snow removal businesses. At the 
episode‟s conclusion they decide to work together, prompting Homer to proclaim, “When two best 
friends work together, not even God himself can stop them.” God‟s voice then echoes from overhead 
“Oh no?” and a ray of light melts all the snow. In the episode “Pray Anything,” Homer becomes 
FCOS‟s proprietor after suing the church. He throws a huge housewarming party at which numerous 
sins, including gambling, drunkenness, blasphemy, and idolatry, are committed. Storm clouds gather 
over the church and Marge, fearing for everybody‟s safety, warns him, “Aren‟t you afraid you might 
be incurring God‟s wrath?” Homer nonchalantly replies, “Eh, God‟s cool,” to which Marge says, 
“See, I don‟t know he is. In the Bible he‟s always smiting and turning people into salt.” Shortly 
thereafter, a bolt from the heavens electrocutes Homer and the town almost floods (in an act of God‟s 
vengeance). Only pleas from the Buddha and Kentucky Fried Chicken‟s founder, Colonel Sanders 
(feeding God popcorn chicken), calms the deity. Marge has a point—the Biblical God has a violent 
record. Marge references Gen 19:26, in which Lot‟s wife is turned into salt when she looks back at 
Sodom and Gomorrah. The Simpsons has also referenced the story of Noah, in which God killed all 
but eight people in a giant flood (“Das Bus”; “Mom and Pop Art”; “Homer and Ned‟s Hail Mary 
Pass”; Gen 6-9), and depicts hell as a fiery inferno, much like artistic renditions since Christianity‟s 




In “Treehouse of Horror XVIII,” The Simpsons parodies the contemporary “hell house” 
phenomenon, in which evangelical Christians depict punishments for people‟s sins on earth. The 
documentary Hell House (Ratliff 2001) chronicles Cedar Hill, Texas‟ Trinity Church members‟ 
careful planning and sincerity in creating a phenomenon that reflects their unseen order. In Hell 
House, rape victims kill themselves, homosexuals die of AIDS, and only a girl who took an abortion 
pill and bleeds over a hospital gurney, before calling out to Jesus, is saved. The rest are condemned to 
eternal punishment and torture. Designed to scare people into believing, The Simpsons summarizes 
their position on God‟s relationship with hell and hell houses when Ned prays, “Please Lord, grant me 
the power to psychologically torture them into loving you” (“Treehouse of Horror XVIII”). He then 
turns into the devil, illustrates how the seven deadly sins are present in Springfield, and shows the 
children hell, which is based on Hieronymous Bosch‟s depiction in “The Garden of Earthly Delights.” 
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 “and the devil who had deceived them was thrown into the lake of fire and sulphur where the beast 
and the false prophet were, and they will be tormented day and night for ever and ever” (NRSV). 
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In The Simpsons‟ version, Principal Skinner‟s head and shoulders are now a building in the middle of 
a lake of fire, into which people jump from a hole in the back of his head. Apu is chased up a tree and 
poked with pitchforks while protesting that he is Hindu, and Mr. Burns has been turned into a toad-
like creature, although he insists he regrets nothing. Terrified, Bart, Lisa, Milhouse, and the local 
bully Nelson Muntz all swear they will never commit the deadly sins and Ned is satisfied that the 
children are scared straight. 
Vengenge and cruelty are cultural traits attributed to God. Drawing from scripture to 
determine God‟s animosity towards homosexuals (Lev 18:22, Rom 1:26-32), condemnation of 
adultery and sexual immorality (e.g., Ex 20:14; Pv 6:32; Mt 5:27-28; 1 Cor 6:9-10, 18-20; Gal 5:19-
21), and granting eternal salvation for those who choose Jesus as a personal saviour, while damning 
those who do not (e.g., Jn 3:16, 10:9, 11:25, 14:6; Acts 4:2; Rom 6, 10:9-10; 1 Tim 2:4-5; Rev 3:20), 
are part of the unseen order conservative American Protestants emphasize when missionizing others. 
Only by accepting Jesus‟ death on the cross as redemption for their personal sins do conservative 
Christians think people go to heaven. Emphasizing God as a cosmic bully may seem cold and harsh to 
some, but scaring you into what these Christians see as ethical behaviour is congruent with their lived 
religious realities, something they see as an act of love. The Simpsons disagrees with this, but uses 
these portrayals of God to satirize those who do see him this way.  
God in The Simpsons is not always a wrathful deity. Some depictions draw upon the 
American liberal Protestant tradition. While conservative Christian voices about God may be the 
loudest and the most sensational, American liberals have a long history of invoking God for their 
causes (Hutchison 1976). The influential Unitarian Universalist William Ellery Channing wrote that 
Christianity‟s essence lay in “The elevation of men above the imperfections, temptations, sins, 
sufferings, of the present state, to a diviner being,—this is the great purpose of God, revealed and 
accomplished by Jesus Christ” (1967, 197). Some nineteenth and twentieth century reformers shared 
Channing‟s sentiments about human elevation. They also saw Jesus‟ example as revealing a loving 
God, often seeing him as a divine person in the Christian Trinity.
90
 Finney‟s advice to revivalists 
included making sure sinners accepted Christ‟s atonement, which would both satisfy God and lead 
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 The other entity in the Christian Trinity is the Holy Spirit. This confusing mystery of how Christians 
can be monotheists, but their God be three people, is satirically questioned in “Treehouse of Horror XV,” in 
which Ned acquires the power to see people‟s deaths. Begging Homer not to go to work, where he will cause 
Springfield‟s  destruction, Ned says, “Homer, please, don‟t tempt the gods. I mean God. There‟s one God. Only 
one. Well, sometimes there‟s three.” This joke references the general confusion that comes from trying to 
explain the Trinity and people‟s general awareness of the problem. 
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them to new ethical practices for the social good (1835, 334-352). The social gospel‟s major 
proponent, Walter Rauschenbusch (1967), argued that Christ‟s goal was to bring about a moral 
realignment that would lead to a better society based on equality, justice, and sharing property. Here 
God commands a great society in which contemporary social ills are cured through moral changes 
and altruistic decision making. Today, liberal evangelical pastor and social activist Jim Wallis writes 
that poverty is the foremost Biblical concern and that we should adjust our social policies towards its 
alleviation (regardless of political affiliation) (2005, 209-293). Positioning himself between 
conservative calls for personal ethics and liberal requests for increased funding, Wallis makes his 
stand on Matt 25:31-46 in which Jesus separates the saved from the condemned based on how they 
treated the impoverished and persecuted in society. For him “This judgement is not about right 
doctrine or good theology, not about personal piety or sexual ethics, not about church leadership or 
about success in ministry. It‟s about how we treated the most vulnerable people in our society, whom 
Jesus calls „the least of these.‟ Jesus is, in effect, saying, I‟ll know how much you love me by how 
you treat them” (218-219). Like Rauschenbusch generations before him, Wallis found that biblical 
Christianity calls him to a greater love for the least privileged Americans. God, through Jesus, calls 
people towards repentance and greater social purpose. He blesses those who adhere to his 
commandments and directs society towards an ultimate good. If God punishes, he also rewards and 
finds joy in those who adhere to his commandments.
91
 
The same holds true in The Simpsons. God frequently helps those who call upon him while 
living according to his commandments. Of all the characters, it is Ned and his family who benefit the 
most from God‟s favour. In “A Star is Burns,” the Flanders family films a re-enactment of the story 
of Moses in the rushes. After the youngest son, Todd, is placed in a basket and carried away by the 
river‟s current, Ned prays, “Flanders to God! Flanders to God! Get off your cloud and save my 
Todd.” A bolt of lightning knocks over a tree which stops the basket. In “Homer the Heretic,” when 
the fire from the Simpsons‟ home moves to the Flanders‟, a raincloud appears over their house, puts 
out the fire, and then a rainbow appears. Similarly, in “Team Homer,” Ned‟s bowling team “The Holy 
Rollers” competes against Homer‟s “Pin Pals.” After Ned rolls a spare, Homer starts taunting him: 
“God boy couldn‟t get a strike.” Ned looks upwards and says, “It‟s me, Ned.” Then the pin falls over 
and the ball returner jolts Homer with electricity.  
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 Jesus is not referenced as frequently or as deeply as God is in The Simpsons, and for reasons of space 
I have excluded a discussion of his role in the program. For an extended discussion of Jesus‟ role in American 
culture see Prothero (2003). 
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Heit takes exception to this last example, arguing that “to suggest that God will help Ned 
during a bowling game characterizes prayer in a way that belittles God. If God truly cares about 
knocking down Ned‟s bowling pins, one would have a difficult time explaining why God does not 
seem to care about other, more serious problems in Springfield” (2008, 31). Henry responds that “I 
see the many examples of God immediately responding to Ned‟s prayers as moments of absurdity on 
the show, and thus candidates for satire, not sincerity. The highly exaggerated way in which Flanders‟ 
faith is portrayed is an indication that the writers are satirizing the presumption that, through prayer, 
one has the power to effect immediate change in one‟s physical environment” (2008, 247-248). 
Henry‟s assessment is more accurate because The Simpsons is satirizing the idea that one can pray 
and change the physical environment. This, however, does not exhaust possible interpretations, as it 
can also be read as God helping those he favours and punishing their enemies. While Henry interprets 
all prayer in The Simpsons as satirizing fundamentalist preachers who claim to affect the natural 
world through prayer (248-249), he misses much of the spiritual depth that prayer in the program 
offers and ignores the breadth of religious behaviour being satirized. After all, prayer is not a foreign 
concept to Americans. The 2008 GSS survey found that 58.9% of respondents pray at least once a day 
and 76.2% pray at least once a week. Among Protestants the numbers are even higher, with 69.4% 
praying at least once a day and 86.8% pray at least once a week (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2008). If 
we correlate this with the Pew Survey‟s findings which found that 60% of all Americans believe God 
is a personal force (72% of evangelicals and 62% of all mainliners), it makes sense to depict people 
petitioning him (2008b, 27).
92
  
And characters in The Simpsons pray. Working from Rodney Stark and Roger Finke‟s 
definition of prayer as “communication addressed to a god or gods” (2000, 109), characters in The 
Simpsons petition God through prayer in ways that range from the flippant to the deeply emotional. 
Bart‟s mealtime grace in “Two Cars in Every Garage and Three Eyes on Every Fish” is flippant, 
“Dear God, we paid for this stuff ourselves so thanks for nothing.” This prayer denounces ideas about 
God‟s providence, saying that God does not provide for us, we provide for ourselves so why should 
we thank him? Bart trivializes God‟s power, making him appear distant and disengaged. Homer‟s 
prayers often blur the lines between trivial and sincere, and his simplicity makes it difficult to 
distinguish between frivolity and piety. In “And Maggie Makes Three,” Homer, oblivious to Marge‟s 
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 We have plenty of statistics demonstrating that Americans pray, but the content of those prayers 
goes largely unanalyzed. However, there is a growing body of sociological and psychological literature that is 
starting to rectify this problem, see, e.g., Bade and Cook (2008), Baesler (2002), Baker (2008), Harris et al. 
(2005), and Ladd and Spilka (2002, 2006). 
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pregnancy and enjoying life just the way it is, prays, “Dear Lord, the gods have been good to me and I 
am thankful. For the first time in my life everything is absolutely perfect just the way it is. So here‟s 
the deal, you freeze everything as it is and I won‟t ask for anything more. If that is ok, please give me 
absolutely no sign.” When nothing changes he says, “Ok, deal. In gratitude I present you this offering 
of cookies and milk. If you want me to eat them for you, give me no sign….Thy will be done.” He 
then eats the cookies and drinks the milk, but, in spite of his sincerity, Homer also sets himself up for 
an ironic twist. While Marge knows what is coming, it is Homer‟s blissful ignorance that makes the 
joke work. She knows, we know, and God knows that God is letting Homer fall into a trap. Whether 
this is irreverent and trivial is up for debate. Pinsky classifies this as asking for something so 
extravagant that Homer gets called on it (2007, 40). God does not work for Homer‟s gratification and 
Homer must live with the consequences of his actions. At the same time, this is a petitioning prayer 
that resonates with prayers people have heard throughout their lives. Homer is asking for something 
he wants and hopes God will intervene for him.  
However, in “Lard of the Dance,” before pursuing a huge quantity of grease for his grease 
recycling business Homer prays: “Dear Lord, I know you‟re busy—seeing as how you can watch 
women changing clothes and all that—but if you help us steal this grease tonight, I promise we‟ll 
donate half the profits to charity.” Bart chimes in, “Dad, he‟s not stupid.” Furthermore, in “Pray 
Anything,” Homer asks God to create a tasty new snack and then claps his hands, saying “I command 
you.” This prayer prompted Heit to argue that “in scenes such as these God is treated as a kind of 
metaphysical butler who will take care of every need” (2008, 32). These trivializing petitionary 
prayers are humorous both because they invert prayer‟s expected nature and because millions of 
Christians pray this way. Heit acknowledges that Christianity sees God as a source of provision (32), 
but he tempers that by arguing that some petitions are trivial and God has better things to do. These 
jokes suggest that God may have better things to do, yet selfishness and individualism are endemic in 
American culture (see also Bellah 2008). This affects what people ask for when they pray. As the 
2005 BRS demonstrates, people of lower economic status pray for financial and health reasons more 
often than those with higher status. Furthermore, they also pray more frequently than the wealthy 
(Baker 2008). In other words, personal interest and need dictate the content of petitionary prayers to 
some extent. The Simpsons reflects this and suggests that sometimes it will work, and other times it 
will not. Through this entire process God is posited as a real, active entity in the unseen order. 
Furthermore, there are petitionary prayers that reveal a kinder God who actively intervenes 
for his followers‟ benefit. Bart‟s famous prayer in “Bart Gets an F” inspired Lee Strobel of Willow 
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Creek Community Church (one of America‟s leading megachurches) to suggest that Jesus would be 
pleased with the prayer‟s heartfelt confession and honesty (1994, 29-41). Knowing that he will fail a 
test and be held back, Bart prays fervently before going to bed: “Well, old timer, I guess this is the 
end of the road.  I know I haven‟t always been a good kid, but if I have to go to school tomorrow I‟ll 
fail the test and be held back.  I just need one more day to study Lord, I need your help. . . . A 
teacher‟s strike, a power failure, a blizzard—anything that‟ll cancel school tomorrow.  I know it‟s 
asking a lot, but if anyone can do it, you can. Thanking you in advance, your pal, Bart Simpson.” An 
overnight blizzard leads to a school cancellation and Bart takes the day to study, after Lisa warns him: 
“I heard you last night, Bart, you prayed for this. Now your prayers have been answered. I‟m no 
theologian, I don‟t know who or what God is exactly, all I know is he‟s a force more powerful than 
mom and dad put together and you owe him big.” The benevolent and powerful God comes forth and 
answers a sincere petition for help. Similarly, in “Bart Sells His Soul,” Bart prays “Are you there 
God? It‟s me, Bart Simpson. I know I never paid too much attention in church, but I could really use 
some of that good stuff now. I‟m…afraid. I‟m afraid some weirdo‟s got my soul and I don‟t know 
what they‟re doing with it! I just want it back. Please? [starts crying] I hope you can hear this.” It is 
then revealed that Lisa bought back Bart‟s soul, but this sincere prayer comes after a long night of 
literal soul-searching for Bart. When he is in his darkest hour he honestly calls out to God. Whether 
or not viewers interpret this moment as God‟s intervention (cf. Heit 2008, 121; Henry 2008, 258-
265), the fact remains that Bart‟s plaintive call to God was done in total sincerity and reflects the 
belief that there is a supernatural agent who will act in his favour. These two prayers demonstrate The 
Simspsons‟ willingness to develop its characters through religious and spiritual practice rooted in the 
Christian tradition, and not just lampoon Christianity‟s beliefs. As we will see in the extended 
discussions of Lovejoy and Flanders, The Simpsons finds a redemptive element in Christianity when 
characters reach beyond themselves. 
However, Simpsons characters also bargain in their prayers, which reveals an understanding 
that God wants us to exchange behaviours for his providence (Pinsky 2007, 34). Stark and Finke 
suggest that religion is, at its core, about entering into exchange relationships with a god or gods 
(2000, 91). The more powerful the god, the more people pay to gain its favour, and the Christian God 
is a prime example of a god with a wide range of powers and high costs for his rewards (2000, 98-
99). The Simpsons, however, suggest that people rarely pay the costs for the rewards they seek and 
sometimes the costs are seen as too expensive relative to the rewards. In “Homer Defined,” during a 
nuclear scare, Marge prays: “Dear Lord, if you spare this town from becoming a smoking hole in the 
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ground, I‟ll try to be a better Christian. I don‟t know what I can do. Oh, the next time there‟s a canned 
food drive I‟ll give the poor something they‟d actually like instead of old lima beans and pumpkin 
mix.” This prayer is ironic because Marge thinks God‟s saving everybody in exchange for tasty food 
for the poor is a fair exchange. As no quantity or actual food source is specified, there is no way to 
tell just how far Marge was willing to go in her exchange, but judging by what she has given in the 
past she does not consider giving to food drives very important. Another time, during a hurricane, she 
prays, “Dear God, this is Marge Simpson. If you stop the hurricane and save our family we will be 
forever grateful and recommend you to all our friends. So if you could find it in your infinite wisdom 
to—” Suddenly the hurricane stops and Homer makes it clear how willing he was to fulfill Marge‟s 
offer, “He fell for it! Way to go Marge!” (“Hurricane Neddy”). Similarly, in “Homerpalooza” Homer 
drives Bart and Lisa to school while pontificating on classic rock music. Bart prays, “Dear Lord, if 
you keep Homer from embarrassing us today we promise to build several churches in your honour.” 
Lisa grabs Bart‟s arm, saying, “Bart! No!” and implying that God might actually hold them to their 
promise, something the kids had no plans to honour. These prayers reveal God as a contractual, 
bargaining deity who makes exchanges for payment that he always has the power to collect. 
However, that does not stop characters from trying to cheat him. 
God‟s appearances and people‟s prayers to him reveal a portrait of a divinity who rewards 
followers, but also extracts a high price for his services. The Simpsons does not deny God‟s active 
agency, but constantly questions his providence. However, while the United States‟ diverse Christian 
traditions shape this general idea of God, in The Simpsons he ultimately exists apart from 
institutionalized doctrines and rituals. In the characters of Rev. Lovejoy and Ned Flanders we see the 
extended criticism of institutionalized Christianity and its separation from The Simpsons‟ unseen 
order. 
5.2 Reverend Lovejoy and the Protestant First Church of Springfield 
Reverend Timothy Lovejoy is a fantastic satiric ideal type. Dressed in clerical blacks with a 
white collar, standing behind a plain pulpit in a large urban church with faux stained-glass windows 
and ample parking, he delivers sermons on topics that are tangential to his congregation‟s interests. 
When the need arises he leads Springfield‟s charge for moral hygiene, but otherwise he would rather 
play with his model trains. It is impossible to tell what denomination he belongs to, although in later 
seasons we learn he is a member of “the Western branch of Reformed Presbylutheranism” (“The 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Guest Star”). Like the minister Dr. Matthew Collins in The War of the 
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Worlds (Haskin 1953), who is also dressed in clerical blacks and collar, “audiences are left free to 
map onto his character any tradition they choose” (Cowan 2007a, ¶20). While Heit avoids assigning 
Lovejoy any particular Christian denomination, Pinsky argues that he and his church represent 
mainline Protestantism (2007, 75). Pinsky is correct to a point because the church presents 
characteristics popularly associated with mainline Protestantism and helps explain how 
denominations such as the United Methodist Church, American Lutheran Church, and Presbyterian 
Church, USA contribute to The Simpsons‟ unseen order.
93
 However, mainline Protestantism‟s more 
liberal elements are absent in Lovejoy‟s preaching, making him a more conservative caricature than 
he would be were he representing mainline Protestantism‟s liberal theological developments which 
emphasize critical historical thinking, a social ethic based on Jesus‟ teachings, and a postmillennial 
view of the world that encourages the betterment of human beings through social improvement (see, 
e.g., Ahlstrom 2004, 731-824; Hutchison 1968, 1976; Lofton 2006; Ogden 1976; Thuesen 2002). 
The first observation others make about FCOS is that its pews are full on Sunday (Heit 2008, 
72; Pinsky 2007, 75; Turner 2004, 263-264), which Pinsky notes “is, in part, a plot device” (2007, 
75). However, as both Pinsky and Heit acknowledge, just because people are in the pews does not 
mean they are particularly pious. Church is treated as a chore on The Simpsons, literally topping 
Homer‟s chores list in The Simpsons Movie (Silverman 2007). Furthermore, in “In Marge We Trust,” 
Lisa says that the time right after church is the best time of the week because “it‟s the longest possible 
time before more church!” In the Simpson family, it is Marge who insists that church is important for 
teaching morals and guiding people in their daily lives (“Bart‟s Girlfriend”, “In Marge We Trust”). 
For the others, church is boring and irrelevant. Homer constantly falls asleep during the service (e.g., 
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 Grouping churches as “mainline” is increasingly problematic, as the term does very little to 
distinguish these Christians from other Protestants. The Pew Survey Report lists 52 different responses people 
gave for their Mainline Protestant classification (2008a, 105-106), which accounts for 18.1% of the adult 
population. This includes groups with different polities (e.g., American Baptist Churches, USA‟s 
congregational polity compared to The United Methodist Church‟s hierarchy of conferences and general 
agencies) and denominational histories (see Smidt et al. [2003] for mainline clergy differences). Roof and 
McKinney‟s American Mainline Religion (1987) makes identifying mainline Protestants by denomination even 
more difficult, as they argue that mainline American culture is shifting away from the more liberal 
denominations towards a bifurcated debate, and changing demographics and declining attendance make it 
difficult for groups which traditionally shaped American morals to maintain their influence. At the same time, 
there are a group of moderate Protestant denominations (Methodists, Northern Baptists, Disciples, Lutherans 
and Reformed churches) that, along with Roman Catholics, hold the centre (see also T. Smith 1990). The 
sociological question that needs to be answered, and is still being debated, is which groups have the power to 
shape cultural and legal norms in an America where people are pulled between individualism and tradition (see 
also Bellah 2008, G. Layman 1997, J. Hunter 1991, Tamney 2005, Wuthnow 1988). However, the “mainline” 
label is still used in popular literature, and people know it as a differentiating marker from the more castigated 
fundamentalist and evangelical labels. 
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“Homer the Heretic”; “In Marge We Trust”; “Simpsons Bible Stories”), listens to football games on a 
portable radio (“The Telltale Head”), and makes noise with his motorcycle‟s engine during the 
service, causing Lovejoy to give up and cut his sermon short (“Take My Wife, Sleaze”). Bart‟s 
irreverent attitude extends to both the service, where he dispenses Iron Butterfly‟s “In-A-Gadda-Da-
Vida” as the hymn “In the Garden of Eden” by I. Ron Butterfly (“Bart Sells His Soul”), plays with 
troll dolls (“Bart‟s Girlfriend”), and plays video games (Silverman 2007), and to Sunday school 
where he pesters the Sunday School teacher about whether or not severed limbs will be waiting for 
you in heaven (the answer is “yes”) (“The Telltale Head”), and he gets excited to learn about hell 
(“Homer vs. Lisa and the 8
th
 Commandment”) and why God causes train wrecks (“Homer‟s Triple 
Bypass”). He also returns to Sunday School to catch Rev. Lovejoy‟s daughter. When the prodigal son 
returns, the Sunday School teacher announces, “but Bart, we banned you from Sunday School. You 
were happy. We were happy. Everybody was happy—particularly the hamster.” When Bart claims he 
has changed his ways the teacher accepts him back, noting that the Bible teaches forgiveness. Her 
efforts at teaching are futile though, as the students give her confused looks when she says that the 
prodigal son has returned (“Bart‟s Girlfriend”). Prothero‟s (2007) claims about American biblical 
ignorance can certainly be found in FCOS‟s Sunday School and in the church where people are 
present but do not care enough to invest their energy in learning about Christianity. Springfielders are 
in the pews not because it is congruent with their character (Marge and Ned Flanders exempted), but 
because this is a good setting for jokes. 
This leads us to the problem of declining attendance, a major concern for contemporary 
mainline churches (see, e.g., Demerath 1995b; Finke and Stark 2005, 235-283; Hout, Greely, and 
Wilde 2001; Hutchison et al. 1991; McKinney 1998; Roof and McKinney 1987; cf. Percy and 
Markham 2006; Wuthnow and Evans 2002). While FCOS is apparently not suffering an attendance 
problem, it is stricken with apathy. For Finke and Stark (2005, see also Stark and Finke 2000) 
mainline denominations decline because they uphold cultural norms without causing members to 
invest time, money, and identity in the organization. There is little to distinguish the religion from the 
culture at large so people do not bother adhering (see also Hoge, Johnson and Luidens 1994). For 
Finke and Stark, religions that demand significant investment of this world‟s resources in exchange 
for benefits in the next are more likely to succeed than those that do not (see also McGaw 1979; cf. 
Wellman 2002). The Simpsons suggests that while FCOS does not demand much of its members, it is 
the religion‟s content and otherworldly character that cause people to leave.  
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This is a church that does not reflect upon Christian doctrine, nor does it have regular rituals 
which engage people‟s minds, hearts, and bodies. The Eucharist is rarely referenced, and when it is, it 
is either to make a joke about the wine‟s alcoholic content (“Co-Dependents Day”) or about 
transubstantiation (“Mona Leaves-a”).
94
 Lovejoy‟s sermons are all the members have. Occasionally, 
Lovejoy has a passionate sermon, usually when he is mad about something Homer has done. In “The 
Telltale Head,” he attacks sports gambling, calling it the eighth deadly sin, while Homer listens to the 
football game on headphones. In “Homer the Heretic,” he warns people to honour the Sabbath in a 
sermon advertised as “When Homer Met Satan.” However, Lovejoy‟s usual sermons are drab and 
irrelevant. That people fall asleep during his sermons or while he reads through the entire Bible on a 
hot Easter Sunday (“Simpsons Bible Stories”) is part of Lovejoy‟s problem. His sermons miss any 
contributions Christian teachings could make to people‟s lives. In “The Springfield Files,” an “alien” 
(actually Mr. Burns) is spotted in Springfield, prompting Lovejoy to preach, “I remember another 
gentle visitor from the heavens. He came in peace, and then died only to come back to life. And his 
name was... E. T. the extraterrestrial. I love that little guy.” While the obvious inference would have 
been Jesus, this joke works by referencing another familiar character with negligible significance for 
Christianity. In “Bart‟s Girlfriend,” Marge tells Bart he has to go to church to learn morals and how to 
treat others. The scene shifts to Lovejoy mid-sermon where he says, “And with flaming swords, the 
Aromites did pierce the eyes of their fellow men and did feast on what flowed forth. Among whom 
also we all once conducted ourselves in the lusts of our flesh [his voice trails off].” This subverts 
Marge‟s original goal and suggests that Lovejoy‟s emphasis is counter-intuitive to the values 
Christians claim as their own. Finally, Lovejoy comes across as defeated by the tradition. In “Faith 
Off,” Lovejoy starts his sermon with “In his letter to the Corinthians, Paul instructed them to send ten 
copies to the Thessalonians and the Ephesians. But the Ephesians broke the chain, and were punished 
by the…” at which point Bart interrupts him, snoring. Lovejoy holds up the Bible and says, “Hey, I‟m 
doing the best with the material I have.” Bart, who recently attended a revival meeting, argues, “But 
church can be fun!” When the parishioners laugh, he protests, “No, really, it can be a crazy party with 
clouds and lasers and miracles! . . . A real preacher knows how to bring the Bible alive through 
music, and dancing, and Tae-Bo!”
95
 When Bart starts dancing in the aisles, a dejected Lovejoy rolls 
                                                     
94
 In “Co-Dependents Day,” Marge has been arrested for drunk driving, and when she drinks from the 
chalice Agnes Skinner yells, “Save some for the rest of us, alchy!” Then the local bus driver, Otto, says, “Don‟t 
bogart our Lord!” In “Mona Leaves-a,” Ned argues against reincarnation, stating, “people don‟t come back as 
anything, except for our Lord who came back as bread.” 
95
 Tae-Bo is a mass marketed aerobics program that combines martial arts, boxing, and dance. 
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his eyes and mutters “Never give them an opening.” Bart is able to recognize the fact that religion can 
be made interesting if communicated properly—something at which Lovejoy clearly fails. Lovejoy‟s 
sermons direct our attention to the fact that in The Simpsons the Christian tradition has failed to 
captivate the hearts and minds of its adherents, suggesting that contemporary preaching is largely 
boring or irrelevant in people‟s lives. 
Lovejoy can also be interpreted through the lens of internal strife within mainline 
denominations. As historian William Hutchison (1976) illustrates, the modernist impulse in American 
Protestantism led progressive Christians to try to adapt Christianity to the times. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, this meant rejecting established creeds and doctrines that were not 
deemed useful in elevating humans to their fullest potential in modern society. The progressives‟ 
focus was on improving conditions in this life as a way of showing God‟s love, and using human 
knowledge to achieve the kingdom of God on Earth. However, Lovejoy not only fails to inspire his 
congregation, he is also fairly staunch when it comes to moral issues. While he appears leading moral 
crusades against lewd behaviour (“Bart After Dark”), science (“Lisa the Skeptic”; “The Monkey 
Suit”), and Krusty the Clown (“Krusty Gets Busted”), his most controversial (or, depending on one‟s 
perspective, conventional) moral stand comes in season sixteen‟s “There‟s Something About 
Marrying.” After Springfield legalizes gay marriage to increase tourism revenue, hordes of 
homosexual couples come to Springfield to tie the knot. Lovejoy refuses them entrance to the church, 
saying, “While I have no opinion for or against your sinful lifestyles, I cannot marry two people of 
the same sex any more than I can put a hamburger on a hot dog bun.” When Marge challenges him on 
this, saying that love should be the deciding factor, Lovejoy sticks to the text: “The Bible forbids 
same sex marriage,” although it should be noted that he cannot name specific books (e.g., Lev 18:22, 
Rom 1:26). He starts ringing the church bell to quiet Marge‟s protests, although we can hear her 
arguing that scriptural scholars disagree about the significance of something (her voice fades out) and 
that Jesus‟ ministry emphasized love. Henry argues that this episode is the latest example of The 
Simpsons challenging heteronormativity in American media, but downplays its religious elements 
(Henry 2008, 220-224, 286-287), while Pinsky (2007, 192-198) uses the episode to illustrate that the 
series does not attempt to resolve the same-sex marriage issue for either side of the debate. Indeed, 
those both for and against same-sex unions claim the episode represents their views. While this is an 
issue that fills books, journals, and airwaves, the salient point about this episode is that Lovejoy 
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rejects the liberal attitude The Simpsons treats as normative.
96
 In doing so he becomes another 
religious bigot, a villain in the larger discourse about Christianity in America. American churches are 
divided on this issue and it continues to further separate them (Cadge 2002; Cowan 2003b; Olson and 
Cadge 2002; Cadge, Day and Wildeman 2007). The modernist impulse embraces homosexuals‟ 
human potential and sees homosexuality as naturally occurring and, therefore, not sinful. 
Conservative Christianity generally does not (see Dawne Moon [2005], for discourse analysis of both 
perspectives). Lovejoy‟s position is the conservative one, denying marriage rights to homosexuals 
based on strict Biblical interpretation, suggesting that he is not as liberal as Pinsky submits. 
Lovejoy has other personal problems which affect his ability to minister effectively. Like 
other clergy members, he constantly worries about finances. He borrows the local library‟s copy of 
the Bible every week because he cannot afford one himself (“Bart the Mother”). In “Bart Sells His 
Soul,” when Milhouse asks Bart what the world‟s religions have to gain by lying about the soul‟s 
existence, the scene cuts to Reverend Lovejoy pouring money from the collection plates into a coin 
sorter. Furthermore, in “The Joy of Sect,” Lovejoy denounces the new religious movement “The 
Movementarians,” saying, “This so called „new religion‟ is nothing but a pack of weird rituals and 
chants designed to take away the money of fools. Let us say the Lord‟s Prayer forty times, but first 
let‟s pass the collection plate.” Lovejoy‟s concluding contradiction: His church is just as greedy as 
any new religion. This point is brought to the forefront in “Viva Ned Flanders,” when Lovejoy 
explains tithing to his congregation: “And once again, tithing is ten percent off the top. That‟s gross 
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 Olson and Cadge (2002) argue that debates about homosexuality raise questions that are pivotal to a 
church‟s identity, stating, “Homosexuality is about scripture: How is the Bible to be read, interpreted, and 
understood? It is about creation: How ought the people that God creates behave sexually? Homosexuality is 
about families and reproduction: Who can be married? Bear children? Adopt children? Raise children? What 
lessons should those children be taught about sexual behavior?” (155). Cadge (2002) reviews the different 
positions different mainline denominations took at the turn of the millennium, noting that there were 875 “gay 
welcoming or transforming congregations” in the United States (277). Thumma (2006, 100) now puts the 
number in excess of 1600 congregations. When we consider that none of the mainline denominational bodies 
had legitimated homosexual marriage or ordination in 2000, even though some local churches and bishops went 
against official church positions, this number is significant (since Thumma‟s writing the United Church of 
Christ and the Episcopal Church have issued statements which do not call homosexuality sinful [Cadge, Day 
and Wildeman 2007, 248]). It should also be noted that in Thumma‟s (2006) study of 750 Open and Affirming 
congregations across the Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the 
churches had the same rate of decline as others in the denomination. Put differently, a congregation that decides 
to be Open and Affirming of homosexuals does not necessarily help or hinder its growth. It should also be noted 
that homosexual marriage is not the only same-sex issue churches are conflicted about. Homosexual ordination 
is also particularly contentious and involves similar battles over the nature of homosexuality (is it a choice or 
genetic), its status as sin, and whether or not celibate or committed homosexuals should be considered for 
ordination. For an extended discussion of the Presbyterian Church (USA)‟s 1996 General Assembly debate on 
this issue see Beuttler (1999), Burgess (1999), Rogers (1999), Wellman (1999), and Weston (1999). 
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income, not net. Please people, don‟t force us to audit.” Heit argues that Lovejoy‟s financial concerns 
reflect ministers‟ realities across the United States. That is, they are overworked and underpaid 
because people do not financially support their religious institutions (2008, 76-78).  
Lovejoy‟s ennui stems from the fact that while he originally came to Springfield to help 
others, he has since become overworked by Ned Flanders‟ constant questions about applying 
Christianity to the smallest details of his life. This is clearly illustrated in “In Marge We Trust” when 
Marge volunteers at the church. Lovejoy is overjoyed that he now has some help looking after the 
building and, in preparing his sermon “The Joy of Shame” finds, “a form of shame that has gone 
unused for seven hundred years.” However, when people start calling the Reverend for advice, he 
dismisses them. He tells Principal Skinner to read his Bible for guidance after a fight with his mother. 
When Skinner asks about a specific passage Lovejoy responds, “Oh, it‟s all good.” When Marge asks 
him what had happened to his passion, Lovejoy explains that over the years Ned has asked him so 
many inane questions that eventually he stopped caring about people. Marge then takes over the 
Reverend‟s advising role, which leads him to feel that he has lost his flock. Walking into the church 
he looks at the stained glass windows of saints dying gruesome deaths and experiences a vision in 
which they talk to him, asking him what he has done to inspire faith. When Lovejoy says that he had 
the church vestibule recarpeted, one of the saints looks at him and complains, “I‟ve appeared in over 
eight thousand visions, and that is the lamest reply I‟ve ever heard.” After Lovejoy protests the saint 
silences him, saying, “You‟re just lucky God isn‟t here.” Meanwhile, Marge excels at Lovejoy‟s job 
as advisor until she gives Ned some bad advice, and he needs to be rescued from baboons at the local 
zoo by Lovejoy. Similarly, at the end of “Pray Anything,” Lovejoy returns to Springfield after leaving 
because Homer won the deed to the church in a lawsuit and turned FCOS into the Simpsons‟ home. 
Homer‟s housewarming party has caused massive flooding, and the entire town huddles fearfully atop 
the church. Lovejoy appears just in time, prays for forgiveness, and the rain stops. These examples 
demonstrate one of Lovejoy‟s major characteristics—he rises to the occasion and looks out for his 
parishioners. Even if he represents Christianity‟s failed theology, greed, and general irrelevancy in 
many Simpsons jokes, when he is needed, Lovejoy selflessly looks after the people he serves. 
Although often a caricature for organized Christianity‟s failures, Lovejoy is a complex 
character who wants to thrive professionally and encourage people. It is in those moments when he 
embodies love and courage in Christianity‟s name, and leaves his bigotry and judgementalism behind, 
that he is applauded. Heit accurately assesses Lovejoy‟s Christian leadership: “He accomplishes more 
than simply recarpeting the vestibule. He is inconsistent and cynical, to be sure, but he shows that he 
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is capable of making himself and the church he represents relevant to a town that will turn its back on 
its faith. Springfield‟s parishioners will fall away, neglect the demands their faith places upon them, 
do their best to avoid their fiduciary obligation to the church, but their pastor will trudge along, even 
at a low hourly wage” (2008, 82). These are the acceptable Christian elements for The Simpsons, 
leaving the boring sermons, irrelevant scriptural references, and conservative bigotry for their scorn. 
But Lovejoy is not the only Christian caricature in The Simpsons. Ned Flanders provides a nuanced 
interpretation of American evangelicalism and raises more questions about what is acceptable and 
damnable in The Simpsons‟ unseen order. 
5.3 Ned Flanders’ Dynamic Evangelicalism 
Among Simpsons commentators there are two major summaries of Ned Flanders and his role 
as a caricature of evangelical Christianity. Pinsky (2007, 46-69) portrays him positively, as a 
representative evangelical who tries to be a genuinely good person, only briefly acknowledging some 
of Ned‟s more politically conservative activities (50-51). Heit (2008, 83-95) argues that Ned reflects 
Christianity‟s dark side (see also Turner 2004, 265; Henry 2008, 256-258, 270-275). When faced with 
diametric disagreements like these we often find that the situation is more nuanced than either analyst 
permits. First, consider Heit and evangelicalism‟s dark side as projected through Ned Flanders, 
especially his political work as a moral watchdog and his goal of returning the country to “the 
America of yesteryear that only exists in the brains of us Republicans” (“Home Away From Homer”). 
Here, we see a two-pronged attack on mainstream life in the United States. First, there is the attempt 
at moral reform through public action on issues such as homosexuality, abortion rights, prayer in 
public schools, and media content. Second, there is the promotion of an alternative symbolic universe 
rooted in conservative Christianity‟s Biblical interpretation and morality. The satirist‟s gaze focuses 
on these evangelical characteristics. Pinsky‟s discussions of Ned‟s Christian morality, on the other 
hand, suggest that he also represents the tradition‟s moral aspects that Simpsons portrays as valuable. 
This complicates Ned‟s character, moving him away from being an American evangelical caricature 
and making him into a plausible representative of evangelical values. 
Ned‟s evangelicalism has deep roots in American culture. Today‟s evangelicals stand upon a 
rich and colourful history that stretches back to the First Great Awakening. Evangelicalism was 
America‟s dominant Christian tradition during the nineteenth century, but with the increased 
questions about biblical inerrancy, intellectual skeptics influenced by Darwinism, and German higher 
criticism, and the fundamentalist retraction from the mainline Protestant denominations after the 
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Scopes trial in 1925, conservative evangelicals withdrew from the American mainstream for their 
own isolated communities and abandoned the world to its sinful nature (Marsden 2005).
97
 However, 
this did not last long as less conservative evangelicals started actively engaging the culture at large in 
the early 1940s, starting with the National Association of Evangelicals‟ (NAE) founding in St. Louis 
in 1942 to combat the liberal Federal Council of Churches. After a lull in political engagement during 
the 1960s, evangelicals were drawn back into the public square because of church and state issues 
regarding prayer in public schools and the 1973 landmark Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion. 
Ronald Reagan‟s election in 1980 marked a new high point for conservative religion‟s political 
influence, a phenomenon repeated when George W. Bush took the presidency in 2000 and 2004 with 
strong conservative Christian support. Evangelicals were also known through highly visible public 
preachers and televangelists, including Billy Graham, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Jim Bakker, and 
others (Marsden 1991, 62-82; C. Smith 1998, 2-19; Hankins 2008; J. Stone 1997).
98 
 
Evangelicalism is a diverse religious subculture with members spanning the political 
spectrum from conservative to liberal. Studies emphasize evangelicalism‟s conservatism, and, 
depending on the analytic framework, “evangelical” may be exclusive to Protestants in conservative 
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 Marsden (1991, 11-17) argues that a convergence of intellectual criticisms of traditional Christian 
beliefs, the influx of Catholic immigrants that led to greater pluralism, urbanization, and increasing 
secularization in the public sphere where Protestant respectability was favoured over a prophetic voice caused 
the evangelical decline. Bringing this line of argument into the present, James Hunter (1983, 11-19) builds on 
Peter Berger (1967), arguing that accommodating the intellectual trends of modernity led to mainline 
Protestantism‟s erosion. Concurrently, he contends that evangelicalism is dying a slow death before modernity‟s 
onslaught. Christian Smith (1998, 107-113) suggests that Hunter‟s and Berger‟s arguments about religious 
enclaves slowly dying away is incorrect. Instead, modernity allows evangelicals to construct strong subcultures 
that engage some elements of modernity and refute them, building a strong subcultural identity in the process 
(see also pgs. 41-42). This ties into the secularization debate discussed in chapter 3, ff. 45, see also Gallagher 
(2004), Hankins (2008). 
98
 This shift is sometimes referred to as the neo-evangelical movement which is helpfully interpreted in 
light of what Wuthnow (1988, 1989) calls the restructuring of American religion. That is, after World War II 
the United States is experiencing a religious reorganization away from denominations towards religious special 
interest groups. While neo-evangelicals are still involved in denominational and non-denominational churches, 
it is impossible to understand their spread without knowledge of parachurch organizations. Evangelist Billy 
Graham is a central figure whose crusades brought many people into the movement, but without institutions 
such as Christianity Today magazine, the NAE, youth and young adult movements such as Campus Crusade for 
Christ, educational institutions and seminaries including Wheaton College and Fuller Theological Seminary, 
and a wide array of radio and television programs and personalities, the infrastructure permitting a sacred 
canopy/umbrella to exist could not have developed and effectively permeated people‟s lives. Although this is 
not an exhaustive selection of neo-evangelical parachurch organizations, it is also important to note that not 
every institution will appeal to every evangelical. Neo-evangelicalism‟s internal diversity allows different 
people to engage with the movement and interpret it in light of their own experiences and needs (C. Smith 
2000). It is also significant that while scholars may classify these evangelical organizations together, within the 
various evangelical subcultures there is a distinct awareness of subtle differences between different evangelical 
groups (J. Stone 1997). 
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denominations, include or exclude Pentecostals and Fundamentalists, or be defined as a transnational 
subculture that permeates into religious groups classified as mainline.
99
 Historian Randall Balmer 
(2006) includes Pentecostals, Fundamentalists, and other conservative Protestants in his description of 
the evangelical subculture, but evangelical historian Mark Noll excludes Fundamentalists (2001, 9-
26).
100
 To describe Ned Flanders, I follow Balmer because the breadth of his conceptualization allows 
us to combine evangelicalism‟s many elements into a single caricature—an ironic choice because 
Balmer aptly demonstrates the movement‟s internal diversity (see also Shibley 1996, 20-21).
101
 Ned 
embodies those subcultural elements which combine right wing politics with a sincere desire to live 
Christian lives and help people. 
Ned‟s dark side can be seen in over-protective parenting and his role in Springfield‟s moral 
watchdog groups. He is not only a moral exemplar, but what Howard Becker described as a “moral 
crusader” (1963, 149). Moral crusaders work to enact changes they believe will improve the lives of 
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 See, e.g., Mac Iver (1990) and Jim Wallis (2005) who discuss liberal evangelicalism. Shires (2007) 
describes how Americans who converted to evangelicalism during the Jesus People movement in the 1960s 
shaped conservative evangelicalism, emphasizing the golden rule, conversionism, and working for political 
restructuring which would allow others to reach their full potential under what they saw as God‟s will. These 
are the ideas influencing left-leaning evangelicals and, therefore, it is worth considering the similarities between 
the two sides as well as the differences. 
100
 There are numerous other categorizations. Christian Smith (1998) and Jon Stone (1997) categorize 
fundamentalists separately, positioning evangelicals between fundamentalists and liberal Protestants. They use 
“evangelical” to indicate those Christians who trace their religious lineage back to the evangelical-
Fundamentalist split that occurred between 1942 and the 1960s. Smith, however, includes evangelicals, 
Fundamentalists, and Pentecostals under the banner of “conservative Christian” when conducting his research 
(2000, 15-18). Reimer (2005) describes evangelicalism as a transnational subculture that permeates into many 
denominations, making the movement difficult to categorize (see also Ammerman [1987]). 
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 Aside from the categorization according to broad religious movements which I use, there is also a 
definitional approach to evangelicalism. Marsden identifies five beliefs he considers essential for evangelicals: 
“(1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of the bible, (2) the real historical character of God‟s saving 
work recorded in Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based on the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the 
importance of evangelism and missions, (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life” (1991, 4-5). 
Bramadat uses this definition and augments it with a sixth characteristic, a personal relationship with Jesus 
(2000, 10). Bebbington identifies evangelicals according to the core characteristics of conversionism 
(emphasizing a life changing experience in which people encounter God and are “born again”), biblicism (the 
Bible is the ultimate authority), activism (evangelizing), and crucicentrism (a focus on Christ‟s redeeming work 
through his death on the cross which is often seen as the way to salvation) (Bebbington 1989, 2-3). Canadian 
historian George Rawlyk used this model to identify evangelicals in a nationwide survey in which he concluded 
that one third of all Canadian evangelicals are Catholic (1996, 118; on the charismatic movement see Neitz 
[1987], and Hervieu-Léger [1997]). While Noll also uses this definition, he warns that these “traits have never 
by themselves yielded cohesive, institutionally compact, or clearly demarcated groups of Christians. But they 
do serve to identify a large family of churches and religious enterprises” (Noll 2001, 13; see also Hankins 
2008). I follow a model that draws from traditions because it allows me to associate Ned‟s actions with 
contemporary evangelicals (broadly defined), rather than trying to fit both the caricature that is Ned, and real 
evangelicals whom the program‟s creators satirize, into an artificial category that emphasizes certain 
characteristics over others.  
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others. In “You Kent Always Say What You Want,” Ned writes an email to his online compatriots 
after hearing local newsman Kent Brockman swearing on television. When his sons Rod and Todd 
ask what he‟s doing, Ned replies, “imploring people I never met, to pressure a government with better 
things to, do to punish a man who meant no harm, for something that nobody even saw!” Another 
time, Ned tells Homer that he spent his whole morning blacking out the words “gosh” and “darn” in 
Hardy Boys novels (“Smoke on the Daughter”). He also argues that “our courts aren‟t fit to keep 
children in line. The only thing they‟re good for is telling women what to do with their bodies” (“The 
Bart of War”). He scares Bart wearing finger shears (visually referencing Freddy Krueger, the central 
character in the Nightmare on Elm Street horror films), telling him to say his prayers because the 
schools can‟t force him like they should (“Cape Feare”). Furthermore, he reassures his children that 
Harry Potter and his friends will go to hell for practising witchcraft (“Trilogy of Error”), but he does 
allow them to watch “Gravey and Jobriath,” in which the young man, Gravey, is making a pipe bomb 
to blow up Planned Parenthood (“HOMЯ”). In an extended sequence on the DVD version of this 
episode, Ned refuses to explain Planned Parenthood to the boys because he is busy taking down 
doctors‟ names being listed on the screen. Parodying the Lutheran Church of America‟s popular 
Davey and Goliath cartoon from the 1960s and 1970s, The Simpsons takes Davey and Goliath‟s 
association with Christian teachings of love, forgiveness, and tolerance and inverts it, suggesting that 
evangelicals share abortion clinic bombers‟ moral self-righteousness. 
These examples reference and satirize politically engaged evangelicals (see Jelen 2005). As 
we saw in the last chapter, Ned has represented conservative Christian ideas in Springfield‟s 
courthouse when fighting for intelligent design. However, the battle between creationism and science 
is not evangelicalism‟s only crusade. The above examples point out symbolic identity markers that 
different evangelical groups have projected into American consciousness. References to courts 
controlling women‟s bodies and attacks on Planned Parenthood recall the evangelical anti-abortion 
lobby of the late twentieth century, which saw sit-ins at abortion clinics and the harassment of women 
seeking abortions. In some cases, doctors were murdered and properties burned. Anti-abortionism has 
become a significant element in evangelicalism‟s symbolic boundaries, and is a litmus test for 
political support (see, e.g., Evans 2002, Hadley 1994, Hoffman and Johnson 2005, Hughes 2006, 
Jelen and Wilcox 2003, Maxwell and Jelen 1995, Wilcox and Gomez 1990).  
Abortion decisions are not the only legal issues evangelicals have challenged. When Ned 
complains that the schools cannot force Bart to pray he references 1962‟s Engel v. Vitale, 1963‟s 
Abington School District v. Schempp, and 1971‟s Lemon v. Kurtzman Supreme Court decisions 
 
 117 
banning school board-drafted prayers, and prohibiting religion‟s promotion in public schools. These 
are contentious decisions, and evangelicals continually seek ways to circumvent them (see, e.g., 
Chancey 2007, Ebel 2009, Elifson and Hadaway 1985, Green and Guth 1989). In this section‟s 
opening paragraph I referenced Ned‟s quote about the America of yesteryear that only exists in the 
minds of Republicans. As school prayer and anti-abortion are popularly associated with evangelical 
support for the Republican Party, it is little surprise that The Simpsons would use its evangelical 
character to satirize the Republican Party‟s base‟s religio-politics because these issues are seen as 
antithetical to the individualism and secularism The Simpsons supports. 
The Flanders home and family are caricatures of American evangelicals. Their house is filled 
with pictures of God and Jesus, Ned has an extensive collection of Bibles, and the boys play games 
such as “Christian Clue,” “Good Samaritan,” and “Billy Graham‟s Bible Blaster” (“Bart Has Two 
Mommies”; “Lisa‟s First Word”; “Alone Again Natura-Diddly”). “Home Sweet Homediddly-Dum-
Doodily” emphasizes the Flanders‟ stark contrast with the Simpsons. After the Simpson children have 
been placed in the Flanders‟ protective custody Lisa characterizes the difference as, “it seems like our 
house, but everything‟s got a creepy Pat Booneish quality to it.” The Flanders do not watch television, 
they eat cucumbers with cottage cheese as a snack, and to relax they play “Bombardment of Bible 
Questions.” While Ned and his wife Maude (who died in season eleven‟s “Alone Again Natura-
Diddly”) are caring parents, they are presented as the wrong custodians for Bart and Lisa. This is 
made readily apparent in the bombardment scene when, asking questions from the Vulgate of Saint 
Jerome, Ned questions the children about their biblical knowledge: 
NED 
Come on, this one‟s easy. 
LISA 
We give up. 
NED 
Well, guess! Book of Revelations, fire-breathing lion‟s head, tail 







[yelling] Je...Jes...don‟t you kids know anything? The serpent of 
Rehaboam? [Bart and Lisa stare blankly.] The well of Zohassadar? 
[More blank stares.] The bridal feast of Beth Chadruharazzeb? 
When Maude says that these are the things the children should have learned in baptism class, 
Lisa acknowledges that they were never baptised. After Ned faints he decides to take the children to 
the Springfield River and baptize them for the good of their immortal souls. Once Homer and Marge 
discover this they come and rescue the children. The Flanders are loving and caring, but far too 
entrenched in fundamentalist conceptions of family values for The Simpsons. Emphasizing Rod and 
Todd‟s sheltered lives suggests that the Flanders have built a barrier to the outsider world, protecting 
themselves with evangelical trappings. Their sacred umbrella is exclusive and strong enough to 
prevent neighbouring forces from penetrating.  
Ned is not always a moral crusader. He can also be a model of compassion, generosity, and 
neighbourliness. Indeed, one of the important things about Ned is the way that he embodies the ideal 
type of a kind, caring Christian—even if that type becomes corrupted by his moralizing and Christian 
exclusiveness. Throughout the series we see Ned practice neighbourly love, even though Homer is 
one of the most obnoxious characters anyone could ever imagine having as a neighbour.  
From early in the second season, Ned seeks help from Rev. Lovejoy whenever he feels he has 
failed at this task. Reaching out only results in Homer‟s anger and mockery, but Ned tries to make 
amends by sending the Simpsons a heartfelt letter of apology (“Dead Putting Society”). In season 
five‟s “Homer Loves Flanders,” Ned and Homer briefly befriend each other after Ned generously 
invites Homer to a football game, buys him snacks, and offers him the game ball. However, Homer‟s 
friendship quickly becomes overbearing. Ned wants to be a good neighbour, but ends up lying to 
Homer to get some time with his family. Eventually, he tries to race away from Homer, and after 
escaping he is stopped by the police. The church bus passes him, and everybody judges Ned while 
praising Homer‟s good works. Dejected, embarrassed, and angry, Ned is eventually redeemed after 
Homer declares that Ned is the most caring person he knows. Homer reminds us that if everybody 
were like Ned Flanders “there‟d be no need for heaven, we‟d already be there.” Similar sentiments 
can be seen in “Home Away From Homer,” in which Ned moves away after Homer humiliates him. 
Homer tracks him down, begging him to come back because the new neighbour is not nearly as 
gracious with Homer‟s failings as Ned. Finally, in “No Loan Again, Naturally,” Ned becomes the 
Simpsons‟ landlord. He eventually evicts the Simpsons after they continue wrecking the house, but as 
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two new tenants are about to move in Ned has a change of heart. Explaining why he allows the 
Simpsons to return home, he says, “Well, the people who lived here before weren‟t always the best 
neighbours, but I love „em. And you can‟t be a saint unless you live among the lepers.” This suggests 
The Simpsons can find something valuable in Christian charity. 
Ned is also willing to help financially when strangers are in need (“Brother, Can You Spare 
Two Dimes?”), and when Homer and Bart think they have contracted leprosy he pays to send them to 
a first class leper colony on Hawaii‟s Molokai Island, which is famous for the work of Fr. Damien of 
Molokai who dedicated his life to improving the conditions of the leper colony there (“Little Big 
Mom”). He does charity work in a variety of episodes, including feeding the homeless or planting a 
tree at the seniors‟ centre (“Homer Loves Flanders”; “The Bart of War”; “„Tis the Fifteenth Season”). 
Pinsky correctly asserts that “Ned is . . . deeply immersed in the good works of the social gospel” 
(2007, 50), which Heit downplays in favour of his argument that Ned represents Christianity‟s dark 
side. Indeed, Ned‟s willingness to extend a helping hand makes him an easy foil for Homer‟s abuse, 
but evangelicalism‟s ethical vision of loving others and doing the right thing dwells beneath the 
humour Homer‟s torments generate. Ned legitimates Christianity‟s ethical side. While the 
institutional and culture warrior elements of Ned‟s character are decried, his faith—his spirituality—
is affirmed as ethical. Commentators like Pinsky and Bowler, who emphasize the good in religion that 
The Simpsons supports, focus on these elements of Ned‟s character. 
Ned‟s two major crises of faith reveal his spiritual depth. In “Hurricane Neddy,” a hurricane 
destroys the family house while nothing happens to the Simpsons‟. The Flanders take shelter at FCOS 
where the sign out front reads, “God Welcomes His Victims.” Echoing the Biblical story of Job, who 
lost his home, family, and property in a bet between God and Satan, Ned wonders if he is being 
punished. Lovejoy‟s response to whether or not God is penalizing Ned is far from comforting: 
“Ooh....short answer yes with an if, long answer no with a but. Uh, if you need additional solace by 
the way I‟ve got a copy of something or other by Art Linkletter in my office.” The reverend‟s 
ambivalence forces Ned to find answers for himself. That night he climbs into the sanctuary and 
prays, “Why me, Lord? I‟ve always been nice to people, I don‟t drink or dance or swear. I‟ve even 
kept kosher just to be on the safe side. I‟ve done everything the Bible says, even the stuff that 
contradicts the other stuff! What more could I do? I feel like I‟m coming apart here! I want to yell out 
but I just can‟t dang-diddly-do-dang-do-damn-diddly-darn do it! I... I...[sighs].” Unlike Job, who 
receives an audience with God and is rewarded for his faith in the face of hardship, Ned‟s prayer is 
never answered. However, his actions call into question Turner‟s claim that “in the Flanders home, 
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spirituality often appears to be fragile and other-worldly—couched in antiquated language, in need of 
constant protection from the rough-and-tumble of everyday life” (2004, 267). Instead, religion‟s 
institutional concepts—the rules, dogmas, and rituals—have driven Ned towards a moral life. While 
he does not receive any consolation for his family‟s suffering, religion frames the question of “why 
do I deserve this?” and gives Ned‟s life meaning even if the answers he receives are unsatisfactory. 
This is a deep faith developed within religion, and while Turner is right that the caricatured 
fundamentalism Ned can represent is satirized, this does not mean that it cannot provide a meaningful 
spiritual experience in spite of its cultural baggage. Understanding Flanders‟ value for The Simpsons‟ 
unseen order means seeing past caricatures, realizing that The Simpsons actively selects what it deems 
positive traits from different religions, and showing how those elements can fruitfully enrich a 
character‟s life. 
Ned‟s other major crisis comes in “Alone Again, Natura-Diddly,” when Maude dies. 
Grieving her loss, he prays, “Lord I‟ve never questioned you, but I‟ve been wondering if your 
decision to take Maude was well...wrong. [Hastily] Unless this is part of your divine plan. [Groaning] 
Just give me some kind of sign. Anything. [Nothing happens] And after all that church chocolate I 
bought, which by the way was gritty and had that white stuff on it! Well I‟ve had it!” The next 
morning he threatens not to go to church, but he cannot follow through. When he arrives he walks 
into a performance by the Christian rock band Covenant and lead singer Rachel Jordan‟s lyrics 
convince him that putting his faith in God will carry him through this dark time. Unlike the last time, 
Ned‟s prayers are indirectly answered, and it is the church and Christianity that facilitates his healing. 
While The Simpsons has not spared Ned‟s politics, parenting, or preachiness, how Ned copes with 
pain demonstrates a recognition and acceptance of the ways evangelicals can find meaningful answers 
to difficult problems through their religious traditions. 
5.4 Conclusions 
Christianity has an ambiguous place in The Simpsons‟ unseen order. Far from Heit‟s call to a 
reformation of American Christianity, a closer look at Christian elements in different characters 
illustrates that when Christianity matches The Simpsons‟ liberal values emphasizing positive social 
and individual development it is applauded. However, when Christianity shows its conservative side 
and tries to enforce a particular unseen order on others, shaping society to conform to a conservative 
viewpoint, and taking people‟s money, it is satirized harshly as hypocritical and irrelevant. Humour in 
these examples shows that The Simpsons acknowledges American Christianity‟s diversity, but works 
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to promote certain elements of the tradition over others. Christians who share, love, and risk 
themselves for others are acknowledged as good characters. When those same characters judge and 
try to enforce their unseen order on Springfield they not only fail, but fail in a way that makes them 
appear foolish. 
The Simpsons assess Christianity according what sociologist Nancy Ammerman calls 
“Golden Rule Christianity” (1997), in which someone‟s Christianity is dedicated towards helping 
others and bringing about a greater spiritual depth without the rigidity and combativeness that is born 
from doctrinal adherence and struggles. These Christians live ethically without the ideological 
baggage that characterizes the extreme liberal and evangelical poles on the Protestant religious 
continuum (although Ammerman‟s survey also includes Catholics in this definition). Ammerman 
suggests that this is Christianity for the majority of American Christians. They live honestly, try to 
help others, and build meaningful relationships that make the world a better place. While Lovejoy 
lacks altruistic enthusiasm and Ned can be haughty and self-righteous, the humour directed at them 
does not attack the values and actions Golden Rule Christians find favourable. Humour in this case is, 
as Bergson suggests, a means to align behaviour to an assumed standard (1956, 147). Ridiculing 
Lovejoy for his greed and apathy and Flanders for his literalism and overzealousness tells us what 
The Simpsons treats as fundamentally flawed about lived Christianity in America. At the same time, 
seeing Lovejoy embody community values by returning to rescue the town from Homer‟s excesses 
and saving Ned from baboons demonstrates that there are Christian values The Simpsons treats as 
exemplary. Similarly, Ned‟s Job-like spiritual searching in the midst of suffering suggests that the 
religion offers something meaningful. While The Simpsons attacks scripture‟s relevancy, Christian 
dogma, God‟s character, and prayer‟s efficiency, it does not discredit the people who achieve socially 
good things through these mechanisms, only the mechanisms themselves. 
This puts Christianity in an ambiguous position relative to the comedic centre discussed in 
the previous chapter. While Christian spirituality is lauded, the institutional order and its legitimating 
devices (texts, rituals, and hierarchy) are not. As Henry notes, Humanism shares the same values 
Ammerman locates under Golden Rule Christianity (2008, 287) which suggests that Christianity may 
not be vital or have an important role in their conception of the unseen order. Henry goes so far as to 
say that in The Simpsons “religion, particularly Christianity, is a sham” (289; cf. Heit 2008, Pinsky 
2007). This is going too far, as it is through Christianity that Ned is able to find answers to his 
struggles and Lovejoy finds a framework for returning to help others. Christianity still offers 
something valuable, but it has accumulated religious baggage The Simpsons ridicules. Likewise, God 
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exists as a bipolar character, but honestly searching for a right relationship with others through a 
framework that also worships this divine being and petitions him for help in achieving honest and 
good goals is treated as plausible and practical in The Simpsons. This reflects the reality of millions of 
Americans, even while it tries to correct some people‟s religious extremism. The Simpsons‟ satire of 
Christianity allows the evangelical to see where their behaviour may be excessive, but also directs 
them towards religious behaviours they would find congruous. It is not dismissal and destruction so 
much as it is constructive criticism. 
Throughout this chapter we have seen how The Simpsons‟ struggles with the supernatural‟s 
reality and with ethical action inspired by institutions they deem erroneous. Those who deal in 
absolutes with the program‟s treatment of religion (e.g., Delaney 2008, Heit 2008, Henry 2008, 
Turner 2004, Pinsky 2007) miss this inner conflict. In the next chapter we will see how it carries over 
to two religions which are historically associated with immigrant populations in America: Judaism 
and Hinduism. The questions of what is ethically beneficial and supernaturally relevant carries on in 




Chapter 6—Insiders or Outsiders? Judaism and Hinduism 
Examining religion in The Simpsons involves moving from an ideological centre towards a 
periphery. Sometimes, as in the case of deinstitutionalized spirituality, Buddhism, and science, we 
find a direct correlation between what is acceptable in The Simpsons‟ unseen order and in established 
socio-religious institutions. In other cases, as with Protestantism, we find some elements are 
congruous with The Simpsons‟ worldview while others are not. But what should we make of marginal 
religious traditions that have encountered liberal American values differently and at different times? 
Two characters in The Simpsons, Krusty the Clown and Apu Nahasapeemapetilon, embody the 
tensions non-Christian immigrants have experienced in their passages to America over the last two 
hundred years. While Krusty is a caricature of the secularized Jew combined with the ravages a life in 
show business brings, Apu is a contentious stereotype of South Asian immigrants who have become 
increasingly visible since 1965‟s Immigration and Nationality Act allowed extensive immigration 
from non-European countries. In this chapter we consider these two underdiscussed characters (only 
Dalton et al. [2001]
102
 and Pinsky [2007] examine them) in light of the emerging pattern of religious 
acceptance developed in the last two chapters. What elements of the Jewish and Hindu communities 
The Simpsons embraces, and what elements are attacked, determines how they present “proper” 
ethno-religious adaptations in America. 
While Jews are an established religious group, their minority and non-Christian status still 
positions them tenuously in mainstream America‟s religious culture. Theirs is a long history of 
immigration and integration into American culture, as Jewish immigrants from different European 
countries have found their way to the United States since the colonial period. Today, Jews are a 
largely accepted and established ethnoreligious group in America (although anti-Semitism persists 
among some Americans),
103
 while Hindus are generally unknown. Despite there being over a billion 
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 Dalton and his associates only devote one paragraph of summary description to each of these 
characters, which, while factually accurate, do not address the underlying significance of the portrayals. As 
such, I mostly argue with Pinsky, if any of the major Simpsons commentators, in this chapter. 
103
 Finkelstein (2005; see also 2003) argues that there are two different types of anti-Semitism in 
contemporary America. Anti-Semitism, “the unjustifiable targeting of Jews solely for being Jews,” persists in 
small pockets throughout the country, and is not nearly as prevalent as “anti-Semitism” (emphasis his) makes it 
out to be (2005, 84). “Anti-Semitism,” “the instrumentalization of anti-Semitism by American (or other) Jewish 
elites,” is a politically useful strategy used to protect Israel‟s interests and cover its human rights records (84). 
In deflecting legitimate criticism of Israel by labelling opponents anti-Semites who pose the same threats as the 
Nazis, Finkelstein contends that those using “anti-Semitism” for their political purposes support ongoing human 
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Hindus globally, in “Homer the Heretic” Reverend Lovejoy remarks that Homer was saved by God 
working in the hearts of his friends and neighbours “Be they Christian, Jew, or miscellaneous.” When 
Apu responds that there are over 700 million Hindus (the episode aired in 1992), Lovejoy says, 
“Awww...That‟s super.” Lovejoy is condescending and dismissive, but his comment indicates that 
Hinduism has yet to establish itself as a “normal” religion in American culture. These two characters 
allow for a comparison between two groups with different histories in America, permitting us to see 
how The Simpsons uses historical patterns and particularities for their comedic purposes. In short, 
Krusty and Apu are metonyms for their respective religious groups. 
6.1 Crossing and Dwelling: Migration and Changing Religious Identities 
Thus far I have used a modified version of William James‟ definition of religion 
(institutionalized systems of beliefs and actions relating to an unseen order which compels 
harmonious adjustment thereto) to argue that The Simpsons presents a normative ordering of different 
religions in American culture. In other words, it has its own unseen order of unseen orders. But when 
it comes to thinking about religions shaped by migration and flux, it is also helpful to consider 
Tweed‟s definition from Crossing and Dwelling: “Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows 
that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes 
and cross boundaries” (2006, 54).
104
 In viewing religion as something that moves people about, 
bridging different places—whether other countries or alternate planes of existence—and providing 
explanations for why humans inhabit the world they do, Tweed offers a new twist on the Bergerian 
problem of legitimation. While Berger does not figure prominently in Tweed‟s theoretical foundation, 
they share an interest in religion‟s role in providing life with cosmic congruity and meaningfulness. 
Tweed‟s definition, which he acknowledges is a collection of tropes (167-171), implies that religion 
makes our constantly changing and moving world comprehensible by locating us in a cosmic 
narrative, even when the rest of our lives feel as though they are in flux. This relates to an unseen 
order, but acknowledges that the unseen order is intimately shaped by the adherent‟s context. Even 
                                                                                                                                                                    
rights violations in the Middle East and abuse the memory of those who died in the Nazi holocaust. In the main 
text I refer to the first type of anti-Semitism, which is often associated with marginal racist organizations. 
104
 Not everybody finds Tweed‟s theory helpful, as his aquatic metaphors and the theory‟s testability 
have been challenged. Other scholars favour more limiting spatial metaphors for describing the often 
contentious and powerfully mediated flow of people in the contemporary world. See the Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion‟s extended review panel discussion (Taves et al. 2009). 
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while an unseen order provides meaning in a confusing world, it is also adapted to the changing needs 
of those who believe in it. 
A growing body of literature explains new immigrant religious adaptations to American 
culture. In Religion and the New Immigrants, sociologists Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman 
Chafetz (2000) synthesize findings from thirteen case studies in Houston, arguing that environmental 
impacts including the local economy and institutional location affected how different religious and 
ethnic groups integrated into the city. Religious institutions often serve as places for immigrants to 
come for social services related to settling in America.
105
 Furthermore, they are places for socializing 
the second and subsequent generations into home cultures through different languages, ethnic 
holidays, and religious festivals not celebrated in American culture at large.
106
 In other words, 
ethnoreligious institutions preserve cultural and religious traits for groups transitioning from one 
national context to another. In practitioners‟ minds the two are often inseparable. This process creates 
a variety of ethno-Christian churches and introduces Americans to practitioners of established 
religions that are new to this continent, including Middle Eastern and Asian Islams, different schools 
of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism.
107
 This growing religious diversity has been celebrated 
in some corners and derided in others. In 1997, then South Carolina school board member Dr. Henry 
Jordan said, “screw the Buddhists and kill the Muslims” during a discussion about displaying the Ten 
Commandments in schools (quoted in Nimer 2002, 181). Others share his views, as violence against 
mosques and gurdwaras, synagogues and temples periodically arises in America. New religious 
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 Although he does not deal with transnational immigration, McRoberts‟ (2003) study of churches in 
Boston‟s Four Corners neighbourhood is related because it illustrates the transient nature of religious 
institutions in contemporary America. As suburbanization changes major cities‟ inner dynamics, different types 
of churches emerge, adapting to the situation. This can mean anything from established churches changing their 
programming to serve a new clientele to storefront churches opening to provision a small group of people for 
short periods of time. Immigrant religious institutions face similar issues, from finding spaces to refurbish or 
build, to establishing temporary homes until the community can raise the financial resources to find a 
permanent residence. 
106
 I follow Bramadat in defining ethnic groups as “any significant group of people, typically related 
through common filiation, or blood, whose members also usually feel a sense of attachment to a particular 
place, a history, and a culture (including a common language, food, and clothing). An ethnic group is therefore 
a kind of modern „tribe‟ in the sense that its members believe themselves to be related, and to owe some degree 
of loyalty to the main institutions, leaders, history, or symbols of the larger group” (2005, 8). 
107
 While this chapter‟s narrative applies theories and questions about ethnic adaptation and religious 
perseverance in American culture to Jews and Hindus, this does not exhaust the literature on new immigrant 
religious traditions. A significant portion is dedicated to Christian congregations (see, e.g., Guest 2003; Orsi 
1985, 2005; Tweed 1997a; Yang 1999). Furthermore, there are diverse resources dedicated to non-Christian 
ethnoreligious traditions‟ adaptations and assimilations in America (see, e.g., Brown 2001, R. Williams 1988; 
and chapters in Haddad 1990, 2002; Haddad and Smith 1994; Orsi 1999; Prebish and Baumann 2002; Warner 
and Wittner 1998). 
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immigrants are in a precarious situation where their sacred umbrellas represent different perspectives 
from already established American religions. While some people embrace this difference, others are 
threatened by it (Eck 2001, Wuthnow 2005). 
Over fifty years ago, sociologist Will Herberg wrote his now famous Protestant, Catholic, 
Jew (1960) about how these three religious groups had become the major identifying bodies for 
Americans. Herberg argued that by the third generation, an ethnic group had lost its “ethnic” 
language, dress, and customs, but kept its religion intact. Religious difference was the one acceptable 
distinction people were expected to preserve. There was a sense of shared American cultural values, 
especially individualism, idealism, and moralism with a strong work ethic. Upon this cultural ground 
religious differences were maintained. They enabled people to be different within the larger cultural 
fold. However, recent studies of religious immigrants call Herberg‟s thesis into question. Ebaugh and 
Chafetz (2000) demonstrate that old patterns of establishing ethnoreligious enclaves are ongoing, and 
socializing children to maintain language and customs from the old country is a large part of their 
church programming. While this repeats patterns Herberg discussed in relation to Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews (see also Dolan 1985, R. Williams 1988), differences in international travel and 
communications complicate the old patterns of immigration and assimilation in which people moved 
to the United States with little hope of seeing their homelands again. Furthermore, communicating 
with the homeland was difficult before modern telecommunications. Assimilation was a matter of 
survival because there were no other communities to which they could remain connected. Today, 
things are different. With telecommunications, the Internet, air travel, and satellite television, the 
immigrant from India, China, or Iran can talk to friends and family, consume news and entertainment 
media from their homeland, or visit. While there may be economic restrictions, the fact remains that 
today we talk about “transnationalism” as a reality rather than as the lucrative privilege of the few 
who could afford to travel (Warner 1998, 14-15). 
Wuthnow argues that there are four reasons why religious diversity is socially significant: 
“First, there are some who believe that greater diversity poses a threat to democracy itself . . . Second, 
there is concern that greater religious diversity raises difficult practical questions about fairness and 
decency. Third, there are those who fear that increasing diversity is undermining long-held American 
values. And fourth, there is a set of arguments suggesting that the religious dimension of religious 
diversity is itself an important cultural challenge that needs to be taken seriously” (2005, 78; 
emphasis in original). America has always been a religiously diverse country. However, the variations 
among Protestant sects and even among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews are more easily overcome 
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than the differences, for example, between American Protestants and Hindus. While Christians and 
Jews have some “family resemblances” and a long history of interaction, Hinduism and Christianity 
are foreign to each other. Hinduism‟s karmic system and ongoing cycle of rebirths is very different 
from the Christian view of one life to live on this earth with the soul judged after death. Hinduism‟s 
many deities are contrasted with the monolithic God. Hindu rituals, with their visceral smells, bright 
colours, dancing, and sacrificial poojas at which gods and goddesses are fed, clothed, and treated as 
present in their murtis (statues of the deities) are distant from the sombre Calvinist Protestant 
traditions that have been so influential in shaping the United States. When we combine these religious 
differences with various ethical traditions, cultural histories, and the fact that Hindus are noticeable 
for their professional achievements, we can see why Americans who are unfamiliar with this tradition 
could feel threatened by it. After all, they are now seeing intelligent and successful people from 
another country move into their neighbourhoods, take leadership positions in the community, and 
practice a religious tradition that was formerly foreign to the United States (R. Williams 1988). 
Incidents of racism and more subtle forms of discrimination (e.g., finding ways to obstruct a temple‟s 
construction) come from trying to deal with the radical changes these religions pose to the 
predominantly Christian assumptions that shape the unseen orders of majority of Americans. 
This framework is useful for studying Krusty and Apu because their religiousness is directly 
tied to their ethnicity, and this helps identify where they are positioned within The Simpsons‟ unseen 
order. Furthermore, these ethnic identities have an explicit religious component in The Simpsons. 
How are these religions and ethnicities embraced or criticized in terms of The Simpsons‟ expectations 
for religious groups? How does The Simpsons position itself relative to religious groups that are 
shaped by fairly recent immigration? While historically all Americans (with the exception of Native 
Americans) are immigrants, descendents of non-Western European Protestants find their 
enthoreligious identity is marginal to the country‟s mainstream (see also L. Moore 1986). The 
question now becomes how far The Simpsons accepts these new variations in America‟s religious 
culture.  
6.2 The Other American Indian: Apu Nahasapeemapetilon and Hinduism in The 
Simpsons 
Current immigrants from Southeast Asia can look to the Hindu, Apu, as their ethnoreligious 
representative. A Ph.D. in computer science, Apu is an Indian immigrant who manages Spingfield‟s 
Kwik-E-Mart (a convenience store). He lives with his wife, Manjula, and their eight children in a 
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small apartment. Apu has been associated with Hinduism from the second season in which he 
explains that he enrolled in a screenwriting class because “I long to tell the story of an idealistic 
young Hindu pushed too far by convenience store bandits. I call it „Hands off my Jerky, Turkey‟” 
(“Brush with Greatness”). The first depiction of Hinduism comes in “Homer the Heretic” when 
Homer asks Apu why he is not in church. Apu replies, “Oh, but I am. I have a shrine to Ganesha, the 
god of worldly wisdom, located in the employee lounge.” The camera pans to the lounge where there 
is a murti of Ganesha, the popular elephant headed Hindu god who removes obstacles and brings 
luck. Homer, however, tries to offer Ganesha a peanut. The indignant, but polite, Apu responds, 
“Please do not offer my god a peanut.” Homer retorts not only with ignorance, but a rudeness born of 
a historical hubris which sees Hindu deities not as representatives of an unseen order, but visible idols 
unworthy of serious engagement. “No offense, Apu,” he says, “but when they were handing out 
religions you must have been out taking a whiz.” 
There are two types of jokes about Apu and Hinduism in The Simpsons. First, there are jokes 
based on superficial knowledge of Hindu practices and concepts such as karma, reincarnation, and the 
Hindu pantheon. These jokes emphasize Hinduism‟s differences from mainstream American religious 
culture. Second, there are jokes that distinguish Hindus from Christians, casting Hindus in a positive 
light because they are more tolerant. While religious studies scholars lament general religious 
ignorance, the fact remains that before I, and others like me, learned more about Hinduism in 
university, I could find these jokes funny by fitting them into my cognitive framework for 
understanding different religions, read them through Apu‟s character, and make sense of them. Just 
because these jokes are superficial does not mean they are inconsequential. Their superficiality makes 
them significant for understanding the program‟s depiction of Hinduism, speaking to how little one 
has to know about Hinduism to understand its place in The Simpsons‟ unseen order. 
Ignorant familiarity is key to understanding depictions of Hinduism in The Simpsons, as the 
jokes are largely based on an “introductory textbook” understanding of Hinduism (e.g., Flood 1996; 
Matthews 2004, 79-121; Molloy 2008, 73-121; Narayanan 2002; see also Grossman 2006). If we look 
at Hinduism jokes in The Simpsons, we see that a few specific tropes are consistently repeated. This 
should come as little surprise. Ignorant familiarity does not require detailed knowledge and jokes 
based on Hindu esoterica would be irrelevant to American audiences. However, reincarnation and the 
polytheist Hindu pantheon are frequent topics for jokes, establishing Apu‟s difference from the rest of 
Springfield. In “The Sweetest Apu,” Apu contemplates suicide after cheating on Manjula. He has a 
small reincarnation chart before him and directs our attention along his spiritual path. “Now, let‟s see 
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what awaits me in the next life. First I was a tiger, a snake, a clod, a goat with a hat, then me... Wow! 
A tapeworm. Then assistant to Lorne Michaels. It‟s going to be a rough couple of lifetimes.”
108
 
Furthermore, in “Smart and Smarter,” Apu takes his eight children to Mrs. Wickerbottom‟s pre-
nursery school so they can get ahead of their academic competition. The children fight outside the 
school while their father encourages them, saying, “That‟s it, claw and bite for position. There‟s only 
enough tuition money for two. The rest of you, better luck next life.” The Simpsons also juxtaposes 
reincarnation with Christianity‟s concept of salvation in “Treehouse of Horror XVI.” In one of the 
stories, Mr. Burns turns his property into a hunting reserve where he kills humans. After Apu is shot, 
his last words are, “You got me, but I shall be reincarnated.” Suddenly, his spirit comes back as a 
rabbit, saying, “Ha ha! You can‟t kill a Hindu.” Suddenly, the rabbit is caught in a bear trap and calls 
out, “Help me, Jesus!” This may be a joke on the karmic consequences of Apu‟s hubris, but it 
emphasizes the fact that reincarnation and Christian salvation are often seen as incompatible. Calling 
out to Jesus for salvation is not a part of the Hindu tradition, but being reborn as different life forms 
(or as a spiritual being) is. The Simpsons mixes and matches from the two traditions for comic effect 
because people are aware that the two religions are different and are, at least, vaguely familiar with 
the different understandings of what happens after death. 
The best introduction to a Hindu worldview in The Simpsons is “Homer and Apu.” After 
selling Homer some diseased meat and losing his job at the Kwik-E-Mart, Apu goes to the Simpsons‟ 
house to make amends. Upon offering to work off his debt Apu tells Homer he is, “selling the concept 
of karmic realignment.” Indignant, Homer tells Apu, “You can‟t sell that! Karma can only be 
portioned out by the cosmos!” and slams the door in his face. Standing on the doorstep Apu says, 
“He‟s got me there.” Later in the episode, when Homer and Apu travel to India so that Apu can ask 
Kwik-E-Mart‟s president for his job back, they are accosted in the airport by Christians singing, “If 
you‟re saved and you know it, clap your hands.”
109
 They travel up a mountain to the world‟s first 
convenience store, where they meet the guru-like president and CEO of Kwik-E-Mart International. 
Designed to look like many gurus who have crossed the globe attracting Western followers, the 
                                                     
108
 Visually, the clod is Alfred E. Neuman—MAD Magazine‟s infamous mascot—while Lorne 
Michaels is famous as the creator of Saturday Night Live, a show for which some Simpsons writers worked 
before coming to FOX. 
109
 This is a direct reference to the International Society for Krishna Consciousness‟ (ISKCON, also 
known as the “Hare Krishnas”) members who distribute religious pamphlets to travelers in American airports. 
One of the Indian passengers rolls his eyes and mutters “Christians” as he passes them, indicating that The 
Simpsons relativizes the prejudice directed towards ISKCON members in America as a matter of cultural 
difference, rather than a flaw inherent in the religious tradition. For more on ISKCON, see Bromley and Shinn 
(1989), Bryant and Ekstrand (2004), and Rochford (1985, 2007). 
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president most resembles Maharishi Maheshi Yogi, Transcendental Meditation‟s founder, who came 
to prominence in the West after the Beatles became his followers for a brief period during the 
1960s.
110
 Seated in the lotus position on a pile of cushions and drinking a squishee, the president 
provides answers under a sign that reads “The Master Knows All Except Combination to Safe.” The 
store is designed like an ashram, with stereotyped Indian designs such as domed tower silhouettes for 
doorways, mixed with convenience store shelves stocked with goods. The president is portrayed as 
mystical, speaking in a soft voice and offering to answer three questions. When Homer uses all the 
questions asking a variation of “Are you really the president?” Apu is furious, but the president 
dismisses them with Apu‟s catch phrase, “Thank you, come again.” 
“Homer and Apu” references karma and some of Hinduism‟s most visible elements because 
they are culturally relevant. In other words, Americans have seen images of gurus, and know that 
Hindus believe in cosmic consequences for their actions, even if they do not understand the 
complexities of these ideas within Hinduism. Gurus are plentiful throughout India, and Indian religion 
has a long history of the divine being revealed through people, places, and things. Indeed, as Eck 
argues in Darśan (1998), Hindus see the sacred through such diverse things as holy rivers (e.g., the 
Ganges), people (gurus and sannyāsin, those who have renounced householder status), and objects 
such as murti. Darśan, seeing the deity incarnated in a murti or flowing through a sacred mountain or 
forest associated with their sacred narratives, is the gift that Hindus receive from these visual 
encounters with the divine. Gurus are not only great teachers, they are also holy men and women. 
Reincarnation, on the other hand, and its determination by one‟s karma, is less popularly understood. 
Karma is often treated as a celestial score card working on the principle of “what goes around, comes 
around.” The sitcom My Name is Earl, which aired on NBC from 2005-2009, used the tag line 
“karma is a funny thing” to frame stories about a small-time hustler who wins $100,000 in the lottery, 
writes a list of everybody he has ever wronged, and sets about trying to make restitution so that his 
immediate circumstances will improve. The Hindu doctrine of karma encompasses a wide variety of 
different beliefs, from the “orthodox” version of karma put forth in the Bhagavad Gita as selflessly 
completing one‟s duty (dharma), to the understanding that bad things happen in this life because of 
actions in past lives, to the basic concept of karma The Simpsons and My Name is Earl use, but the 
                                                     
110
 Groening is a known Beatles fan and all of the band‟s members except John Lennon (d. 1980) have 
appeared as guest stars. Paul McCartney‟s appearance includes a reference to this period in the band‟s history 
when he claims he met Apu “during the Maharishi days” (“Lisa the Vegetarian”).  
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fact remains that through everyday use Indians are aware of the diversity, breadth, and different 
understandings of karma, but it is a novel concept in America (Reichenbach 1988, Sharma 1973).  
Similarly, jokes about the Hindu pantheon also focus superficially on a few well known 
deities. Apu‟s attachment to Ganesha is well established, as he is seen offering him a bottle of Yoo-
Hoo in “Much Apu About Nothing,” an episode parodying California‟s proposition 187 on the 1994 
state election ballot.
111
 The Simpsons draws upon the phenomenon of “milk miracles” which took 
place in September 1995 when, for three days, murti of Ganesha and other deities around the world 
appeared to drink milk offered by devotees (Kurien 2007, 53). Apu‟s relationship with Ganesha is 
made explicit when he offers the bottle as a bribe to make anti-illegal immigrant protestors depart, 
saying, “make the protestors go away and I‟ll give you the entire bottle.” This sacrifice is appropriate 
because Ganesha is the remover of obstacles, but in other cases when The Simpsons uses Ganesha for 
humorous purposes, the deity‟s character is not acknowledged or parodied.  
The Simpson family has a history of dressing up as Ganesha when they are trying to 
influence Apu‟s life. In “The Two Mrs. Nahasapeemapetilons,” Homer dresses up as Ganesha in an 
attempt to stop Apu‟s wedding to Manjula. Walking down the aisle and talking in a ghostly wail, he 
flaps his arms and says, “I am the god Ganesha! This wedding angers me! All will die unless it is 
stopped.” Eventually, he is chased up a tree and the wedding continues. In “The Sweetest Apu,” Bart, 
Lisa, and Maggie dress up as Ganesha in an attempt to force Manjula and Apu to reconcile after 
Apu‟s affair. Bart, voicing Ganesha, shows that he has no understanding of this deity and, in a voice 
imitating a cinematic vampire, says, “I order you to get back together or I‟ll suck your blood!” While 
Apu respects Ganesha, The Simpsons pays him as much respect as any other god—which is to say 
very little. However, these depictions also play on general assumptions about gods. That is, they get 
angry, they can affect people‟s lives, and they are willing to act on their anger. This ignorant 
familiarity, combined with culturally relevant intertextual assumptions about gods and their powers, 
restricts the use of more specific references to devotion to Ganesha because the god is not widely 
known and worshipped in the United States. Ganesha is a familiar icon, but, as with other Hindu 
deities (see “Kiss, Kiss, Bangalore”), his character in The Simpsons is as a generic god.  
Another problem with The Simpsons‟ depiction of Hinduism is that it lacks any portrayals of 
lived Hinduism. Hinduism in America is practiced mainly in the home, although worship in temples is 
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 Proposition 187 is a significant example of anti-immigrant legislation directed at denying illegal 
aliens social services including health care and education. Although it passed on the original ballot, it was found 
unconstitutional in 1998 and overturned by the Supreme Court (American Civil Liberties Union 1999). The full 
text of Proposition 187 can be found on the anti-illegal immigrant website SaveOurLicence.com (2010). 
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increasing, as they are being erected in the country‟s major urban areas.
112
 Apu does not attend a 
temple nor does he have a religious community. His Hinduism lacks the important ritual traditions 
that locate Hindus within the world. This is not to say that there are not moments when we see 
parodies of Hindu ritual. In “The Two Mrs. Nahasapeemapetilons,” Apu‟s mother comes to 
Springfield from India and forces Apu to fulfil his obligation to marry Manjula, a girl to whom he 
was betrothed to when he was very young. For North Americans, the tradition of arranged marriages 
stands in stark contrast to the tradition of “love marriage,” in which two people choose each other 
instead of having parents make the choice for them. Apu, though, is not North American. He rides to 
his wedding on an elephant, while Bart prepares a sacred fire by tearing pages from a hymnal and 
throwing them on the fire. Reverend Lovejoy officiates at the service, but he does not know what he 
is doing so he admits that he consulted a Hindu website for his information and justifies his 
officiating as “Christ is Christ,” an ecumenical statement that completely misses the differences 
between the two religions (see Hinduism Today 1999). Homer tries to disrupt the ceremony dressed 
as Ganesha (described earlier), and Apu marries Manjula even though he has never met her before. 
The Simpsons‟ take on the Hindu wedding is somewhat consistent with real Hindu 
ceremonies. While there are a wide variety of wedding traditions, if we follow the ritual performed in 
Pittsburgh‟s Sri Venkateswara Temple (one of the first Hindu temples in North America) we see 
some definite similarities (Sri Vankateswara Temple 1999). First, there is the worship of Ganesha. At 
Sri Venkateswara, the bride‟s parents invite the deity to come and remove any obstacles to the 
ceremony‟s smooth procession. In this case, Homer invites himself as Ganesha, circumventing and 
inverting Hindu tradition with humorous consequences. Homer as Ganesha is an obstacle, and misses 
the god‟s significance for this occasion. There is also the pradhana homam, or worship of Agni who 
is represented by the sacred fire. In this, The Simpsons‟ depiction is somewhat closer to reality, with 
Bart tending the fire. However, a hymnal is not desecrated to sanctify the fire at Sri Vankateswara 
and, according to the DVD commentary, this was a twist The Simpsons‟ creative team added as a way 
of making the fire sacred.
113
 The most accurate depiction of a Hindu wedding ceremony comes when 
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 There is a wealth of material on Hindu temples as gathering places through which the community 
proves they have arrived in North America and pass their traditions to their children. It should also be noted that 
Indian immigrants emphasize the religious elements of the temples, instead of their role in helping immigrants 
settle socially, as opposed to Asian churches which help many newcomers with settlement issues such as 
finding work, navigating immigration law, and learning English, see Gupta (2003); Jacob and Thaku (2000); 
Kurien (1998, 2007); Mazumdar and Mazumdar (2003); Min (2003); Waghorne (1999). 
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Apu and Manjula walk around the fire to seal their vows. Called Sapta Padi, this moment in the ritual 
marks a statement before a deity and is an exchange of vows between the married couple. It is also 
the one element of the wedding The Simpsons‟ team does not satirize. The solemnity of marriage, as 
the episode‟s emotional climax, is too important to make light of on this occasion. 
These examples demonstrate that there are visual, surface elements of Hinduism that a wider 
audience can access through cultural intertextuality. However, this knowledge is disjointed and 
superficial, illustrating the fact that for the majority of Americans, knowledge of Hinduism is 
unnecessary. They do not practice it themselves, it does not have public stigma associated with it, and 
Hindus have quietly worked their way into different sectors of American culture without trying to 
change American culture to be more like India‟s. In other words, most Americans only need an 
“ignorant familiarity” of Hinduism to navigate their everyday worlds, and The Simpsons uses these 
basics to generate their humour. People know a little about karma and reincarnation, have seen 
pictures of Hindu weddings, gurus, and gods, and are not threatened by them. Hinduism exists as one 
religion among many, but because it is not a dangerous religion, The Simpsons does not frame it 
negatively. 
This is not to say that these ignorant familiarities are unaccompanied by evaluations of 
Hinduism. Understanding where Hinduism fits in the grand scheme of The Simpsons‟ creative team‟s 
unseen order can be seen when Apu and Ned Flanders are juxtaposed. A recurring theme is that of 
“religion is acceptable if it is not forced on others,” and this places Hinduism in a positive light. Two 
examples from the later seasons emphasize the differences between American evangelicalism and 
Hinduism. Season sixteen‟s “Midnight Rx” sees an exchange between Apu and Ned when Homer 
crosses into Canada to take advantage of the country‟s cheaper prescriptions after Mr. Burns cancels 
the nuclear plant‟s staff‟s health plan. Sitting in the back seat of Homer‟s van, Apu and Ned have the 
following exchange: 
APU 
Homer, tell Ned to stop trying to convert me. 
NED 
I‟m just telling him how brave he is to worship a false God. 
APU 
I don‟t worship one God, OK? I worship a whole super team of 





Well, where‟s your super team now? 
HOMER 
Listen you two, I‟ll tell you who the true God is if you‟re quiet the 
rest of the trip. [Apu and Ned protest.] 
HOMER 
All right, I‟m coming back there. [Mini van swerves all over the 
road.] 
APU 
Save me, Shiva! 
NED 
Why don‟t you just call out for Hawk Man? 
APU 
Why don‟t you just shut up? (“Midnight Rx”) 
Ned and Apu‟s exchange is childish, as it draws upon children‟s backseat fights during long 
road trips as a humorous script. What concerns us is the difference between Ned‟s aggressive, 
ridiculing evangelism, and Apu‟s resolute refusal to be converted. Ned‟s belligerence is used as a foil 
here to emphasize the differences between American evangelicals and the perspective an immigrant 
such as Apu brings to the United States. This joke trivializes the Hindu pantheon, making them sound 
like DC Comics‟ famed Justice League of America, which featured such superheroes as Superman, 
Batman, and, yes, Hawkman. While there is a body of literature relating superheroes to religious 
figures (see, e.g., Garrett 2008, Oropeza 2005, Skelton 2006), the distinction remains between Ned as 
the aggressor and Apu as the defensive Hindu who does not wish to convert. This constrast is raised 
again in “Mona Leaves-a,” when Homer goes to the Kwik-E-Mart for solace when his mother dies: 
HOMER 





Manjula will sell the store, dye her hair blonde, and marry my cousin 
Jangala. 
MANJULA 
Yes, I will. 
HOMER 
I mean, do you think my mother‟s out there somewhere? Does she 
know I feel bad about things I said? 
APU 
Oh, perhaps she‟s around us now. She may have already been 
reincarnated as that new born baby [points to a newborn], or that tiny 
mouse in the nacho cheese [a mouse slides down a ladle‟s handle 
into the nacho cheese]. 
NED 
Oh for crying out loud! People aren‟t mice. 
APU 
Oh, what a surprise! Joe Jesus Junior‟s going to set us all straight. 
NED 
Look Homer, people don‟t come back as anything, except for our 
Lord who came back as bread. That‟s it. 
HOMER 
That‟s it. [Homer sighs, takes his groceries, and leaves the store.] 
APU 
What‟s the thing with your religion? It‟s a bummer. 
NED 
Even the sing-a-longs? 
APU 
No, the sing-a-longs are ok. (“Mona Leaves-a”) 
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Ned‟s persistent perpetuation of Christian belief in death‟s permanence opens the door for 
Apu to correct him. There is no proof that Homer‟s mother was not reincarnated as a mouse sliding 
into a vat of nacho cheese, but Ned‟s lived Christianity is a bummer. With the exception of sing-a-
longs, there is nothing Apu (and in this case the despondent Homer) can find uplifting in the United 
States‟ dominant religious tradition. Hinduism, conversely, offers hope. Our loved ones could be 
there in the room with us, they know we are trying to make amends, and there is hope for redemption 
beyond this life. This humorous exchange revisits the arguments in chapter four about spirituality and 
its position over Christianity in The Simpsons‟ unseen order. Here, Hindu concepts such as karmic 
rebirth and the fact that Apu does not aggressively proselytize, but does offer a hopeful solution to the 
problem of death, is juxtaposed against the negative elements of Ned‟s Christianity to show us how 
The Simpsons positions and evaluates both religions. 
While Apu is a stereotype representing today‟s ethno-religious immigrants to America, his 
religiousness lacks depth. In this case, superficiality is not insignificance, as it lets us know about 
Hinduism‟s general acceptance in the United States, but also the indifference with which it can be 
treated. There is not much more to say about Apu‟s Hinduism other than that it is based on textbook 
knowledge, is seen positively compared to Christianity, and is easily reducible to a few basic tropes. 
While this is certainly not representative of Hinduism in America, it focuses our attention on the 
larger issues ethnoreligious groups face in gaining acceptance. That is, they are known only to the 
extent that their histories and actions impact the lives of mainstream Americans, and then they are 
reduced to the bare essentials necessary for navigating those encounters. 
6.3 Krusty the Clown’s Jewish Neuroses: Secularism, Ethnic Intermarriage and 
Semitic Angst 
If Apu‟s Hinduism is portrayed as different, but acceptable for Americans, Krusty the 
Clown‟s Jewishness demonstrates that ethnoreligious groups can be welcomed into The Simpsons‟ 
portrayal of American culture, provided they adopt the individualism, tolerance, and spiritual seeking 
at the heart of The Simpsons‟ unseen order. Krusty is one of The Simpsons‟ more memorable 
secondary characters. He is a chain-smoking, hard drinking, gambling, pornography-addicted comic 
with green hair, white make-up, and a red nose. He consistently produces shoddy merchandise with 
his likeness, mistreats people, and tells terrible jokes. Krusty is Springfield‟s foremost children‟s 
entertainer and he is also Jewish. In short, he is a complex character who epitomizes a stereotype of 
professional Jewish entertainers. Krusty‟s Jewishness provides him with no small amount of angst. 
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He fluctuates between accepting the faith and trying to hide any traces of his Jewishness. “I don‟t do 
the Jewish stuff on the air,” he yells at a chef on his television program, “Cooking With Krusty,” in 
“The Front,” while in “Today, I am a Clown,” he embraces his faith by showing an episode of the 
ultra-violent “Itchy & Scratchy” cartoon (which is shown as part of his “Krusty the Clown Show”) 
entitled “A Briss Before Dying.” In this episode the psychotic mouse (Itchy) takes a scalpel from the 
cat (Scratchy), who is dressed as a mohel (circumciser) trying to perform a circumcision. Itchy then 
mutilates Scratchy, puts him through a meat grinder, melts his flesh, and creates a glass out of it. 
Itchy promptly wraps the glass in a cloth, stomps on, and yells “Mouseltoff!” [sic], parodying the 
Jewish tradition of smashing a small glass at weddings to remember the destruction of the second 
Temple in Jerusalem. The scene shifts back to Krusty‟s stage where he yells “And that‟s what I 
believe in now!” 
But Krusty was not always depicted as Jewish. His Hebraic ancestry was introduced in the 
season three episode, “Like Father, Like Clown.” Parodying The Jazz Singer (Crosland 1927), in 
which the son of a Jewish cantor defies his father to become a jazz singer, this episode tells the story 
of how Krusty, born Herschel Krustofsky, defied his father, Rabbi Hyman Krustofsky (voiced by the 
self-professed “ultimate Jew,” Jackie Mason), to become a clown. In the second act we learn that 
Krusty grew up in Springfield‟s Jewish neighbourhood which is based on New York‟s Jewish 
neighbourhoods. Here Jews dress in Orthodox fashion (e.g., long robes, beards, earlocks), play chess 
outdoors, and debate ethical questions. In a flashback sequence we learn that Krusty‟s father was a 
rabbi in a long line of rabbis, but young Herschel wants to make people laugh. His father responds 
with a quote that cuts to the core of this dissertation: “A clown is not a respected member of the 
community. . . . Herschel, life is not fun. Life is serious.” Rabbi Krustofsky echoes generations of 
thinkers who have seen nothing substantial in comedy. This is not to say that Krusty sees himself as a 
comic figure transcending the material world and revealing something sublime—he just wants to 
make people laugh. The comedy bug is too much for Krusty, who got his first laughs impersonating 
his father in Yeshiva (a Jewish religious school), where he stood before the class and said, “Blah, 
blah, blah Moses!” Despite his father‟s best efforts to stop him, Krusty pursues a career in comedy 
until one day, at a Talmudic conference in the Catskills, a rabbi sprays him with a seltzer bottle and 
Krusty‟s makeup washes off. His father disowns him for the shame he brought on the family, and for 
twenty years the two do not speak to each other. 
Seeing Krusty so disheartened, Bart and Lisa resolve to reunite father and son. Rabbi 
Krustofsky is still heartbroken after all this time, so the only solution is to appeal to his knowledge, 
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or, as Lisa says, “We‟re going to hit him where it hurts, right in the Judaica.” Two special consultants, 
Rabbis Harold Schulweis and Lavi Meier, gave feedback on the episode so that the exchange between 
Bart and Rabbi Krustofsky is as close to an authentic rabbinical exchange as possible. (Lisa is 
working hard in the library, reading books like The Big Book of the Chosen People, Views on Jews, 
and Jewishness Revisited.) First, Bart corners the rabbi in his office and quotes the Babylonian 
Talmud: “A child should be pushed aside with the left hand and drawn closer with the right.” Bart is 
sure that he has given a strong religious argument for forgiveness, but the Rabbi counters with the 
fifth commandment: “Honour thy father and mother, end of story.” Lisa then gives Bart some 
material from Rabbi Simon ben Eleazar, and Bart tracks Rabbi Krustofsky to a sauna where he says, 
“At all times let a man be supple as a reed and not rigid as a cedar.” The rabbi is unimpressed, 
countering with “the Book of Joshua says „You shall meditate on the Torah all day and all night.‟”
114
 
Bart cites another Talmudic passage during a circumcision: “Who will bring redemption? The 
jesters.” Krustofsky is not convinced and sends Bart away as his timing is inappropriate. It is only 
with a long-shot quote that Bart convinces the rabbi to change his ways. While they play chess in the 
park, Bart sighs and quotes a “great man”: “The Jews are a swinging bunch of people. I mean, I‟ve 
heard of persecution, but what they went through is ridiculous. But the great thing is, after thousands 
of years of waiting and holding on and fighting, they finally made it.” Krustofsky is impressed, but 
cannot identify the “great man” among various religious sources. Bart then reveals the quote came 
from famous entertainer Sammy Davis Jr.‟s autobiography, Yes I Can. The rabbi, broken, laments the 
lost years and reconciles with Krusty. 
This exchange brings Jewish tradition into The Simpsons in an honest and authentic way. 
Although there are humorous elements in the exchange (e.g., in the sauna scene there are other Jews 
with the rabbi and one says “all night?” when the rabbi quotes Joshua), its significance comes from 
the fact that Jewish thought is built on continuous argument about the Torah‟s meaning. Part of a 
rabbi‟s job is to offer guidance based on interpreting the Torah, and American Jews are divided on 
different approaches to the Torah and its interpretation. Furthermore, historically, finding rabbis to 
resolve conflicts relating to the Torah‟s interpretation was very difficult. However, now that Jewish 
                                                     
114
 In Judaism the Torah refers to the whole of the law (including the oral Torah, also known as the 
Mishnah and Talmud), as well as the first five books (the Pentateuch) of the Tanak (what Christians call the Old 
Testament). However, some American nontraditionalist groups (e.g., Reform Jews) will call into question some 
laws in the Torah and may not even acknowledge the oral Torah as legally binding (Raphael 2003, 18). Any of 
these meanings works here. This means that even if non-Jews in the audience are only familiar with the Torah 
referring to the Pentateuch, the exchange still makes sense. 
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communities are well established in the United States, there are rabbis to argue with each other about 
the Torah‟s ethical implications (Diner 1999, Raphael 2003). The Simpsons chose this vehicle for its 
first intense look into Judaism. This is not an exploration through ritual practice, the synagogue, or 
Semitic stereotypes, which is different from their treatment of Christianity and Hinduism. While 
Christianity is centred around Flanders‟ ethics and the First Church of Springfield, Judaism is 
introduced through the tensions between popular entertainment‟s secular seduction and the religious 
calling to meditate on the Torah all day and all night. In the end, there is no easy answer. 
At the same time, this episode has been positively received within the Jewish community. 
According to Pinsky, after consulting on the episode Rabbi Schulweis said he “became an instant 
hero among my young people. I was cool” (quoted in Pinsky 2007, 151). Reconciliation was also a 
powerful theme for some viewers, who reached out to alienated parents for the first time in decades 
(158). However, it is Rabbi Daniel Wolpe who emphasizes the episode‟s significance for 
understanding Judaism: “It was an interesting take on the greatest of contemporary Jewish dilemmas, 
which is the battle between tradition and modernity” (quoted in Pinsky 2007, 158). Indeed, the 
struggle to belong and adapt to the American environment while maintaining their ethnic differences 
has long been a concern for Jews. 
American Judaism has historically developed along a continuum dealing with these issues. At 
the far right are ultra-Orthodox Jews, known as the Hasidim and Haredim, who try to adhere 
completely to all the Torah‟s laws and who refuse to accept any modern innovations they feel violate 
Torah. Next come the Orthodox, who also uphold the laws, but do not build their communities around 
a charismatic Rebbe like the Hasidim do. Orthodox Rabbis, in other words, are religious professionals 
who may be charismatic, but the community does not exist around their charismatic presence whereas 
the Hasidim are characterized by the mystical Rebbe‟s centrality in the community. Moving closer to 
the centre are Conservative Jews who seek to uphold the Torah while making modest concessions to 
modern ideas. Allowing men and women to sit together in the synagogue, signifying equality, is one 
such change that the Orthodox have not embraced. Reformed Jews have embraced the modernist 
impulse more thoroughly than other Jewish denominations, which has led to conflict with Orthodox 
Jews over what constitutes proper Judaic practice. Reform Judaism has led the way in ordaining 
women, mixing sexes in the synagogue, and abandoning some traditions which are deemed irrelevant 
in the modern world, such as kosher food preparation. Finally, Reconstructionist Judaism developed 
out of a desire to treat the Jewish people as a distinct ethnic group with significant religious 
contributions, but it removed the tradition of divine election and any supernatural elements from its 
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understanding of Judaism. Over the last two centuries these different movements have fought and 
supported each other (although the Hasidim have largely removed themselves from this discussion as 
they treat all other Jewish traditions as inauthentic), showing that the tensions between Jewish 
survival (which binds them) and how to practice and protect the tradition (which divides them) are 
brought out in Judaism‟s institutional organization in America (Diner 1999, Kaplan 2009, Raphael 
2003, Sarna 2004). 
Despite American Judaism‟s historical institutional developments, Krusty is recognizable as a 
stereotype that marks him as an ethnic, rather than a religious, Jew.
115
 Jewish traditions mean little to 
Krusty except when he faces an identity crisis. While American Jews have struggled with questions 
regarding the extent to which they should adapt their traditions to American culture, Krusty struggles 
with a problem more reminiscent of Herberg‟s analysis (1960). That is, his ethnoreligious identity as 
a Jew matters when he wants to see himself as complete. In the United States, that often means 
having a religious identity. Rabbi Krustofsky‟s denunciation embodies Orthodox Judaism‟s defence 
against modernity‟s onslaught, as these Jews have tried to preserve their traditions by rejecting 
modern trends and maintaining the Torah. Yet, like all Jewish denominations, they struggle to 
maintain adherents who find Orthodox Judaism too costly. Furthermore, as Jewish sociologist Sylvia 
Fishman argues, Jewish and American values have coalesced to the point where “many American 
Jews—including some who are very knowledgeable and actively involved in Jewish life—no longer 
separate or are even conscious of the separation between the origins of these two texts” (2000, 10). 
Fishman identifies the specific American liberal values of “free choice, universalism, individualism 
and pluralism” (1; see also Cohen and Eisen 2000, 35) as the values Jews now find legitimated and 
incorporated into their Jewish identities.
116
 Sociologist Steven Cohen and Judaism scholar Arnold 
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 There are ongoing debates about Judaism‟s role in Jewish ethnic identity. One way into the 
discussion is through Herbert Gans‟ characterization of American Jews‟ “symbolic ethnicity,” a “nostalgic 
allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country: a love for and pride in a 
tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated into it” (1999, 178). Winter (1992, 1996) argues that 
Jews are an ethnoreligious group because their religious identity is key to understanding both their ethnic 
identity and maintaining the group‟s community structures that extend beyond religious organizations (see also 
Levine 1986). While this question can be discussed within the ethnoreligious category, we still have to account 
for the fact that Jews are Jews by blood as well as by belief (see Cohen and Eisen 2000, 27-42), and this causes 
problems for contemporary Jews who are negotiating their identities. Kaufman‟s overview of the ongoing 
debate argues that splitting ethnicity and religiosity is problematic for understanding Judaism as lived among 
people. However, Krusty‟s sporadic interest in his tradition marks him as, at the very least, a highly secularized 
Jew who only turns to his tradition when he needs to resolve identity crises. It is, in short, a last resort and not a 
central element to his frequent depictions in the program. 
116
 Feingold‟s (1995) survey of American Jewish political history suggests that while Jews support 
these values‟ implementation, they are also becoming more libertarian in their support for free access to 
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Eisen (2000) further found that a majority of Jews (roughly 60%) are engaged in “moderately 
affiliated Judaism” (5), which encompasses a type of “spirituality of seeking” (Wuthnow 1998, 4) 
within the confines of traditional Judaism. The self is sovereign over tradition, and Jews actively 
select from the tradition along with their experiences to craft their identities (Cohen and Eisen 2000). 
Taking Fishman‟s, Cohen‟s and Eisen‟s findings, the modernist problem for Jews is that these 
moderately affiliated Jews interpret their tradition through the issue of being Jewish by both blood 
and choice (Cohen and Eisen 2000, 27-42). In other words, Jews are Jews because they were born 
Jews, but they are also Jews because they choose to practice the religious tradition which has 
historically informed that ethnic identity. This helps explain Krusty‟s struggles as somebody who 
fluctuates between accepting and resenting his ethnoreligious tradition.  
As some American Jews left synagogues and found their way as an ethnic, rather than 
ethnoreligious, group,
117
 those who remained religious fought hard to maintain their tradition and 
bring their lapsed brethren back into the fold (often unsuccessfully). Jewish studies scholar Jacob 
Neusner (1990) notes that the Jewish American identity is one that developed after the Second World 
War around the state of Israel. Specifically, being Jewish in America meant supporting Israel, which 
in turn preserved the Jewish people, a development that came to fruition after the Six Days War in 
1967 (see Oren 2002 for a recount of the war). After the war, the sense that preserving Israel was 
essential to Jewish survival became a “civil religion” uniting American Jews (see also Glazer 2005, 
Sklare 1990, Woocher 1990).
118
 However, this support for Israel as central to Jewish identity started 
                                                                                                                                                                    
abortions and the end of quota systems such as affirmative action which have blocked Jews who acquire 
education and training from taking jobs. He and Auerbach (1995) also note the importance of second generation 
Eastern European Judaism‟s allegiance with Roosevelt and New Deal politics during the Great Depression as 
the catalyst for bringing American Judaism into both liberalism and American acceptability. Glazer (1995) 
argues that while Jews support American liberal causes such as using taxation to distribute wealth and fighting 
for civil rights, their support of Israel has become a difficult contradiction for them to overcome. That is, Jewish 
support for Israel and its policies of treating Arab citizens as second class, and Israel‟s prominent and active 
military exploits, contradicts the values Jews want American democratic government to enforce at home. 
Auerbach (1995) contends that Glazer misreads American Jews, suggesting that the Israel issue, not their 
liberalism, will separate American Jews from Israel. On the dangers modernization poses for the American 
Jewish community, see Ritterband (1995).  
117
 Cohen and Eisen estimate that at the end of the second millennium CE, about 20% of Jews could be 
categorized as nonreligious (2000, 5). 
118
 Krusty rarely deals with the Israel issue in his Jewish identity, reflecting Cohen and Eisen‟s finding 
that, “the young to middle-aged Jews we interviewed in the 1990s have clearly retreated from a passionate 
engagement with Israel” (2000, 189). The only time Israel comes up in regards to Krusty is in “The Greatest 
Story Ever D‟Ohed,” in which the Simpson family accompanies Flanders‟ Bible study group to Jerusalem. 
Krusty is there at the airport and says, “I believe that every Jew should make a pilgrimage to Israel before he 
dies. . . . Don‟t want to end up in Hell.” When Lisa informs him that Jews do not believe in Hell, Krusty runs 
off to the “Gaza Strip Club,” reflecting the ongoing pattern of not embracing the religious elements of his 
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changing in the 1970s and 1980s as Jewish individualism became more significant for the baby 
boomer generation.  
Jonathan Sarna, a historian of American Judaism, argues that one of the major challenges 
facing the Jewish community in the twenty-first century is to what extent the religion will accept the 
multiple identities Americans feel free to adopt. In other words, “the Jewish dilemma, at its core, 
involves a conflict of loyalties: faith pulls in one direction, America in the other” (2004, 371). While 
this contradicts Fishman‟s assertion that now Judaism and America are almost as one, Sarna points 
out that there are still tensions between the religion‟s ethical demands and the individual‟s desires. 
Questions of whom one can marry and who is inside the community are significant elements of 
Krusty‟s religious life. For more orthodox Jews, in the sense of Jews who adhere to any of the 
denominational traditions and not just the Orthodox, the development of Jewish ethnic identity 
divorced from its religious history presents what Sarna is discussing and what Rabbi Wolpe saw in 
“Like Father, Like Clown.” Krusty is a secular Jew who is incomplete without his religion. So, while 
The Simpsons does not embrace everything about Judaism, it acknowledges its importance in crafting 
a meaningful identity for Jews in contemporary America and suggests that Krusty is an incomplete 
person without it. 
Contextualizing this trend is the personal spirituality theme discussed in chapter four. 
Sociologist Chaim Waxman argues that baby-boomer “seeker” spirituality has influenced 
contemporary Judaism, leading synagogues to serve individuals‟ desires and spiritual developments. 
This endangers the tradition because the community is no longer emphasized. While traditional 
Judaism has developed around the unifying idea of the chosen people serving God, this new shift asks 
how contemporary Judaism can serve the individual‟s personal quest without prioritizing the group 
(2005, 104-112). As such, Jews become religious for themselves and not for the continuation and 
connection with other Jews. Sociologist Nathan Glazer sees this as a new stage in Jewish civil 
religion. While past generations organized themselves politically to oversee the Jewish people‟s 
“sacred survival” (especially through support for Israel), today he sees an increased focus on “sacred 
community” in which the Jewish tradition offers its adherents different ways to identify as Jews. For 
Glazer this is an increase in Jewish religiosity and a decrease in Jewish ethnic identification (2005). 
Cohen and Eisen (2000) identify the significant point about this shift: privatization. Today, Jews find 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Jewishness when his hedonistic pleasures can be pursued. While this episode also deals with some 
contemporary issues, such as pluralism in the Middle East and the problems it raises there, I do not have the 
space to discuss them here. 
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meaning in selecting which rituals to practice, how to practice them, and which elements of the 
tradition they do not want to engage. One of the refrains Cohen and Eisen (2000) found among their 
interviewees was that they bypassed elements of the tradition that bothered them. Privatization leads 
to selective interpretation and radical changes in the tradition when the institutional order can no 
longer command adherence to its principles. We can see this in the treatment of Jewish rituals. 
Krusty‟s adaptations to modernity and his desire (occasionally) to take his faith seriously 
collide again in the season fifteen episode, “Today, I am a Clown.” After getting a puppy from the 
Simpson children, he takes it for a walk in the old Jewish neighbourhood where street vendors call 
out to customers, promoting Brazilian wax jobs and DSL services. Eventually they find the “Jewish 
Walk of Fame,” which features such notable Jews as Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Sandy Koufax, 
comedian Joan Rivers, children‟s entertainer and puppeteer Shari Lewis, and her puppet Lamb Chop. 
Krusty is astounded that he does not have a star on the Walk of Fame and goes to the offices of the 
“Jewish Walk of Fame: Where the Chosen Get Chosen.” While the curator agrees that Krusty should 
have a star, it turns out that Krusty has not been bar mitzvahed. However, Krusty‟s father never let 
Krusty have a bar mitzvah because he was afraid the boy would make a mockery of the ceremony. 
When Krusty decides to take his faith seriously, his show gets cancelled because he will not work on 
the Sabbath (Saturdays in the Jewish tradition), and Homer‟s replacement show becomes a bigger hit. 
Desperate, Krusty takes his bar mitzvah to FOX and, co-hosted with actor Mr. T, he has an 
extravagant ceremony, complete with The Beach Boys singing about kosher meal preparation and a 
performance by the cast of Broadway‟s version of The Lion King. The ceremony ends not with Krusty 
reading from the Torah, but with Mr. T strapped to a giant menorah which is spun around by Krusty 
while sparks shoot from its ends. Krusty is a hit again, but, not surprisingly, his father is disappointed. 
In the end, Krusty decides to have a real bar mitzvah, in a synagogue with a small group of friends 
celebrating. 
If “Like Father, Like Clown” represents the alienation that some Jews feel among the 
generations, religious life, and secular society, then “Today, I am a Clown” captures the angst 
involved in limited religious participation, while still trying to maintain an ethnoreligious identity. 
While there are certainly “secular” Jews, marginal affiliates are confronted with a tradition that 
emphasizes practice over belief. Indeed, in the strictly religious sense, Jews are free to question the 
Torah, just not to disobey it. Krusty‟s need for a bar mitzvah is significant because it is a transition 
into adulthood, it makes him both a man and a Jew. Without it, and the serious commitment it 
requires, Krusty knows that his identity‟s religious component is unfulfilled. The Simpsons accurately 
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captures the bar mitzvah‟s significance.
119
 This is a substantial turn for The Simpsons because this 
story arc suggests there is something significant about the institutionalized traditions within Judaism. 
Unlike Christianity‟s institutional elements which were cause for ridicule, the bar mitzvah is treated 
with utmost seriousness, to the point that Krusty feels compelled to have a replacement ceremony 
because it needs to be held in an “authentic” environment. Wilful participation in Jewish ritual fulfils 
Krusty, suggesting that personal religious pursuits within institutionalized frameworks, without trying 
to convert others to one‟s religion, are considered acceptable religious practices in The Simpsons‟ 
unseen order. 
Krusty‟s religiousness falls somewhere between Cohen‟s “moderately affiliated” and 
“peripheral” Judaism (1995). That is, he is not wholly uncommitted to the tradition, but he is not 
committed enough to participate in regular holidays other than Hanukkah. Krusty‟s need for religious 
identity is not enough to generate a permanent change in character the way Lisa‟s conversion to 
Buddhism changed her identity. Instead, this is the modernist problem of individual identity 
construction. Krusty understands himself as Jewish and needs the legitimacy that rites of passage 
provide. However, his individual interests also involve eating pork (and endorsing pork products) 
(e.g., “Krusty Gets Busted”), in “Today, I am a Clown” he refers to the 613 mitzvot (Jewish laws) as 
“all these rules, I feel like I‟m in a strip club!” Clearly, the formal demands of Orthodoxy are not on 
Krusty‟s mind. On the other hand, this puts Krusty‟s religiosity squarely in the pattern that has been 
established in the previous two chapters. Religion is a good thing when it provides individual 
meaning and self-worth, and bad when it prohibits or forecloses individual pursuits. Krusty‟s 
commitment makes him a man and a Jew in his eyes, giving him the social recognition he craves, but 
this does not stop him from indulging in drugs, alcohol, and pork products; mistreating his coworkers; 
and luxuriating in crass materialism. The ethical stance that has defined liberal Judaism means 
nothing to Krusty. As such, he represents a position that reflects contemporary Jews‟ nervousness 
about the continuation of their religious tradition. 
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 A similar service, known as the bat mitzvah, is held for women in Reformed, Reconstructionist, and 
some Conservative synagogues. For a brief explanation of the ritual see Olitzky (2000, 7-10). Silberman and 
Silberman (1993) discuss the ritual‟s importance as a rite of passage, but also locate it in the contemporary 
Jew‟s life cycle. That is, this is a rite for young adolescents which makes them religiously adults, but does not 
make them socially adults. It should also be noted that the bar mitzvah contributes to contemporary Jewish 
anxieties about the community‟s continuation because it is often the point where young Jews stop attending 
synagogue. In other words, their parents take them to synagogue long enough to be bar mitzvah and then stop 
because of prohibitive costs involved in synagogue membership (Kaplan 2005, 11). 
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 The final Jewish concern Krusty touches upon emphasizes anxieties about the community‟s 
continuity in contemporary America. That is, in the four-hundred and fiftieth episode, “Once Upon a 
Time in Springfield,” Krusty gets engaged to his new co-star, Princess Penelope. At the wedding 
ceremony we learn that she is not Jewish when Rabbi Krustofsky announces, “friends, loved ones, we 
are gathered here today to marry a Jew and a... Congregationalist? Is that even a thing? And now, 
let‟s continue with this mockery.” Although the wedding does not take place because Bart and 
Milhouse convince Krusty that he is a terrible husband and Penelope is too good for him, the clown 
eventually follows his girlfriend to Paris, where they reunite.  
On the surface this is another in a long line of Simpsons “crazy-wedding” episodes, but it 
raised concerns in the Jewish community. Journalist Nathan Burnstein summarized the episode in The 
Jewish Daily Forward (2010), and the Jewish Outreach Institute applauded it for (briefly) drawing 
attention to intermarriage (2010). Rabbi Simcha Weinstein (2010) took a more cautious approach, 
arguing that he would like to see more exclusively Jewish married couples on television, contending 
that they can be as humorous as mixed couples. On the other hand, Jewish Exponent writer Barry 
Schwartzman used “Once Upon a Time in Springfield” to illustrate the fact that intermarriage is 
increasing within the Jewish community, at least in Philadelphia where the Jewish Federation of 
Greater Philadelphia had just released a study showing that 45% of marriages involving Jews under 
40 in the Philadelphia area were exogamous. Schwartzman and his sources treat this as a problem 
because children born to intermarried couples are rarely raised solely as Jews, leading to the question 
of whether or not America‟s Jewish community is slowly dying due to a lack of replenishment 
(2010). 
Ethnic and religious intermarriage has long been a significant issue in the Jewish community. 
Rabbi and Judaism scholar Dana Evan Kaplan writes that this has historically been a major dividing 
point within the community, complicating the question of who is actually Jewish (2009, 161-205). 
Some Orthodox rabbis refuse to recognize intermarriage, and will not officiate at ceremonies. 
However, as the rate of intermarriage spiked in the Jewish community after the 1950s, a new problem 
arose in the Jewish community. Children of Jewish fathers and Gentile mothers were not being raised 
Jewish and were not recognized as Jews, while children of Jewish mothers and Gentile fathers were at 
least nominally Jewish. In 1983, Reform Judaism allowed for patrilineal descent, and previously 
unrecognized children were now accepted as Jews, the hope being that their parents would now bring 
them to the synagogues and introduce them to their religious traditions. Unfortunately, this further 
split the Jewish body as Orthodox rabbis refused to acknowledge patrilineal descent. Today, the rate 
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of intermarriage is increasing and Kaplan thinks its stigma is decreasing as only the Orthodox 
continue to object. Yet, there is still a fear of the Jewish people‟s disappearance due to exogamy and 
lack of interest because children are not being raised within the tradition.  
Sociologist Paul Ritterband (1995, 382-384) sees the problem demographically. Statistically, 
the children of intermarriages tend towards “cultural Christianity” (383), rather than Judaism. For 
Ritterband this is more than a symbolic question, it is a matter of basic survival. Without new Jews to 
replace the ones who die, the community will continue contracting until it disappears. According to 




To the non-Jew, Krusty‟s marriage to Princess Penelope is little more than a plot device to 
expose Krusty as a terrible husband. To many Jewish observers, their fears and concerns are 
symbolically communicated through the depiction of a Jew marrying a Congregationalist. While there 
have certainly been other jokes in The Simpsons‟ history which seem more offensive—for example, 
in “Mr. Plow,” the Simpsons attend a car show where a German spokesman for “Fourth Reich 
Motors: Since 1946” explains that their, “tireless safety engineers crash test over 1000 cars a year.” 
After viewing their demonstration video, Lisa notes that the crash test dummies are real people, 
causing the spokesman to close the exhibit. This passing reference to the Holocaust draws on the 
horrors of Nazi “scientific experiments” on Jewish prisoners, but it never caused a stir in the Jewish 
community. This speaks to fact that in America there are other ways to threaten Jewish existence than 
the brutality and horrors the Holocaust wrought. The slow disappearance of the Jewish community 
through exogamy is one such threat. 
Through Krusty we see how The Simpsons treats established ethno-religious communities in 
America. Judaism‟s rituals are not intimately woven into Krusty‟s character, but they are important 
for his spiritual development when he chooses to pursue it. At the same time, the endogamous 
practices that some Jews see as essential for preserving their community, which contradict the idea of 
freedom of choice in a marriage partner, brings The Simpsons‟ willingness to attack institutionalized 
ideas that violate liberal American values back to the forefront of our discussion. Judaism‟s 
embracing of these values is applauded (Fishman 2000) as an accepted ethno-religious tradition in 
America. 
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6.4 Crossing and Dwelling in a Diverse America 
Tweed‟s inspiration for Crossing and Dwelling, Our Lady of the Exile (1997), is a study of 
Miami‟s Cuban Catholic community and their reverence for Our Lady of Charity. As an outsider 
looking in, he took it as his professional duty to reflect on his position relative to these Catholics 
while trying to understand how their religion helped them in their movement. Cuban Catholics living 
in the United States were between two worlds, longing for Cuba, but steadfastly supporting American 
economic policy. Their religious practices supported this as they wanted to unite the two worlds on 
Cuban soil, even as the second generation was starting to assimilate. 
For The Simpsons‟ creative team there is no such commitment to representing reality. All that 
matters is that they generate jokes they think the audience will find humorous. However, Tweed‟s 
ideas from Crossing and Dwelling are useful in that they alert us to the fact that human beings are 
constantly in transition, even while they are in one place. The challenges of being Jewish or Hindu in 
America, and linking these two religions to their ethnic heritages, has generated numerous 
stereotypes. While there are numerous studies about immigrant religious groups, some of which 
include how communities deal with prejudice from the other Americans, part of dwelling in America 
is knowing that there are “others” nearby. Controlling public representation and presentation are part 
of the struggle for ethnic religious groups. But no one group can ever completely control what others 
think about them. Stereotypes develop over time, and they are activated by humorists when they think 
they can make their audience laugh. 
Krusty and Apu use their religions to mark transitions in their lives, giving them a sense of 
identity and difference in America. This reflects Herberg‟s (1960) thesis that having a religion is an 
acceptable mark of difference in America. The Simpsons embraces this idea, and positively contrasts 
Judaism and Hinduism with Christianity. Judaism and Hinduism give their adherents meaning and 
direction, helping them to transition through life in a culture that labels them as religiously different. 
The varying levels of depth in the jokes, with the shallowness of the Hindu jokes contrasted with the 
Judaism jokes drawing upon Jewish ritual traditions, suggests that there is greater intertextual 
familiarity with Judaism among the people creating and watching The Simpsons. However, both 
religions are treated as being acceptable religious practices in America. 
In the continuum of Springfield‟s unseen order, Judaism and Hinduism fit somewhere 
between the core religions of Buddhism, Native American religions, and “spirituality,” and the 
ridiculed, stupid, Christians. They are positive to the extent that they provide frameworks for people 
transitioning to America, facilitating our reading of Krusty and Apu as Americans in the sense that 
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they are different, but similar, in their drawing selectively from their inherited religious traditions to 





Chapter 7— New Religions, Secret Societies, Muslims, and the 
Media: The Simpsons’ Unseen Order’s Outer Fringe 
The last four chapters discuss a continuum of acceptable practice informing The Simpsons‟ 
critique of America‟s religions and their public roles. Deinstitutionalized spirituality, with its 
appropriation of Buddhism and Native American religions is combined with scientific rationality to 
provide a base for this criticism. Christianity, among both Catholics and Protestants, was criticized for 
its institutional and traditional religiosity. However, The Simpsons praises Christian ethics when they 
lead to positive social behaviour. To reiterate Homer‟s joke from “Homerpalooza,” Christianity is the 
religion “with all the well meaning rules that never work out in real life.” But when people follow 
through on the rules promoting positive social actions (e.g., caring for others), The Simpsons treats 
Christianity as socially beneficial. Within this schema, Jews and Hindus are marginalized because of 
their ethnoreligious traditions. Although both traditions have sects that welcome converts (e.g., 
Reform Jews, ISKCON), they are noticeable for their ethnic insulation. 
The Simpsons draws upon a variety of historical events and filters them through an ignorant 
familiarity to craft jokes based upon presumed political and religious norms in their audience. This 
chapter criticizes the way that The Simpsons replicates mass mediated stereotypes about New 
Religious Movements (NRMs), the Freemasons, and Islam. They reproduce, rather than criticize, 
news media‟s biases, which is problematic because then Simpsons commentators reproduce the 
stereotypes as if they were true. In other cases, The Simpsons is critical of news media‟s accuracy. 
Jonathan Gray writes that the program‟s parodies criticize news media‟s trustworthiness (2006, 94-
116). They depict local newsman Kent Brockman as careerist and incapable of discerning real news, 
such as the Soviet Union‟s collapse in 1989, from soft news, such as dogs being issued major credit 
cards (“Sideshow Bob‟s Last Gleaming”).
121
 They attack reporters who capitulate to owners‟ 
interests, and present news broadcasts as overhyped stories designed to entertain rather than inform. 
Gray considers this humorous criticism of news media a public service. The Simpsons teaches viewers 
a critical approach to mass media and hopefully they will become suspicious of future news 
broadcasts. Guehlstorf, Hallstrom, and Morris (2008, 215-216) note a similar pattern, and highlight 
                                                     
121
 Some Simpsons episode titles are witty references to popular culture phenomena. “Sideshow Bob‟s 
Last Gleaming” is a parody of Twilight‟s Last Gleaming (Aldrich 1977), in which a United States Air Force 
general takes control of a nuclear missile silo and threatens to start World War III unless his demands are met. 
In “Sideshow Bob‟s Last Gleaming”, Bart‟s nemisis, Sideshow Bob, steals a nuclear weapon and threatens to 
destroy Springfield unless all television programming is taken off the air. 
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The Simpsons‟ parody of the conservativism in FOX News‟ news ticker in the episode “Mr. Spritz 
Goes to Washington,” with such headlines as “Study: 92 percent of Democrats are gay.” Parodying 
the news ticker was so controversial that FOX forbade The Simpsons from ever doing it again, fearing 
the audience would interpret the news ticker as real. For these scholars, mocking the media elite is 
part of The Simpsons‟ criticism of power. Furthermore, media analysis professor Mick Broderick 
acknowledges that the program satirizes mass media‟s capitulation to the nuclear power industry 
(2004, 259-261) and English literature scholar Duncan Beard contends that the show‟s oppositionality 
lies in its ironic and destabilizing use of mass media stereotypes (2004, 273). Other studies have come 
to similar conclusions.
122
 In light of this support for The Simpsons‟ critical perspective on mass 
media, its uncritical portrayal of contemporary America‟s most marginalized and maligned religions 
through common stereotypes is significant because it shows just how deeply entrenched these 
stereotypes are in the cultural stock of knowledge. 
NRMs, secret societies, and Islam are some of the easiest religious targets for hostility in 
contemporary America and an uncritical position toward their marginality reflects how The Simpsons‟ 
creative team views these groups in the United States. First, I outline a specific “cult” stereotype and 
its historical use in mass media since the 1970s. Then, I demonstrate how this concept informs the 
episodes “The Joy of Sect” and “Homer the Great” and is challenged in “Rednecks and Broomsticks,” 
discussing throw-away jokes from other select episodes to demonstrate its pervasiveness. Finally, I 
will discuss Islam‟s depiction which was consistent for the first nineteen seasons before reversing 
itself in 2009‟s “Mypods and Boomsticks.”  
7.1 The Cult Stereotype 
For decades mass media has negatively portrayed NRMs. In a special issue of Review of 
Religious Research dedicated to mass media and unconventional religion, sociologist Stuart Wright 
writes, “It would seem that, in most cases, the only story sufficiently „newsworthy‟ about these 
religious groups must involve some diabolical plot to subvert the innocent, engineered of course by a 
crazed maniacal „cult‟ leader who secretly schemes to amass limitless power” (1997, 110-111). Ten 
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 Among non-academics, Turner argues Brockman is glib and hysterical, while Springfield news (and 
by extension all news media) is preoccupied with trivial and sensationalistic stories (2004, 399-403), and 
Keslowitz (2006, 105) contends that “there is no news media program that can support and promote democracy 
the way The Simpsons does on a weekly basis.” Within the scholarly community, Scanlan and Feinberg (2000, 
132) recommend teaching critical media awareness to sociology students through The Simpsons, and 
Blakeborough (2008) argues the program‟s irony criticizes negative media stereotypes of the elderly. 
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years earlier, sociologists Barend van Driel and James Richardson identified the most common 
negative motifs used in “cult” reporting between 1972 and 1984 (1988a, 177; see also 1988b): 
charismatic leadership; extreme authoritarianism and discipline; confining members or depriving 
them of personal freedoms; behavioural control using psychological manipulation or brainwashing; a 
preoccupation with the leaders‟ wealth and luxury; the group‟s portrayal of the outside world as evil 
and something to be feared; and apocalyptic beliefs.
123
 These are the essential elements of a 
stereotype which is used as recipe knowledge for explaining NRMs to media consumers who have 
little, if any, direct contact with these religious groups. As the 1978 National Review article “Cult 
Taxonomy” demonstrates, “cult” further symbolizes the difference between accepted and unaccepted 
religious beliefs. The article‟s unnamed author lists the following traits as characteristics of cults: the 
inability to leave due to manipulative forces; the threat of violence; sexual deviance; financial 
exploitation; and doctrines which are “intellectually derisory.” The article‟s unnamed author uses the 
Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (the Unification Church, or “The 
Moonies”) as an example of the last two points (1578).
124
 This pervasive stereotype homogenizes 
many different groups, but how did it develop?
 
 
Religion and media scholar Sean McCloud argues that while the concept of an exotic 
religious fringe existed prior to the 1970s, the contemporary “cult” concept took shape during that 
                                                     
123 For examples of news stories and popular exposés using this stereotype in relation to Scientology 
see Behar (1991), R. Miller (1987) and Reitman (2006); criticizing the Unification Church see Woodward 
(1976, 1978); its role in discussions of the Branch Davidian conflict at Waco see Kantrowiz (1993) and Puente 
(1993); framing discourse about the Children of God/Family International and sexual abuse see Chainey (2008), 
Nash (1993a, 1993b), and M. Williams (1998); and Mannes (1997) and Macklin (1997) regarding the Heaven‟s 
Gate suicides. These are only some of the most prominent groups to receive media coverage and this survey is 
not exhaustive. However, it gives readers a sense of the consistency with which these groups are categorized 
together in popular consciousness, even when individual religions are being discussed. It also demonstrates how 
negative portrayals shape news coverage of NRMs. For academic accounts of these groups see Bednarowski 
(1995), James Lewis (2009), Melton (2000), and Roy Wallis (1977) on Scientology; Barker (1984, 1995), and 
Bromley and Shupe (1979) on the Unification Church; regarding The Family International see Bainbridge 
(2002), Chancellor (2000), Lewis and Melton (1994), Melton (2004), and Van Zandt (1991); see Tabor and 
Gallagher (1995), and Stuart Wright (1995) concerning the Branch Davidian conflicts; and regarding Heaven‟s 
Gate see Balch and Taylor (1977, 2002), Balch (1995), and Winston Davis (2000). See also Cowan and Hadden 
(2004) on NRMs and mass media. 
124
 Bromley (1994, 123) notes similar characteristics commonly associated with cults, emphasizing the 
stereotyping of charismatic leaders as manipulative, greedy, and capable of making their followers docile. He 
also adds the fear of each movement being densely populated when most groups are quite small. Robbins and 
Anthony (1994, 126) argue that while there is no clear or consensus definition, the term cult connotes “an 
authoritarian, mind-controlling movement in which convert-victims are mentally enslaved and can be made to 
perpetuate violence and crime as ordained by a charismatic prophet or guru.” According to McCloud (2006, 
215), “cult” “conjures images of brainwashing, coercion, deception, exploitation, perversion, and religious 
fraud.” See also Beckford (1994), and van Driel and van Belzen (1990). 
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decade (2004; see also P. Jenkins 2000, van Driel and Richardson 1988b). The Unification Church 
led in negative coverage. Sun Myung Moon‟s lavish lifestyle, rumours of Moon‟s involvement in 
bizarre sexual practices in Korea, and accusations of brainwashing and involuntary confinement made 
for captivating journalism (McCloud 2004, 128; see also Barker 1984, Bromley and Shupe 1979). 
However, “by the late 1970s the connections between cults, brainwashing, and fraudulence had 
become naturalized. In other words, these associations became unquestioned truths—not just in 
magazine articles, but for many Americans” (McCloud 2004, 128). That is, the stereotype became 
recipe knowledge for interpreting NRMs and implicated more groups than just Unificationists. On 
November 18, 1978 the fear of violence was added to the stereotype as the members of Peoples 
Temple drank Flavor-Aid laced with cyanide and committed mass suicide at Jonestown, Guyana. 
Children too young to drink the concoction were injected with the poison. Jonestown has had a 
profound effect on American cultural memory, and it is cited in anti-cult literature as a reason to be 
wary of all NRMs (e.g., Rudin and Rudin 1980; Singer and Laich 1995; cf. J. Hall 1995).
125
 McCloud 
notes that it featured prominently in discussions of the Branch Davidian‟s fifty-one day standoff with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) between February 28 and April 19, 1993 in Waco, Texas, 
which culminated violently as FBI combat engineering vehicles wrecked the Davidian compound and 
a fire gutted the building, killing seventy-four members. Echoing initial attempts to make sense of 
Jonestown, mass media legitimated events as a cult suicide by weak-minded followers of a 
charismatic psychopath getting what they deserved (2004, 179-184). In James Richardson‟s words, 
the Branch Davidians were turned into “unworthy victims” (1995) who deserved their fate.
126
 By 
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 Barker (1986) notes Jonestown‟s impact on anti-cult literature, a major source for reporters‟ 
opinions about NRMs. John Hall (1995) shows that narratives of “cult suicide” stemming from Jonestown‟s 
cultural impact influenced government decisions during the Branch Davidian standoff. Rebecca Moore (2003) 
demonstrates that the idea of “drinking the Kool-Aid” became a part of popular discourse after the People‟s 
Temple suicides, and works as a way of excluding the memory of Jonestown while implying a total 
commitment to the ideologies of an individual or group. Chidester‟s (1988) and John Hall‟s (2004 [1987]) 
studies explicate how discourse around Jonestown contributed to the way people distanced themselves from the 
events, denying Peoples Temple members their humanity and delegitimating their actions. Meanwhile the 
Peoples Temple members‟ revolutionary voices were silenced in the dominant discourses of mass media and 
government explanations. For more on Jonestown‟s visual impact see Cowan (2008a). For initial news coverage 
of the event, see Matthews (1978) and “Nightmare in Jonestown” (1978). 
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 Examining media‟s role in the Branch Davidian conflict provides many fruitful insights. James 
Lewis (1995) argues that by applying the “cult” label to the group it was only a matter of time before a violent 
confrontation with law enforcement came to fruition. Documentary footage in Waco: The Rules of Engagement 
(Gazecki, 1997) demonstrates that there is good reason to call the FBI‟s interpretation of events into question, 
as government inquiries of FBI actions and video footage of the events of April 19, 1993 show their version of 




1993 it was clear that journalistic reporting on “cults” resonated favourably with the American public. 
These ideological narratives dialectically received legitimation and endorsed the political actions of 
the anti-cult movement (ACM) who then provided journalists with expert advice.  
During the “cult wars” of the 1970s and 1980s, the ACM worked doggedly to advance their 
theory of conversion to NRMs and the dangers these groups presented. Assuming that NRMs caused 
people to “snap” and become charismatic leaders‟ servants, journalists Flo Conway and Jim 
Siegelman (1978) gave an early account of what would be repeated many times under the 
“brainwashing” rubric. James and Marcia Rudin of the American Jewish Committee wrote that using 
highly successful techniques to manipulate thoughts and behaviours of new members were 
characteristic of new religions (1980, 16-17; see also Appel 1983; Shapiro 1977). Psychologist 
Margaret Singer argued that cultists kept recruits unaware of their surroundings, controlling the 
situation so neophytes felt helpless, replacing the convert‟s old worldview with a new one focussed 
on the group‟s charismatic leader, and constructed a closed system where criticizing the leader was 
unacceptable (Singer 1995, 63). Singer (11), and Conway and Siegelman (1978, 46) argued that these 
groups‟ main purposes were recruitment and fund-raising. Linking violence to the charismatic bond, 
Singer and the Rudins insinuated that devotion to a charismatic leader led to the events at Jonestown; 
and Singer, along with anticultists such as Rick Ross, the Cult Awareness Network, and the American 
Family Foundation (later International Cultic Studies Association) were all prominent suppliers of 
information, acting as expert resources during major cult controversies of the 1980s and 1990s.
127
  
Comparing this focus on mind control, charismatic leadership, and fund-raising with the 
characteristics of mass media‟s framework for reporting on NRMs discloses a direct correlation 
between anticult ideologies and media accounts of NRMs‟ beliefs and practices. This ideological 
spectrum legitimates certain religions as “authentic,” “real,” and/or “valid.” How a religion is 
classified along certain cultural standards that editors, reporters, and audiences take for granted 
determines how it will be reported to the general populace (Barker 1986, Bromley 1994, Possamai 
and Lee 2004, Richardson and van Driel 1997, Robbins and Anthony 1994, and Shupe 1997).
128
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 Shupe and Bromley‟s A Documentary History of the Anti-Cult Movement (1985) demonstreates the 
historical development of these concerns through primary source documents. For overviews of the ACM, see 
Shupe and Bromley (1980) and Shupe and Darnell (2006). 
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 Asian religions are also categorized along an implicit standard, in which “real religious” groups 
consist of people of Asian ancestry worshipping Asian gods or listening to traditional institutional leaders (e.g., 
Buddhist monks), while gurus with numerous Western converts (e.g., ISKCON) are labelled dangerous cults. 
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NRMs face an uphill battle for legitimacy as stigma and controversy frames the public‟s initial 
exposure to them. 
NRMs face another serious problem in terms of their “newsworthiness.” Since they are small 
and marginal, newsmakers tend to treat them as significant only in cases sociologists Anson Shupe 
and Jeffrey Hadden call “crisis events” (1995, 182). These events are meaningful because they 
demand responses from a society‟s authoritative institutions whose legitimacy is challenged. Hence, 
as sociologist Adam Poassami and criminologist Murray Lee (2004) assert, this tends to involve 
criminalizing narratives of NRM activity (see also van Driel and Richardson 1988b). Cowan and 
Hadden (2004, 69-77) present a four stage value-added model of NRM newsworthiness which 
consists of event negativity, the event‟s resonance with a target audience, the rarity of the event for 
that audience, and how clearly and simply the event can be portrayed. By reducing complexity and 
relying on abnormal behaviour to frame their stories, news reporters have built a stereotype of cults 
which feeds into the ACM‟s agenda and reifies specific social arrangements (e.g., the nuclear family, 
monogamous heterosexuality, American middle-class lifestyle) and the authority structures that are 
legitimated by these arrangements (e.g., government, law enforcement). Richardson and van Dreil 
argue that this is dangerous because while these stories sell newspapers, they also discredit the idea of 
newsmakers as “fair and balanced” and harm civil liberties (1997, 128). Similarly, Berry College 
scholars Harvey Hill, John Hickman, and Joel McLendon suggest that by characterizing NRMs as 
dangerous, media may pressure borderline movements into violence when they might otherwise 
abstain (2001, 34-35; cf. Wessinger 2000). By reducing all NRMs to the status of “cult,” mass media 
has played a role in marginalizing these groups. 
If the cult stereotype is founded on faulty assumptions, the logical question is why media 
outlets perpetuate it. Journalist-turned-professor Mark Silk (1997) and Christian Century news editor 
John Dart (1997) defend journalists from accusations that they are spreading controversy in order to 
sell newspapers and preserve the American status quo. Silk argues religious news is based on the 
moral standards of the culture at large, not on the biases of the ACM; while Dart contends that 
journalists need to work with the common stocks of knowledge they assume people possess so they 
can get their story across quickly. He also writes that the best reporting happens when a journalist 
disproves a common assumption (1997, 148). Newspaper reporters have neither time nor space to 
study a group carefully for a prolonged period of time and then write a complex article. Their job is to 
convey events and their significance relative to the audience‟s assumed values (see also Beckford 
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1994, McCloud 2004). These arguments are helpful because they remind us that the news is not 
scholarship, but that it has a critical influence on society. 
This explains why journalists do what they do. However, it does not absolve them from 
responsibility for the fruits of their labour. Neither Silk nor Dart refutes the problem of a deeply 
flawed and prejudicial “cult” stereotype in American culture. When journalists frame their stories 
about NRMs opposing everyday norms and only consider the story newsworthy if it is an event which 
violates social standards, they implicitly reaffirm the standards most people have for religious 
conduct. While journalists may consider it their job to report the uncommon, NRMs become news 
through deviance. As Cowan and Hadden remind us, the negativity of an event is its first newsworthy 
value (2004, 69-71). Despite Silk‟s belief that his writings on local Scientologists are similar to his 
coverage of other religious Americans (1997, 139), this does not change the fact that the stories which 
attract people‟s attention and shape popular opinion about NRMs are firmly rooted in controversy. 
With this stereotype established over the last forty years and still readily available, it is part of the 
cultural stock of knowledge The Simpsons draws upon when making its jokes. The questions are: 
How is it used? Why is it used? And why does it matter? 
7.1.1 The Movementarians 
In “The Joy of Sect,” the Simpsons join “The Movementarians,” a NRM that has just arrived 
in Springfield. The group entices Springfielders to donate their worldly possessions to follow the 
movement‟s “perfect leader” who is building a space ship that will take them to the planet Blisstonia 
(“known for its high levels of bliss”).
129
 An amalgram of a variety of NRMs, the Movementarians are 
the cult stereotype writ large. When Homer and Bart walk through Springfield airport a man in a 
saffron robe offers Homer a pamphlet and asks, “Have you heard of Krishna Consciousness?” Homer 
points at him and says, “This, Bart, is a crazy man.” They then pass a man in a blue suit, holding up a 
white book with a golden cross, who says, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” 
Homer‟s reply echoes the critiques of Christianity discussed in chapter five: “Yeah right, that‟ll 
work.” Only the Movementarians‟ promise of a new and better life on Blisstonia makes sense to 
Homer and he decides to attend their free weekend retreat. 
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The retreat displays many of the cult stereotype‟s assumptions. At the welcome centre, people 
are shown a video about the Movementarians. Although free to leave at any time, they are pressured 
to stay: a spotlight shines on anyone who tries to exit and a voice asks why he or she wants to go. 
Homer is subjected to the “circle of judgement,” in which members of the Movementarians and his 
Springfield neighbours insult him, and the cultists remind us that “everybody loves a droning, 
repetitive chant.” A parody of the Batman theme song wins Homer over and he joins the group, 
registering the entire Simpson family and giving the Movementarians their life savings, the deed to 
their house, and a commitment of one trillion years of service. Once the house is donated the family 
moves to the Movementarian compound where they harvest lima beans, live in a dormitory, and are 
educated in the group‟s doctrines. Bart tries to cause havoc, but his “Lil‟ Bastard General Mischief 
Kit” is no match for the cultists‟ “Lil‟ Bastard Brainwashing Kit.” Lisa starts loving the leader to get 
good grades, and Homer begs Marge to remarry him in a mass marriage parodying the Unification 
Church‟s blessing ceremonies in which thousands of people are paired by Reverend Moon and then 
married simultaneously.
130
 Only Marge is not taken in by the group and manages to escape the 
compound. 
Back in Springfield she enlists Reverend Lovejoy and the elementary school‟s Scottish 
groundskeeper, Willie, to free her family. Willie offers to kidnap and deprogram Homer, and the three 
of them take a Rolls Royce to the compound, pretending to be the leader. They beckon Homer and the 
kids into the car and take them to Ned‟s house where they tie them up in the basement. The children 
leave the movement with the promise of hover-bikes and it looks as though Homer will be won over 
with the promise of beer. That is, until the Movementarians use their deadliest weapon—the lawyers. 
When the lawyers find the Simpsons in Ned‟s basement they return Homer to the compound because 
he is Movementarian property. 
Upon returning, Homer throws open the doors to the “forbidden barn,” revealing a spaceship. 
Everybody is convinced the leader was telling the truth as the saucer lifts off, but then its exterior falls 
away revealing a man pedaling a helicopter bicycle with sacks of money attached to it. He crashes 
into Cletus‟ farm and loses the money as the dejected Springfielders return to their lives.  
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 Mass marriage has been the subject of other throw-away jokes. A sign in “Sideshow Bob Roberts” 
reads, “Tonight: Mayoral Debates Tomorrow: Mass Wedding of Cult Members,” and in “How I Spent My 
Strummer Vacation,” after Homer gets his friends front row seats to an all-star benefit concert, an excited Moe 
the bartender exclaims, “I ain‟t had front row seats since my Moonie wedding.” These jokes continue to work 
within the larger context of “cults” being deviant in their family arrangements. 
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Comparing these jokes to historical events reveals a pattern that draws upon examples framed 
by the cult stereotype to generate derisive humour. In “The Joy of Sect,” The Simpsons uses brief, 
meaningful statements and visual references to associate the Movementarians quickly with various 
NRMs, attaching these examples to negative sentiments already established in society. This way The 
Simpsons references numerous NRMs without any direct explanation of which groups are being 
parodied and allowing the overriding sentiment of “dangerous religions” to work as the interpretive 
framework.  
First, the Movementarians are a group which follows a charismatic leader who is also the 
head of their perfect family. The term “perfect family” should not be taken lightly. As religion 
scholars Dereck Daschke and Michael Ashcraft note, NRMs which present themselves as new 
families often draw the ire of society because they challenge traditional notions of family and the 
religious and state organizations that support it (2005, 12). The Unification Church and The Family 
International are the most obvious targets of this agenda. When we take their controversial histories 
into account we can see how the idea of a “perfect family” is part of the cult stereotype which is 
derided in order to preserve the status quo. Unificationists consider Reverend Moon and his wife, Hak 
Ja Han, their perfect parents, shepherding them into completion of God‟s plan for humanity. In their 
collection of NRM primary sources, Daschke and Ashcraft include an extended interview with 
Unificationists Hugh and Nora Spurgeon. The Spurgeons explain the Moon family‟s role in the 
Unification Church as “Rev. and Mrs. Moon are the central family through whom we as followers can 
find new meaning for marriage and family life” (in Daschke and Ashcraft 2005, 153). Moon has also 
claimed that he is the Messiah and that he and his wife are “the True Parents of all humanity” (S. 
Moon 1992). Unificationists believe that God sent Moon to fulfil the mission Jesus failed to 
complete, that is, to found a perfect family through which humanity can find fulfilment. This is done 
through an ideal family structure known as the Four Position Foundation in which husband and wife 
nurture each other in submission to God and in a position of authority over children who are born 
without the sinful state of separation wrought by Adam and Eve‟s fall (Barker 1984, 70-93; Cowan 
and Bromley 2008, 99-106; Daschke and Ashcraft 2005, 139-144).
131
 In Unification theology, in 
order to achieve salvation, people have to marry into this perfect family and then raise their own 
perfect families in accordance with Moon‟s teachings. Similarly, The Family‟s members refer to 
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founder Moses David Berg (d. 1994) as “Dad” or “Grandpa.”
132
 This works within the Family‟s 
structure, in which everyone is considered a part of the same family. This is emphasized in their 
traditions of living communally (although today only the most committed members do so [see 
Shepherd and Shepherd 2005]) and practicing free love. During his lifetime, Berg communicated with 
the different Family groups around the world through his “Mo Letters.” In the letter entitled “Happy 
Rebirthday,” he wrote “MARRIAGE IN THE FAMILY is to Jesus and they are all „Jesus Babies‟! 
[children born in the movement, regardless of the parents‟ marital status]—And we are all married to 
each other in His love” (Berg 1978; emphasis in original). This upset converts‟ biological parents, and 
the separation of people from their families became one of the central concerns about cults (see Shupe 
and Bromley 1985). These alternative relationships helped inspire the ACM‟s campaign to legalize 
deprogramming, as they saw these new family arrangements as proof that members were brainwashed 
and that the groups were threats.  
Furthermore, while we do not see the leader until the episode‟s conclusion, the fact that he 
has a team of brainwashers working for him is paradigmatic of the charismatic leader element of the 
cult stereotype. That the leader‟s face resembles Scientology‟s founder L. Ron Hubbard is not 
insignificant. Hubbard is a recognizable religious figure and Scientology has been accused of 
coercive mind control and financial exploitation. It also has a history mired in litigation with 
opponents ranging from defectors to journalists to the United States government. Hubbard has been 
accused of founding the religion for financial reasons, and Scientology‟s detractors often depict it as 
financial chicanery masquerading as a religion (e.g., Behar 1991; Beit-Hallahmi 2003; Kent 1999a, 
1999b; R. Miller 1987). The “trillion years of service” to which the Simpsons commit references the 
billion-year contracts members of Scientology‟s elite Sea Org sign. This decision makes sense within 
Scientology‟s unseen order, in which reincarnation plays an important role, but seems ridiculous to 
outsiders because this sounds less like a means to spiritual development and more like people putting 
their faith in science fiction, which Hubbard wrote prolifically (see Flinn 2009; Hubbard 1977; J. 
Lewis 2009; Kent 1996, 1999a; Melton 2009). In The Simpsons Archive‟s (http://www.snpp.com) 
episode capsule for “The Joy of Sect,” fan Mark Dallara noticed this reference and drew analogies 
between the Sea Org‟s and Movementarians‟ blue uniforms. He also linked the Movementarians‟ 
orientation film to Scientology‟s recruitment practices; the lawyers to Scientology‟s litigiousness; and 
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the judgement session, references to UFOs, and tax-exempt status to Scientology‟s beliefs and 
practices. This demonstrates how the religion can be reduced to these few references in the popular 
imagination. Comparing the leader to Hubbard, he echoes critics who treat Scientology as 
disingenuous: “that the Movementarian [sic] claims that he [the leader] invented morse [sic] code and 
other crap is similar to Scientology‟s absurd biographical sketch of the con man who started it all” 
(Wierny 2000). Dallara‟s fellow Simpsons aficionado Benjamin Robinson made connections to other 
groups, including the Unification Church and Heaven‟s Gate. However, when it comes to 
Scientology, he argues that because Nancy Cartwright, the voice of Bart Simpson, is a Scientologist 
the writers probably felt limited in how explicit they could make the references (Wierny 2000).
133
 
Hubbard is not the only NRM leader accused of misappropriating funds. Moon was 
imprisoned in 1981 on tax evasion charges and Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, founder of the short-lived 
1980s Oregon community Rajneeshpuram, was viewed suspiciously because he owned numerous 
Rolls Royces (Carter 1990; Urban 1996, 2005). The Simpsons reference this directly when the leader 
leaves “the forbidden barn” in a Rolls Royce and Lisa expresses disgust over the economic disparity 
between the leader and his followers who toil in the fields. The Simpsons encourages people to 
question NRM leaders‟ wealth in order to criticize their credibility. While individual religious leaders 
in other traditions are criticized for their wealth, this is not seen as a fundamental flaw in the religion 
as a whole. For example, just because televangelist Joel Osteen is wealthy does not mean mass media 
treats Christianity as a deeply flawed religion. However, this double standard legitimates criticisms of 
NRMs. 
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 Rumours exist suggesting that Cartwright‟s connections to Scientology have caused some jokes to 
be rewritten. According to reporter Chris Ayers, the script for “Little Big Girl” originally called for the 
Mormons to be called “the second freakiest religion in America” (2009). The joke that aired has Bart saying, 
“Utah? Home of America‟s most powerful weirdos?” The implication Ayers draws from this is that 
Scientologists are the freakiest American religion. According to Cartwright‟s publicist, because Scientology 
was not directly mentioned there is no story here. However, because of Scientology‟s negative public image, 
and the general consensus that is reified through the cult stereotype, the story writes itself in the popular 
imagination (Ayers 2009). 
Cartwright briefly mentions her philanthropic relationship with Scientology‟s para-organizations 
Narcanon, The Way to Happiness, and The World Literacy Crusade in her autobiography My Life as a 10-Year-
Old Boy (2000). However, she does not give any reflection on her religious beliefs or opinions about Hubbard 
other than calling him a “humanitarian” (270). In 2009, Cartwright caused a stir among Simpsons producers by 
using Bart‟s copyrighted voice in a phone advertisement for Scientology‟s Flag World Tour event. Executive 
producer Al Jean then clarified that the program does not support any religious organization (Ayers 2009). 
Furthermore, Pinsky reports that The Simpsons‟ producers vetoed an episode criticizing Scientology because of 
the church‟s history of litigiousness (2007, 202). 
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During the audio commentary, show runner Steve Moore, writer Steve O‟Donnell, and Matt 
Groening acknowledge that Erhard Seminar Training (est) and the Unification Church inspired the 
peer pressure scenes. Both groups were criticised for their high intensity recruitment techniques and 
their treatment of their meetings‟ attendees. Est was accused of verbally abusing people and 
subjecting them to draconian conditions, while charging exorbitant sums of money for a chance at 
enlightenment. Alternatively, the Unificationists were demonized for their practice of “love-
bombing” in which they said overwhelmingly positive things about a potential recruit so the person 
would stay with the group. The implication is that love-bombers lied to grow their movement. In 
“The Joy of Sect,” these cultural memories are recalled comically, and that the idea that cults verbally 
abuse people and restrain recruits in high pressure situations is seen as maliciously motivated.
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Furthermore, Willie‟s offer to deprogram Homer and the kids recalls how deprogrammers 
were often championed as heroes who rescued children from cults. Starting in the early 1970s, 
deprogramming developed as a radical way to remove young adults who had converted to NRMs and 
cut ties with their parents. For a fee, deprogrammers would locate converts, abduct and detain them, 
and use a series of the same tactics brainwashers were accused of using, including sleep deprivation, 
yelling, and occasionally physically abusing them in an attempt to undo the changes brought about by 
religious conversion (Shupe and Bromley 1980, 1994; Shupe and Darnell 2006). This is not the only 
time The Simpsons has featured deprogramming. In the episode “Burns‟ Heir” Marge and Homer hire 
a deprogrammer from “Conformico Brain Deprogrammers: A Subsidiary of Mrs. Fields Cookies” to 
rescue Bart from Mr. Burns, who is grooming the boy as his heir. Outside the deprogrammer‟s office 
is a “before-and-after” set of pictures. The first is of a man with a hair knot, wearing a toga, and 
carrying what looks like a tambourine—a visual reference to the Hare Krishna practice of men 
shaving their entire heads except for a small patch of hair at the back. The second (ostensibly) is of 
the same man in a business suit with a briefcase. Both have a vapid look in their eyes, implying that 
the person is still mindless. Once the deprogrammer is hired, the scene shifts to a local motel where 
he spirits a body into a room and says sternly, “You do not love Mr. Burns. You love Homer and 
Marge. You are their son. What you are doing is wrong, wrong, WRONG!” After two weeks we learn 
that he has successfully convinced one of the locals, Hans Moleman, that he is Marge and Homer‟s 
son.  
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 See “Est” (1982) and Gelman (1991) for examples pertaining to Erhard Seminar Training, see 
above citations on Unificationism for criticisms of their recruitment practices. 
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This double-edged criticism of deprogrammers both legitimates their work and makes them 
appear stupid. Deprogramming works on Moleman and he becomes convinced he is Simpson 
progeny. At the same time, the deprogrammer is portrayed as an idiot who could not identify the 
proper victim. The family is still heartbroken, another person‟s life is ruined, and the Simpsons have 
wasted their money again. The joke lies in ignorant familiarity with deprogrammers and also in the 
incompetency of this particular would-be hero. It draws upon cultural arguments for 
deprogramming‟s necessity, which is based on the assumption that this is a last resort for saving 
people from dangerous cults. This helps reify the cult stereotype because it perpetuates the need to 
rescue people from NRMs‟ grips. When deprogramming is not discredited, its legitimacy is affirmed 
because it repeats the foundational assumptions of the recipe knowledge that is the cult stereotype. 
Yet, the fact that the deprogrammer works for “Conformico Brain Deprogrammers” implies that The 
Simpsons is willing to criticize the ACM‟s agenda as conformist, especially the idea of a “normal” 
religious and professional life course contrasted in the before-and-after picture.  
Throughout the episode, the Movementarians are portrayed as able and insidious 
brainwashers. They have the “Lil‟ Bastard Brainwashing Kit” and work hard to overcome Homer‟s 
will so they can mould him for their own purposes. Conversion to the group can be either the result of 
malicious mind control or not-so-subtle socialization, but the implication is that it is insidious and 
deceptive. Although brainwashing was originally conceptualized to explain why American POWs 
allegedly turned on their country and promoted communist China‟s values during the Korean War 
(see, e.g., E. Hunter 1951; Lifton 1961), during the 1970s and 1980s it evolved into an explanation for 
why people joined NRMs. As youth left established middle-class lives and joined these movements, 
many relatives became concerned about these groups‟ influence. Parents were scared when their 
children spent increasing amounts of time with their new religious friends and less time with family, 
when they left left promising careers to preach strange gospels, and when they started dressing 
differently and living communally. Brainwashing as a concept has been heavily criticised in the 
academic literature (see, e.g., Barker 1984; Bromley and Richardson 1983; Cowan forthcoming; 
Dawson 2006, 95-125), but its cultural resonance makes it a useful foil because people are ignorantly 
familiar with brainwashing‟s underlying assumptions. Even if brainwashing has been severely 
criticized, it still resonates as an acceptable explanation for the public because it is consistently 
repeated and left unchallenged in popular culture—including The Simpsons. 
However, realizing the program works from faulty assumptions does mean we are any closer 
to identifying the larger problems with The Simpsons‟ uncritical replication of the cult stereotype. The 
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scholarly and popular literature on The Simpsons makes this episode‟s problems clearer. Pinsky 
argues that this episode is “yet another attack on the mainline worship experience, except that the 
seductive nature of many cults is that they offer much more of an emotional connection than 
traditional Judeo-Christian denominations—even if it is counterfeit and manipulative” (2007, 81), and 
Delaney assesses the Movementarians uncritically through the lens of ACM stereotypes such as 
brainwashing and greed. The only reason he can give for Homer‟s joining the group is that “he is 
weak-minded, unhappy with traditional religions, and possesses a personality that is highly 
susceptible to suggestion” (2008, 214). While all this is true, Delaney also argues that “some people 
(especially the vulnerable or weak-minded) are drawn to cults because of the charisma of the leader 
who attempts to inspire them to new levels of personal achievement” (214). The problem with 
Delaney‟s logic is that it implies that people who are not vulnerable or are strong-minded are unlikely 
to be inspired by a charismatic NRM leader. Sociologist Lorne Dawson‟s literature review of who 
joins NRMs demonstrates that Delaney‟s assumptions do not match the empirical evidence. That is, 
relative to American averages, people who join NRMs are disproportionately young, better educated, 
disproportionately middle to upper class, come from both genders, and come from varying religious 
backgrounds (Dawson 2006, 76-90). Homer is not young, does not possess above average education, 
and is not middle to upper class. His middle-age, stupidity, and poverty are frequent sources for jokes. 
In other words, he is not an ideal type of somebody who would join a NRM, but is characteristic of 
the pejorative assumptions people hold about NRM converts. That is, he must join because he is 
stupid enough to believe the charismatic leader. In repeating this stereotype Delaney is ignoring 
substantial empirical evidence. Delaney‟s argument is further jeopardized by his categorizing cultists 
as devious and manipulative. According to Delaney, cultists are lurking, waiting to grow their 
membership and wealth, and are “not nice people” (215). These quotes reveal how deeply entrenched 
the cult stereotype is, as critics treat it as a truth rather than a proposition. Ignorant familiarity‟s power 
is on display here.  
Delaney and Pinsky assume they know about the religions that have been compressed into the 
Movementarians and that the moral evaluations that accompany those impressions are factual. That 
the episode parodies actual NRMs reinforces the connection between real groups and the stereotype‟s 
criticisms. Pinsky and Delaney can write the way they have because it is unlikely they will be 
challenged. Delaney‟s work demonstrates his unfamiliarity with NRM recruitment techniques, as 
there is no proof people who join these movements are weak-minded, and brainwashing is a poor 
explanation for conversion. Scholarship focussing on conversion as a process of socialization into an 
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NRM better explains these affiliations, stressing the convert‟s agency and allowing for comparison 
with conversions in other religious traditions (see, e.g., Barker 1984; Cowan forthcoming; Dawson 
1990, 2006; Lofland 1977; Lofland and Stark 1965; J. Richardson 1985). 
 The Simpsons generates humour by combining the most recognizable elements of NRMs 
with an already established fear within society. Although they try and make connections between the 
Movementarians and established religions (Bart says, “Cult church, church cult. So we get bored 
someplace else every Sunday. Does this really change our day-to-day lives?” [“The Joy of Sect”]), 
this portrayal of NRMs lacks the balance of positive depictions throughout the show‟s history that 
other religions have. The larger problem lies in the fact that commentators such as Pinsky and 
Delaney are working within an accepted commentarial framework that praises the program‟s 
penetrating insight. In this particular case, academic and popular support for The Simpsons‟ so-called 
critical perspective legitimates the cult stereotype because of this episode‟s uncritical treatment of 
NRMs. When Pinsky and Delaney can write under the premise that these religious groups exist to 
seduce members and defraud them of their belongings, they are working under the assumptions of the 
ACM and Christian countercult (see Cowan 2003a). Many groups are satirized here: Scientology, 
Rajneeshism, The Unification Church, ISKCON, and Peoples Temple, and they have all been accused 
of various forms of social deviance related to the cult stereotype. Because The Simpsons is praised as 
appropriately criticizing society‟s follies, this faulty convention‟s replication is legitimated because it 
is unchallenged. Therein lies the danger of this depiction, as the power structures the cult stereotype 
supports are uncritically reinforced through satire. The Simpsons also finds other marginal religions 
threating. Its treatment of secret societies (and secrecy can be extend to some NRMs such as 
Scientology [Urban 2006, 2008]) builds upon other reasons people have for mistrusting marginal 
religions. 
7.1.2 Secrecy and “Sick, Twisted, Eerie, Godless, Evil Stuff” 
Masonic control of business and government is one of America‟s oldest fears. From the Anti-
Masonic party‟s founding in 1827 to contemporary suspicions of Freemasons secretly influencing the 
American government, this idea has a long and colourful history in American culture.  It is also 
shrouded in religious language, from both the Masons themselves and their detractors who accuse 
them of Satanic practice.
135
 Freemasons claim they pursue knowledge, help build an orderly society, 
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 The Anti-Masonic party arose from fears that Masonic lodges were gaining undue influence in the 
new republic. Although it no longer exists, its biases against Masons persist—especially its claims that Masons 
 
 164 
and engage in charitable works (Fanthorpe and Fanthorpe 2006). However, their ritual secrecy, and 
popular suspicions surrounding their influence in shaping the American republic, has left them in the 
unenviable position of defending themselves against accusations of corrupting both government and 
religion. Meanwhile, they try to preserve the secrecy of their ritual practices from full disclosure. In 
this vein, we find the basis for “Homer the Great.”
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In this episode, Homer joins a mysterious secret society, the Stonecutters, and fulfils their 
prophecy of a legendary chosen one who will lead them to greatness. Based on executive producer 
David Mirkin‟s experience hearing a preacher give an anti-Mason sermon, this episode highlights the 
problem of representing a group which is, at best, mistrusted in the popular imagination. Although 
Mirkin claims on the episode‟s DVD commentary that he researched secret societies and their 
initiation rites, the problem is that these groups‟ secrecy corrupts our knowledge of them. Because we 
cannot know with certainty whether somebody who is secretive is telling the truth, we lack the trust 
needed to build knowledge. Secret societies also lend themselves to conspiracy theories. British 
cultural studies scholar Clare Birchall argues that conspiracy theories arise as (para)institutional 
voices that shape a narrative about powerful forces in our world (2006, 34). Political scientist Michael 
Barkun argues that conspiracy theories inspire “claims to the truth that the claimants regard as 
verified despite the marginalization of those claims by the institutions that conventionally distinguish 
between knowledge and error” (2003, 27).  
Masonic rituals are practiced by a group that has a long history of stigmatization and 
suspicion, and are ideal subjects for conspiracy theorists who focus on the elements of forgotten, 
rejected, and suppressed knowledge (27). That is, Masons claim esoteric, spiritual knowledge that 
goes back to Solomon‟s temple. While their religious claims are largely rejected by political, 
religious, and academic institutions, they are also assumed to control access to powerful positions in 
prominent social institutions such as government and law enforcement, another officially rejected 
                                                                                                                                                                    
were using their fraternal connections for political and commercial gain to the detriment of the rest of society 
(Bullock 1989). For more on the Anti-Masonic party and anti-Mason sentiment in the nineteenth century, see 
Bullock (1990), Formisano (2008), Foster (2003), Gribbin (1974), Kutolowski (1982, 1984), and Vaughn 
(1983). 
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 Another example of The Simpsons using ignorant familiarity and prejudice about the Freemasons 
comes in “Gone Maggie Gone.” This episode makes passing reference to Masonic influence on the American 
government. Mr. Burns reveals that he joined the Masons before it was trendy (it is his eyeball and pyramid on 
the American dollar bill), and Skinner and Comic Book Guy explain that the Masons had known for some time 
about the “Gem of Saint Teresa” Lisa is searching for in this episode. This references the ignorant familiarity 
that the Masons conspire to increase their power. This episode also casts Freemasons as unscrupulous, depicting 
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and King George III of England starting the American Revolution to 
cover up their search for the jewel. 
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proposition (S. Knight 1984). This official rejection of Masonic power supports popular suspicions 
that Freemasons are withholding vital information about the state. The Stonecutters‟ secrecy and a 
history of Masonic conspiracies similarly allow The Simpsons to craft jokes from this pool of popular 
knowledge. These jokes reinforce popular prejudices and locate Masonic religiosity outside the 
acceptable sphere of religious behaviour. 
Homer discovers the Stonecutters when he notices that his co-workers Lenny and Carl are 
never around on Wednesday nights, and that they both have much better parking spots (and office 
chairs) at the nuclear plant. When they refuse to tell him what is happening, Lenny insists it is a 
secret. Homer treats this as a conspiracy and decides to follow them to their hideout. Their “secret 
meeting place” is a large stone building with a design that looks like an unblinking eye (minus the 
pupil) and the Stonecutter‟s logo (a two-headed sledgehammer) above the door. The Masonic Lodge 
has found its way into Springfield. 
Homer is discovered spying when he falls through a skylight, and is promptly thrown out of 
the building. The next day he confronts Lenny and Carl at work: “I saw weird stuff in that place last 
night. Weird, strange, sick, twisted, eerie, godless, evil stuff. And I want in.” Lenny informs him that 
he can only join the Stonecutters if he is a member‟s son or saves a member‟s life. Homer is desperate 
to join, even though he knows nothing about the Stonecutters‟ activities. Religious studies scholar 
Hugh Urban (1997, 1998, 2008) argues that secret societies struggle to protect their esoteric 
knowledge and they use their secrets to increase their power. Esoteric knowledge is both a scarce 
social resource and a source of social power for those who hold it (1998, 220-221). However, a secret 
is not a useful tool for acquiring power if people are unaware that you have it. It only becomes a form 
of capital when people acknowledge its value. Urban argues that secrets can be advertised (without 
being revealed), hierarchalized (progressively revealed), obscured (presented as nonsense or treated 
as “inside jokes”), or concealed by deliberately playing with language and metaphor (1998, 235-239). 
These patterns of concealing knowledge can be seen in Lenny and Carl‟s behaviour before Homer 
joins the Stonecutters, making him aware of the group but not revealing their secrets. 
Secret knowledge is made available to Homer after he discovers that Grandpa Simpson is a 
Stonecutter. Parodying Masonic rituals, at his initiation Homer is made to take “the leap of faith.” 
The group‟s leader, Number One, explains to a blindfolded Homer, “If you survive this five storey 
plunge, your character will be proven.” Homer is then pushed off of a small platform onto the floor. 
In an ironic twist, while the Stonecutters laugh the floor breaks and Homer falls five stories. In the 
second ritual Homer endures, he walks past other Stonecutters who swat him on the rear with large 
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paddles (the final pass is known as “the paddling of the swollen ass...with paddles”). Surviving these 
initiatory trials, Homer vows never to reveal the Stonecutters‟ secrets and Number One welcomes 
him: “You have joined the sacred order of the Stonecutters, who since ancient times have split the 
rocks of ignorance that obscure the light of knowledge and truth. Now let‟s all get drunk and play 
ping-pong!” Masonic initiation rituals involve blindfolding the applicant and leading them through 
the lodge so that all members can see they are prepared for membership. While there is no five storey 
plunge, the entire ritual contains frequent questions about the candidate‟s character and worthiness. 
Finally, in Masonic ritual the candidate is blindfolded to symbolize his movement from darkness into 
the light, from ignorance to knowledge. The Simpsons builds upon this symbolism and then inverts it 
for humorous effect at the Freemason‟s expense. However, The Simpsons still implies that Homer has 
learned something in his humiliation, just as the Masonic candidate learns something through his 
initiation (M. Duncan 1866, 6-57). 
Studies of secret societies note that esoteric knowledge is revealed in ritual or after ritual 
initiation (Bellman 1984, Bogdan 2007, Luhrmann 1989, Urban 2001). For example, anthropologist 
T.M. Luhrmann argues that through casting spells magicians gain esoteric knowledge which plain 
language cannot convey (1989, 145; cf. Salomonsen 2002, 129-152). Put differently, rituals give their 
practitioners insight into reality they hold to be true, but which nobody else can know. Urban 
identifies this element of secrecy in American Freemasonry, arguing that Masonry‟s secrets were 
available only to those properly initiated through ritual. The craft was to mislead and confuse all 
others (2001, ¶35).
137
 Yet, if Homer has undertaken the rituals and gained esoteric insight, we must 
ask why the occasion‟s solemnity is inverted by Number One‟s directive to get drunk and play ping-
pong. The noble goals Freemasons espouse are undermined throughout the rest of the episode: the 
Stonecutters sing a song to their power (featuring lyrics such as “Who robs kingfish of their sight? 
Who rigs every Oscar night? We do!”); they bask in the glow of their sacred parchment; and they get 
drunk at every opportunity. Homer is eventually recognized as the chosen one destined to lead them 
to glory, but when he takes Lisa‟s advice and has the Stonecutters help the less fortunate, they rebel 
and found the “ancient mystical society” of “No Homers.” While some might argue that this is The 
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 Masonic manuals often explain a ritual‟s general meaning and its symbols, but reiterate the fact that 
the real knowledge contained in the rituals is only possible through further reflection and participation in the 
brotherhood (e.g., M. Duncan 1866, How 1881, Macoy 1997). Dumenil (1984) shows how Masons drew upon 





 century America when shaping their interpretations. For a contemporary introduction to Masonry and 
the artwork used to express these religious sentiments, see MacNulty (1991). 
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Simpsons, and inverting expectations is a basic element of humour, the fact remains that some 
religions (e.g., Buddhism) are treated with seriousness and Freemasonry is parodied as corrupt. The 
Stonecutters are portrayed as greedy, manipulative, and self-indulgent, continuing the tradition of 
anti-Masonic rhetoric and conspiracy theories. It also contributes to the suspicion of marginal 
religious groups discussed above. 
But why satirize Freemasonry‟s assumed political power and secret knowledge? In his 
foundational essay on secret societies, sociologist Georg Simmel argued that secret societies tend 
towards an aristocratic view of themselves, considering their status as knowledge keepers a sign of 
their social superiority (1950, 364-366). This can lead members of secret societies to try to influence 
society for their own ends, privileging their interests rather than working for everybody‟s benefit 
(375-376). It is important to note that secrecy is popularly seen as opposing society‟s well being, and 
secretive groups are often considered social threats (see also Erickson 1981, Lowry 1972, Shils 1956). 
Some Masonic conspiracies, and The Simpsons‟ jokes, are rooted in the assumption that Freemasons 
are conspiracists bent on destroying society and ushering in a new world order. For example, Catholic 
anti-Mason Paul Fisher‟s Behind the Lodge Door (1989) claims that Freemasons unduly influenced 
the United States Supreme Court to remove prayer and religion from public schools. British journalist 
Stephen Knight (1984) contends that Freemasonry is incompatible with Christianity and that it 
controls the highest levels of British government. Arguing that Freemasonry is not only a religion, but 
that it has its own god, Jahbulon (a combination of Jahweh, Baal, and Osiris [236]), Knight‟s 
implication is that no Christian who knew Freemasonry‟s highest religious secrets would join the 
society and, therefore, there is a conspiracy to keep this information from the unsuspecting public. 
Furthermore, the website Freemasonry Watch (2008) maps dense webs of argued influence and the 
threats to global security and free democracies posed by Freemasons‟ apparent roles in global politics 
since the nineteenth century. These examples only scratch the surface of Masonic conspiracies in the 
popular imagination. 
Among Simpsons commentators, only Heit discusses this episode, and he approaches it under 
the rubric of “seeker religion” that I discussed in chapter four. For Heit, the fact that the Stonecutters 
cannot abide Homer as their chosen one demonstrates their faith‟s fickle nature. The truly devout 
would stick with their messiah (2008, 106-108). Masonic connections are not acknowledged and his 
argument reveals a clear bias towards Wuthnow‟s spirituality of dwelling (1998, 3-4). However, as 
discussed earlier, spiritual selection in The Simpsons reflects general patterns in American religious 
life. Just because Heit disapproves of the Stonecutters‟ choice to abandon the movement after Homer 
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becomes the leader does not mean that their religious lives are inferior. Yet, the jokes undercutting 
the solemnity of their rituals and beliefs imply a religious deficiency. The Stonecutters have 
tremendous power to do things such as control the British pound, maintain a secret tunnel filled with 
priceless artwork, and provide their members with free cola from the vending machines at the nuclear 
plant. However, they favour hedonism over responsibility, which undermines the gravity Masons 
associate with their rituals and ethics. The powerful have been satirized and subverted, their secrets 
unveiled, and their society depicted as one of convenience rather than insight.  
In “Homer the Great,” negative stereotypes associated with Freemasonry have been 
uncritically repeated and lampooned for a global audience‟s enjoyment. Freemasons are parodied as 
frauds engaging in “sick, twisted, eerie, godless, evil stuff,” falling under the “cult” rubric due to their 
secretive nature and popular concerns about the danger they ostensibly pose to American life. The 
fear of a small group of people amassing wealth and power at innocent Americans‟ expense continues 
here. The Simpsons discredits Masons‟ honest efforts to improve their communities by insinuating 
they have ulterior motives—such as getting drunk and revelling in their power. Even refutations from 
Freemasons cannot change these stereotypes because of the power of suspicion. Once a group 
engages in secrecy everything it says is suspect. Separating fact from fiction is difficult because true 
statements can be dismissed as a way of protecting secrets. But humour can undermine secrecy‟s 
power and privilege. Presenting its own interpretation of what happens behind the lodge doors, The 
Simpsons challenges the Freemasons‟ presumed power and renders it impotent. Here satirical humour 
is a means of attacking the marginal and restoring a supposedly open democratic society‟s presumed 
norms. But what about cases in which attempts at a more nuanced perspective are used to find 
humour in America‟s marginalized religions? 
7.1.3 The Wiccan Exception 
While The Simpsons‟ team uses the cult stereotype to attack numerous marginal religions, 
there is an exception to this rule—Wicca and other varieties of neopagan witchcraft. Wiccans have 
had mixed reception in America, sometimes recognized as strong proponents of feminist spirituality 
and other times treated as Satanists.
138
 The Simpsons has not linked references to occult evils with 
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 The references in this section are to both Wicca and neopaganism, a problem arising from the fact 
that the neopagan movement—which includes Wicca among many other traditions—has porous boundaries and 
is difficult to categorize. Witches know their own histories, but as a movement Wicca is often categorized under 
the larger rubic of neopaganism. For histories of Wicca and neopagnism, Adler‟s Drawing Down the Moon 
(2006) is recognized as an accessible history to witchcraft and neopaganism in the United States. Clifton‟s Her 
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contemporary witchcraft and magic, although it is willing to lampoon these popular perceptions. 
“Radioactive Man”‟s chalkboard gag during the opening credits is, “„Bewitched‟ does not promote 
Satanism.” However, jokes linking spell casting with evil make this assertion somewhat tenuous. In 
“Barting Over,” Lisa finds an old book in the garage and starts reading it. While reading words that 
sound like gibberish, a giant cloud of red smoke billows behind her and forms a demon. The creature 
disappears immediately when she drops the book halfway through the spell to play Mad Libs. In 
“Treehouse of Horror III,” Bart goes to the school library‟s “Occult Section” to find a book for a class 
project. After unleashing a plague of zombies on the city he appreciates magic differently, saying, “I 
thought dabbling in the black arts would be good for a chuckle. How wrong I was. I never should 
have read that book.” 
Yet, when discussing Wicca The Simpsons explicitly links the religion with its positive 
connotations for women. In “Catch „Em if You Can,” Bart and Lisa get into a fight after Bart accuses 
his sister of cursing him with a witch‟s spell:  
LISA 
It‟s called Wicca and it‟s empowering! 
BART 
Wicca‟s a Hollywood fad! 
LISA 
That‟s Kabbalah, jerk!  
“Treehouse of Horror XIX” revisits connections between Wicca and Lisa‟s feminism. While 
preparing for a Halloween dance, Milhouse compliments her on her witch costume. Lisa responds, 
“I‟m not a witch, I‟m a Wiccan. Why is it that when a woman is confident they call her a witch?” The 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Hidden Children (2006), is a study of American Wicca‟s development along its various strands. Clifton 
acknowledges the influence of Gardnerian Wicca on American paganism and Hutton‟s The Triumph of the 
Moon (1999) is recognized as the best history of British Wicca‟s development. Barner-Barry (2005) explains 
how accusations of Satanism directed at witches are upheld in court through Christian ignorance and, in some 
cases, belligerence. Since the United States is a predominantly Christian country, public officials can employ 
Christian prejudices in making decisions and, frequently, not suffer penalties for their discrimination. Pike‟s 
Magical Bodies, Earthly Selves (2001) discusses contemporary pagan festivals (which includes some Wiccans 
and other groups) and contains an important chapter on the way these festivals are mistaken for Satanic 
gatherings (87-122). Salomonsen‟s Enchanted Feminism demonstrates how Redeeming Witchcraft has shaped 
female participants‟ consciousness, especially through ritual (2002). 
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Simpsons draws on both popular fears of the occult and Wicca‟s popularity in the post-Charmed and 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer market for its laughs.
139
  
These early throw-away jokes demonstrate a perspective that is explicitly discussed in 
“Rednecks and Broomsticks.”
140
 In this episode Lisa is invited to join a coven comprised of three 
young girls whom she hears chanting, “Dark is she but brilliant. Black are her wings, black on black. 
She is Lilith who leadeth forth the hordes of the abyss.” When she finds the group, two of the girls are 
chanting around a cauldron, wearing brown robes that cover their faces. The scene evokes numerous 
representations of witches as evil women who work in secret and curse people with their magic spells. 
Lisa quickly discovers that this is not true of these girls and that she has interrupted their esbat, a 
ritual celebrating the new moon and symbolizing the Goddess‟ lifespan (H. Berger 1999, 18).
141
 Once 
she realizes she is not in danger, Lisa is skeptical about the Wiccans because she does not believe in 
magic. They warn her that things said in the ritual circle have a way of coming true, and when she 
benefits from her teacher mysteriously falling ill she decides there may be more to the religion than 
she first suspected.
142
 After researching the basics on “Wiccapedia” and learning that Wiccans 
worship nature, too, Lisa decides to convert.
143
 Bart tries to talk her out of this decision, arguing, 
“You‟re too young to be a witch. Savour the steps leading up to it. College anorexic, string of bad 
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 On how Charmed, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and other portrayals of witchcraft have influenced the 
acceptance of contemporary paganism, see Berger and Ezzy (2009), Clark (2003), Cowan (2005a; 2008b) and 
Waldron (2005b). For a historical account of paganism‟s increasing acceptance in, and appropriation of, popular 
culture, see Clifton (2006, 95-109).  
140
 This episode title appropriately references the Disney film Bedknobs and Broomsticks (Stevenson 
1971), which tells the story of an apprentice witch and the three children in her care using magic to aid the 
British war effort during World War II. “Rednecks and Broomsticks” draws upon the positive associations with 
magic in the original film to frame Lisa‟s storyline (Homer has an alternate storyline in which he becomes a 
moonshine judge). 
141
 For examples of esbat ceremonies, see Starhawk (1999, 193-196). It is important to note that while 
Starhawk has considerable influence within modern neopagan circles because her books are widely read, her 
rituals are only examples or variations that other pagans can modify. This is because of what Cowan calls 
modern paganism‟s “open source” nature (2005a, 30). Modern paganism is characterized by its support for 
personal gnosis and the variations in practice and belief that engenders. While there are communal limits to 
what is acceptable (e.g., there is a strong anti-Christian sentiment among many pagans, although the existence 
of Christo-pagans challenges this generalization), personal insight and pragmatism direct the development of 
neopagans‟ metaphysical beliefs and ritual practices (Cowan 2005a, 27-50). 
142
 The circle is the ritual site where neopagans perform their religious rituals and some of their 
magical spells. Circles have no fixed location and must be called into being instead. This is done through a 
ritual process that involves evoking the spirits of the four directions and using other symbolic instruments such 
as a ritual dagger which symbolizes the male principle, a chalice symbolizing the feminine principle, and 
different objects placed on an altar. These latter instruments‟ significance is not fixed, as neopagans stress 
creativity in their religious practice. For examples of how circles are cast, see Starhawk (1999, 80-101). 
143
 On witchcraft as a nature religion see Starhawk (1999), who argues “Witchcraft can be seen as a 
religion of ecology. Its goal is harmony with nature, so that life may not just survive, but thrive” (35).  
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marriages, career disappointments, failed pottery shop, and then, when you‟re old and alone, you can 
hit the witch thing hard.” 
Lisa is not deterred and joins the coven. One night she approaches a candle-lit circle in the 
forest where the three girls wait for her. Drawing near, one of the girls asks Lisa, “Initiate, how does 
one enter the circle?” to which Lisa responds, “With perfect faith and perfect love.”
144
 As she enters 
the circle the girls chant “Join us” three times before pouring grape juice into a chalice (the ritual 
symbol of the female principle [Cowan and Bromley 2008, 204]). Just as Lisa is about to drink the 
grape juice, the police arrest the girls for practicing witchcraft. Before the trial the girls ask the 
goddess Lilith to show their persecutors their blindness. Suddenly, citizens start going blind. The girls 
are tried in court for causing the townspeople‟s ailment. Lisa defends the girls on the witness stand. 
After the prosecutor accuses the girls of recruiting Lisa “into their evil coven” she retorts, “They‟re 
not evil. They believe in friendship and respecting the earth, and they made me feel like I belong.” 
Ultimately, the judge finds the witches innocent. Angered, the people form a mob and take the girls 
outside where Springfield‟s Mayor, “Diamond” Joe Quimby, says they can prosecute the girls under 
seventeenth-century law. Just before they are to be executed, Lisa reveals the real reason behind the 
townspeople‟s suffering: Local hillbillies poured moonshine into the town‟s water supply, causing 
temporary blindness. The crowd disperses, and the Wiccans thank Lisa for saving them. Lisa is also 
grateful because while she has been rational her whole life participating in the coven made her feel 
cool. Lisa‟s time as a witch ends when Marge removes her from the group, saying, “Well I think 
you‟re very interesting girls, but from now on the only „which‟ in Lisa‟s life is which boy will marry 
her.” 
Drawing from actual Wiccan practices, such as casting the circle and using a ritual chalice, 
and emphasizing the fact that these witches are good people who make Lisa feel accepted, The 
Simpsons juxtaposes positive portrayals with negative stereotypes. Bart‟s reduction of witches to 
depressed women who need to find acceptance in their failed lives, and the townspeople‟s insinuation 
that these girls are witches and, therefore, guilty of heinous acts, echoes the different approaches to 
Wicca taken in the public sphere (see Pike 2001, 87-122; Cowan and Bromley 2008, 192-213). 
Frequently, witches have to protect themselves from accusations that they are Satanists. However, in 
other circles Wicca is seen as a positive feminist religious expression that enables men and women to 
connect with feminine elements of the divine within themselves and nature that Judaism and 
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 The words in real Wiccan ceremonies are, “With perfect love and perfect trust.” 
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Christianity have denied them (see, e.g., Adler 2006, Griffin 1995, Salomonsen 2002, Starkhawk 
1999, Weaver 1989). The Simpsons, while it plays with the fear that witches are Satanists who curse 
people, puts the burden of foolishness on the townspeople who persecute the witches, and not the 
witches themselves, ultimately portraying Wicca as a positive contributor to America‟s religious 
culture. 
These examples return us to the theme of positive religions facilitating individual 
development, discussed in chapter four. Despite Wicca‟s status as a NRM, it has promoted positive 
images of women fighting against patriarchy. Starhawk, a co-founder of the Reclaiming Collective, 
writes that the revival of Goddess religions (of which Wicca is a significant element) is revitalizing 
women and men who have been dominated by the destructive forces of male centred religious 
traditions—namely Christianity and Judaism (1999, 25-39; see also Adler 2006, 178-239; 
Salomonsen 2002).
145
 As I discussed earlier, when Christians persecute other religions, The Simpsons 
fights back for the victims. There is also support for the feminism that they associate with Wicca. 
While Bart‟s stereotype of the modern witch encapsulates pejorative sentiments, it does not capture 
the broad range of people who practice Wicca and other witchcraft traditions. Sociologist Helen 
Berger‟s study of neopagan groups in New England (1999) explores groups with a wide variety of 
ages, from university students to middle aged people (see also Berger and Ezzy 2009; Cowan 2005a; 
Jorgensen and Russell 1999, 330; Salomonsen 2002). The Simpsons associates Wicca‟s support of 
women‟s spiritual pursuits with positive portrayals of religious freedom in America, contributing to 
The Simpsons‟ larger support for feminism and liberal politics in general (see also Griffin 1995; 
Henry 2007, 2008; Weaver 1989).  
7.2 From Hated to Defended: Islam 
Islam is one of the most maligned religions in America. However, treatment of Islam in The 
Simpsons is instructive for its change over time. Until late 2008, the program occasionally used 
throw-away jokes based on prominent Muslim stereotypes in American culture. Scholars studying 
Islam‟s portrayal in news media and popular culture have consistently noted the relationship between 
the United States‟ foreign interests and the denigration of Muslims, who are often portrayed as Arabs 
despite the fact that (a) the majority of the world‟s Muslims live in Indonesia, and (b) not all Arabs 
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 Weaver (1989) illustrates Goddess religions‟ importance for feminist theologizing, arguing that 
these religions raise significant questions about women‟s ritualizing and experience in interpreting religious 
traditions. However, she is concerned about the uncritical use of historical sources—especially unwritten 
sources—in the larger neopagan movement (of which Wicca is a significant tradition).  
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are Muslims (see, e.g., Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008, Karim 2003, McAlister 2005, Said 1981, 
Semmerling 2006, Shaheen 2003). Unfortunately, Arabs and Muslims are often reduced to a 
stereotype that media scholar Jack Shaheen summarizes as “Arabs are brute murderers, sleazy rapists, 
religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women” (2003, 2) or, even more succinctly, 
“billionaires, bombers, and belly dancers” (7). That is, Muslims are frequently depicted as oil barons 
who threaten the American economy and way of life through petroleum embargos; they are portrayed 
as violent suicide-bombers and terrorists, willing to die for purely religious reasons; and they are 
pictured as belly-dancers, a highly-sexualized vision of Arabic women assumedly dominated by 
oversexed Muslim men. Latent in this concept is the belief that Americans are good, modern, 
progressive, and truthful compared to Muslims‟ evil, regressiveness and untrustworthiness 
(Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008, 76).  
This tension between good America and evil Islam is so emotionally powerful that even the 
normally left-wing Lisa can say that she wants to attend an air show because “I want to meet the first 
female stealth bomber pilot. During the Gulf War she destroyed seventy mosques and her name is 
Lisa too” (“Sideshow Bob‟s Last Gleaming”). Usually an outspoken advocate of the downtrodden, 
Lisa withholds her moral righteousness from those who lost their places of worship during Desert 
Storm. While fan Benjamin Robinson noticed this change in her character (Cherry and Goldberg 
1997), he did not discuss its significance further. The fact that the creative team behind the episode 
thought that this change in Lisa‟s character would work, speaks to the fact that when Muslims are 
targets the normal boundaries of what is acceptable for a character are waived; there is little 
discussion and few people notice. In this episode Bart‟s nemesis, Sideshow Bob, steals a nuclear 
bomb and threatens to destroy Springfield unless they cancel television. After Bob makes his 
demands, “representatives of television” (including Krusty and television‟s Dr. Who) are brought into 
an underground bunker to be told that Springfield‟s leaders will meet Bob‟s request. Of the people 
who contributed to The Simpsons Archive‟s episode capsule, more noticed Dr. Who‟s depiction than 
that Lisa had a change of character (Cherry and Goldberg 1997). Lisa‟s change of character and the 
representatives of television are two different throw-away jokes, but the latter one had greater 
resonance for this small—and non-representative—sample. However, the fact remains that Lisa‟s 
comment was not treated as a serious breach of character among The Simpsons‟ most ardent fans. 
This stereotype‟s historical roots are commonly connected with four events, although as 
literary theorist Edward Said (1979) and American Studies scholar Melanie McAlister (2005) 





 embargo from October 1973 to March 18, 1974. During the Yom Kippur/Ramadan 
War
147
 the Arabic oil exporting countries and Iran withheld oil from Western nations and Japan to 
force foreign policy changes. Specifically, they wanted the displaced Palestinians‟ plight recognized 
and Western support for Israel decreased. While these foreign policy goals were not achieved, the 
embargo ushered in an era in which oil became an economic weapon in the hands of nations hostile to 
the United States. This was the catalyst for the image of the Arab oil baron, a greedy man who 
exploits honest Americans. Using oil as a weapon was the first major international incident with these 
countries that affected Americans at home, challenging their sense of American global leadership and 
superiority (see also, e.g., Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008, Knorr 1975, Licklider 1988, Rustow 
1982).  
Second is the Iranian hostage crisis which lasted 444 days from November 4, 1979 to January 
21, 1981. Iranian militants held sixty-five Americans hostage in the U.S. embassy in Tehran at the 
same time the Iranian Revolution took place. The Revolution saw religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini and the circle of elite clerics (the Council of Guardians) replace the Shah, the country‟s 
ruler and America‟s ally (Esposito 1990a). As representations of the struggle of Islamic governance 
against American influence in the region, the hostages were important symbolic capital for both sides. 
Americans wore yellow ribbons in support of the hostages, while the situation itself began in response 
to the Carter administration‟s willingness to allow the ailing Shah into the United States for medical 
treatment. The hostages became a symbol of the new Iranian republic‟s independence from American 
interests. Including a failed rescue attempt on April 24, 1980, the Iranian hostage crisis was both a 
media spectacle at home and a way of giving an anti-American face to emergent Islamic terrorism. 
While incidents such as the attack on Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Munich 
Olympic games were also heavily mediated, the hostage crisis brought the fear and anger of a terrorist 
attack home and helped solidify the divide between America and the Islamic world (McAlister 2005; 
see also Esposito 1990b; Esposito and Voll 1996; Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008; Said 1981).  
Third is the Persian Gulf War lasting from January 17, 1991 when the air carpet 
bombardment started, until April 6, 1991 when the UN brokered a cease-fire. While there was 
certainly media saturation in the two previous situations, with the new twenty-four hour news 
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 OAPEC refers to the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, as opposed to the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which also included countries such as Venezuela and 
Nigeria, which did not join the embargo (Licklider 1988). 
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 Although this war is often called the Yom Kippur War in Western news media and histories, it is 
known as the Ramadan War in the Islamic world.  
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network CNN, Americans were exposed to a post-Cold War clash between the American-led West 
and the threat of a pan-Islamic enemy symbolized in Saddam Hussein. Canadian media scholar Karim 
Karim summarizes the problem mass media posed as a constructed narrative between the good 
American president who represented the enlightened, rational, and benevolent West and the evil 
Hussein who was violent, fanatical, and barbaric (2003, 155). American media stories contrasted a 
unified and diverse America with a monolithic and degrading Islam (McAlister 2005). Furthermore, 
Americans were now engaging in a war not only against evil and tyranny, but were also working to 
liberate Muslim women who were considered voiceless victims (T. Saliba 1994). Whereas the earlier 
examples villainized Muslims, now those villains were morally legitimated targets of military actions 
(see also, e.g., Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008; Jeffords and Rabinovitz 1994). 
The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 and the 
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq constitute the fourth event. The interpretation of this last 
case relies heavily on news media‟s advocacy of Samuel Huntington‟s “clash of civilizations” model. 
In 9/11‟s immediate aftermath, journalists employed the stereotype of Muslims as terrorists which 
had become normalized in the twenty years since the Iranian hostage crisis. Huntington argues “the 
West” and “Islam” are monolithic civilizations that are bound to be at war with each other. That is, 
Islam and America are so disparate the two cannot exist harmoniously and, therefore, the threat to 
America must be fought (1996). It legitimates a violent solution rather than encouraging a search for a 
peaceful one. While scholarship on American Islam demonstrates that Muslims in the United States 
craft their identities by drawing upon American cultural values, the traditions of countries that 
Muslims and their ancestors have immigrated from, and Islamic doctrine (Haddad 1990; Haddad and 
Smith 1994; Jane Smith 1999), mass media has opted for a narrative emphasizing a dichotomy 
between oppressed Muslims living under Islam‟s tyrannical rule and Americans as their good, 
freedom-loving liberators (see, e.g., Abrahamian 2003, Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008, Lincoln 
2006, Martin and Phelan 2002, McAlister 2005, Tweed 2008, Wicks 2006).  
Working within this framework, The Simpsons has told jokes about major Middle Eastern 
political leaders who were demonized in America, the Ayatollah Khomeini prominent among them. 
Season seven‟s “Two Bad Neighbors” directly attacks the Iranian Revolution‟s leader. As Homer and 
Marge are cleaning out their attic Marge raises an “Ayatollah Assaholla” t-shirt with Khomeini‟s face 





Can we get rid of this Ayatollah T-shirt? Khomeini died years ago. 
HOMER 
But Marge! It works on any Ayatollah. Ayatollah Nakhbadeh, 
Ayatollah Zahedi. Even as we speak Ayatollah Razmada and his 
cadre of fanatics are consolidating their power! 
Juxtaposing American ideals of freedom of religion and free democratic government with the 
assumed regressive nature of the Iranian system, this joke activates and draws on prejudices against 
Iran‟s clerical leadership. Later in the episode the mutual animosity between America and Iran is 
foregrounded as Homer tries to sell the shirt at a neighbourhood yard sale. Standing on a table he 
yells, “Say, that Ayatollah thinks he‟s better than America! Is he right?” When the crowd boos (a lone 
voice says “Yes”), Homer rallies them saying, “Well, for just five dollars you can sock it to him in 
style!” Socking it to the Ayatollah by wearing a defamatory t-shirt acknowledges the trend in 
American politics of proselytizing through t-shirts, while reinforcing the idea that Khomeini is 
dangerous. It lampoons the way Americans do politics while reifying one of the pivotal stereotypes of 
the Ayatollah and showing support for American foreign policy against Iran. It uses heavily 
sentimented symbols to rally people to a political cause. McAlister explains buying similar 
merchandise during the Iranian hostage crisis as, “to purchase was to contain” (2005, 215). The 
Simpsons references a product created during the Iranian Revolution (which can still be purchased 
online), using the visual representation to connect to people‟s experiences of containing Khomenini‟s 
and other Muslim leaders‟ perceived power and threat. It exemplifies how The Simpsons both 
participates in and satirizes American popular culture while, in this case, supporting dominant 
political ideologies.  
Terrorists are another fruitful source of jokes for The Simpsons. Terrorist jokes existed before 
September 11, 2001‟s attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon made fears of Islamic 
terrorism into a part of everyday life. Homer caught Mr. Burns selling uranium to Middle Eastern 
terrorists in “The Computer Wore Menace Shoes,” while Maude Flanders and her mother are 
captured by militants while visiting Tyre and Sidon in “My Sister My Sitter.” In post-9/11 episodes, 
American fears of terrorist attacks are fodder for satire. In season nineteen‟s “He Loves to Fly and He 
D‟ohs,” Homer flies on a private jet to Chicago. Returning home, Marge asks him if he flew 
commercial, to which Homer responds, “No way, commercial is for losers and terrorists.” While 
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terrorists of other nationalities have hijacked planes, it is hard to imagine a post-9/11 audience 
thinking that the terrorists who fly commercial are anything but the same ones who crashed planes 
into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Further, in “E. Pluribus Wiggum,” The Simpsons 
satirizes political attack ads. In this episode the Republican Party shows an ad attacking Democrat 
“Vincent Alleppo” being in league with terrorist “Nostafa Mustafi” because they both appeared in the 
same issue of The New York Times (although in completely unrelated articles). Their pictures are 
placed side by side and a milkshake appears between the two images with little hearts rising between 
them before floating offscreen. The ad‟s voiceover states: “And ye shall judge them by the company 
they keep.” While satirizing attack ads and the loose logic that major political parties use to demonize 
their opponents, The Simpsons is also aware that protecting the nation from terrorists is now a major 
part of any politician‟s security platform and is, therefore, a major force in American politics.  
9/11 cemented the connection between Osama bin Laden and terrorism, allowing The 
Simpsons to tell jokes about him that continued his demonization while subtly critiquing American 
foreign policy initiatives. The first of these depictions came in season thirteen‟s (2001-2002) “I Am 
Furious (Yellow),” in which one of the Internet cartoons that the fictitious BetterThanTV.com 
produces is called “Bin Laden in a Blender.” The name says it all and does not challenge bin Laden‟s 
portrayal in popular culture. He is a villain who meets a horrifying end. However, the next season‟s 
“Special Edna” featured a throw-away joke that both attacks bin Laden and comments on American 
foreign policy. As Bart is watching wrestling on TV we see three different wrestlers—Osama bin 
Rotten, Uncle Slam, and Secretary of Hate Colin Kapowell (a reference to then Secretary of State 
Colin Powell). Osama bin Rotten is depicted with a long grey beard and a turban and is lying on the 
mat. The other two wrestlers beat him mercilessly with Kapowell dropping anvils (which the 
announcer calls “sanctions”) on bin Rotten‟s head and Uncle Slam impales him with the American 
flag. Drawing upon famous World Wrestling Federation matches between heroic American wrestlers, 
namely Seargent Slaughter, and ethnic villains, especially Slaughter‟s nemesis the Iron Sheik, this is a 
commentary on American foreign policy as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars heated up and sanctions 
were used to make these nations respond favourably to American interests. In the wrestling ring, this 
caricature assumes ridiculous proportions as Powell‟s symbolic representation attacks his opponent in 
such gratuitous terms. While this is also a parody of wrestling, the symbolic battle between good and 
evil, taken to such extremes, demonstrates the violent direction American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East took during George W. Bush‟s presidency. It also echoes the ways American popular 
culture narrates the battles between good and evil in its athletic dramas, as the Iron Sheik and 
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Seargent Slaughter‟s matches were also nationalist narratives of good versus evil (see Barthes 1972, 
15-25). The Simpsons condenses this history of tackling sensitive international issues through macho 
American pride into a short joke that has no further bearing on the episode‟s story. Season fifteen saw 
Homer mention that his former pen pal was named Osama (“The Way We Weren‟t”), a joke that only 
works if that Osama is bin Laden, because Homer seems unaware of the danger his former pen pal 
poses for the United States. Finally, in season sixteen‟s “Fat Man and Little Boy” one of the t-shirts 
on sale at a t-shirt expo is “Osama bin Scratchy,” which depicts the cartoon cat with a turban, grey 
beard, and a speech balloon saying “Death to America.” The Muslim terrorist stereotype has made its 
way into Springfield‟s favourite cartoon. 
Islam has rarely been portrayed positively in The Simpsons. The most obvious exception is 
from “Insane Clown Poppy” in which Krusty performs at a USO show during the Gulf War. After 
Krusty introduces the Cincinnati Bengals‟ cheerleaders, one of the soldiers yells out that the show is 
an insult to their Muslim hosts (a point which Simpsons fan Benjamin Robinson highlighted as a 
concern of U.S. soldiers during the war [Robinson 2003]). In nineteen seasons, this is the only time 
Muslim concerns were voiced. To that point The Simpsons‟ position on Islam was built upon well 
worn stereotypes, but season twenty‟s (2008-2009) “Mypods and Boomsticks” satirizes those 
conventions. After causing a scene at the Springfield Mall, Bart meets a Jordanian boy named Bashir 
who quickly becomes his friend. On the way to school the next day Bart tells Bashir what he can 
safely eat in the cafeteria. Only the pork chops are harmless, but Bashir‟s religion forbids eating pork. 
Bart does not learn of Bashir‟s religion right away, but he warns him not to tell anyone or else he will 
get beaten up. Overhearing this, the local bullies advance on Bashir who self-identifies as a Muslim. 
The bald bully, Kearney, looms over Bashir saying “You‟re the reason I can‟t carry toothpaste on an 
airplane.” Bart defends Bashir and then makes a statement on diversity, identifying Jimbo (the bully 
in a stocking cap) as Christian, Dolf (the bully with long hair) as Jewish, and Kearney as a member of 
the “cult Moe started” (it turns out Moe was just acting crazy to get out of jury duty, reinforcing the 
stereotype of the duplicitous cult leader discussed earlier). Islam is now counted as one religion 
among many. The Simpsons has turned the tables on its former discriminatory attitude, which has 
become the target of ridicule. 
Later, Homer meets Bashir and is impressed by the boy‟s politeness. However, that night 
Lenny and Carl tease Homer at the bar because of Bashir. Homer initially defends Bashir, but Moe 
warns him, saying, “This Bashir kid is Muslim, and therefore up to something.” While Moe promotes 
a deeply embedded stereotype in American culture, Homer contends he cannot believe it unless he 
 
 179 
sees “a fictional TV program espousing your [Moe‟s] point of view.” Moe turns on a TV show 
resembling FOX‟s hit 24 and Homer is convinced that Muslims are a threat.
148
 Carl suggests that the 
way to get back at Bashir‟s family is to discriminate in employment and housing, but Lenny and Moe 
advocate inviting the family over for dinner and then interrogating them the way 24‟s hero, Jack 
Bauer, would. Homer chooses the latter, implying that biased, stupid people advocate these methods. 
At dinner Homer cannot hide his suspicions. When he learns that Bashir‟s parents met at 
Jordan University of Science and Technology he notes that “science is used to make bombs.” He then 
brings out a cake decorated with the American flag and asks if they want to cut it. When they refuse, 
he bellows, “What‟s the matter? Don‟t like the taste of freedom?” Bart defends them saying, “Dad, 
these people are my friends. Don‟t fear them just because they have a different religion, a different 
culture, and their last name is bin Laden.” Bashir‟s father then models the stark differences between 
the Muslim family and the Simpsons, saying, “Young man, you do not respect us by disrespecting 
your father.” The bin Ladens leave shortly thereafter and Marge rebukes Homer for his behaviour. 
Homer replies, “I‟m sorry, it‟s just so fun and easy to judge people based on religion.” It may be fun 
and easy, but The Simpsons contrasts the way Muslims are normally judged with a Muslim family 
that acts in a more acceptable way than the Simpsons do. The positive presentation of Muslims is in 
stark contrast with other depictions of Muslims on American television, and although the bin Ladens‟ 
last name makes for a convenient joke, it works because it inverts the expectations people have for 
someone named bin Laden. The process of overturning the Muslim stereotype is underway. 
Marge then sends Homer over to the bin Ladens‟ to apologize. However, when he arrives he 
sees Bashir‟s father handling dynamite in the garage and goes home proclaiming that he was right 
about them. Homer‟s dream that night parodies Disney‟s Aladdin. The genie claims he will “destroy 
your decadent Western society,” and proceeds to turn the First Church of Springfield into a mosque, 
makes the bullies dress like Arab gangsters, and changes every CD in the local music store into a Cat 
Stevens album (Stevens converted to Islam in 1977 and is now known as Yusuf Islam). Homer 
awakens reassured that Muslims are a threat. 
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 Debuting in November of 2001, 24 features Counter Terrorist Unit agent Jack Bauer (Kiefer 
Sutherland) fighting domestic and international threats over the course of one day (twenty-four hours, each of 
which is an episode). Extremely popular, the program has featured Muslims (among others) as international 
threats to the United States. Bauer is an example of the American hero who does what it takes to protect the 
country, as he is willing to murder, torture, and break protocol to get the information he needs. The satirical 
portrait in this episode is based on Bauer‟s interrogation scenes (read: torture) across 24‟s eight seasons. 
 
 180 
The next morning he goes to the bin Ladens‟ to confirm his suspicions. Homer overhears 
Bashir‟s father proclaiming his love for blowing up buildings, but does not hear the part where he 
states that it is done safely and legally. Homer‟s eavesdropping reveals that Mr. bin Laden is “killing 
myself, but it is all for the profit” (a clever homonym) and that he will be in a better place. What 
Homer does not hear is that the better place is a corner office. After snooping around the house, 
Homer learns that Mr. bin Laden is going to blow up the Springfield Mall. The condemned building 
is the old Springfield Mall but Homer ruins the demolition, taking the dynamite and throwing it into 
the Springfield River where it destroys a bridge to the Duff brewery. After this escapade, the 
Simpsons have the bin Ladens over for an apology dinner under Homer‟s “Please Forgive My 
Intolerance” banner. At least this Muslim family is welcome in Springfield. 
7.3 Conclusions 
I began researching this material during season eighteen (2006-2007). By that time there was 
an established pattern of employing discriminatory stereotypes to marginalize NRMs and Islam in 
The Simpsons‟ religious culture. These religions were peripheral and unwelcome contributors to 
Springfield‟s pluralism, especially since there is an absence of characters identified with their 
traditions. They lack the Lisa, Apu, and Krusty who represent the complexity of Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Judaism. Without a Flanders or Reverend Lovejoy showing how a single tradition‟s 
positives and negatives complicate an individual character, NRMs and Islam are reduced to throw-
away jokes or single-episode stereotypes. This is still the case, although “Mypods and Boomsticks” 
and “Rednecks and Broomsticks” show how The Simpsons can deflate the stereotypes upon which it 
previously relied. 
A strong sense of mistrust in institutionalized religion persists in the way the Movementarians 
and the Stonecutters are treated. Both of these religions lack a character who speaks as a respectable 
advocate of alternative worldviews. The contrast is notable when we see how Islam‟s portrayal was 
inverted once Bashir and his parents were introduced. By humanizing Islam through a positive 
depiction of Muslims, a history of assumptions underlying throw-away jokes was called into 
question. The Simpsons has amended its Muslim stereotypes, more diversely portraying Muslims and 
their position within American culture. Now Muslims are considered a legitimate part of Springfield‟s 
and, therefore, the United States‟ religious landscape. This is a significant change from their earlier 
position, revealed to Pinsky in an interview with producer Al Jean for the 2001 edition of The Gospel 
According to The Simpsons, and quoted again the 2007 edition. Jean explained that The Simpsons had 
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placed Islam off limits because they were fearful of the violent repercussions that can come from 
offending Muslims. The stereotype of dangerous Muslims struck close to the creative staff‟s hearts. 
Pinsky quotes Jean as saying, “It‟s a faith where you don‟t want to offend, because we‟re not Muslim, 
and we‟re not sure what might be offensive” (Jean, quoted in Pinsky 2007, 214).
149
 The Simpsons 
walked a fine line, never directly challenging Islamic doctrines and practices as they have criticized 
Christianity. Many of the jokes about Islam can be interpreted as jokes about individual Muslims, and 
not Islamic beliefs per se. They have changed their position on Islam and brought it into the 
program‟s larger discussion about appropriate religious behaviour in America. Muslims are now 
welcomed as citizens, but we will have to wait and see if their doctrines are considered safe enough 
for open comedic discussion. 
Unlike Islam, NRMs continue to be stigmatized. The Simpsons and their commentators do not 
seriously engage the challenges and possibilities NRMs represent for American religious life. While 
Islam is recognized as a major world religion, NRMs and secret societies are easily marginalized 
because of their small size and apparent and presumed differences from mainstream American values. 
In their alternative family and living arrangements, different beliefs, and openness to the fringes of 
American metaphysical thought, many NRMs offer multiple perspectives from which to criticize 
mainstream American culture. They are excellent tools for comedic contrast, but The Simpsons has 
not taken the time to engage their different unseen orders. Instead, they replicate and reiterate the 
problem that major news media has presented for NRMs. That is, they are only noticeable as threats 
to the American status quo.  
Negative stereotypes about Muslims and NRMs are generalizations that tell us about the 
stereotypers themselves. Stereotypes are part of Berger and Luckmann‟s system of institutional 
legitimations (1966, 94-96). They are “rudimentary theoretical propositions;” that is, they are 
pragmatic, they direct people‟s actions, but they are not fully developed theoretical arguments. 
Rather, they are moral maxims, hiding their institutional allegiances behind animosity towards 
opponents. Stereotypes also fit into our social stocks of knowledge as recipe knowledge, allowing us 
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 However, this did not stop FOX from remaking the program for a Muslim audience to capitalize on 
The Simpsons‟ popularity. During the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in 2005 (October 2 to November 1, 
2005), MBC-TV, an Arabic cable network, aired the show with significant edits. The Simpsons were “al 
Shamshoon,” some of the characters‟ names were changed, and alcohol and Moe‟s bar were edited out of some 
of the classic episodes from seasons three and four in accordance with Qu‟ranic law. Pork consumption was 
also deleted, which left Al Jean feeling as if the very spirit of Homer had been destroyed. Critics agreed. Pinsky 
(2007, 214-215) records some of the responses, and the general sentiment is that the show was not funny and 
lost much of its humorous grounding in American culture. It was an abject failure in the Arabic world, which 
points to the culturally contextualized nature of The Simpsons‟ comedy (see also Poplak 2007). 
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to conduct routine performances pragmatically without thinking of the underlying assumptions 
driving those actions (42; see also Gottschalk and Greenburg 2008, 76; McAlister 2005; Said 1981). 
While these stereotypes do not accurately depict Muslims and members of NRMs, the contemporary 
United States‟ institutional arrangement makes this point moot. One can live as an American holding 
these assumptions because of their prevalence. Serious social sanctions for believing these prejudices 
are lacking. While Muslims work hard to change popular perceptions of them, the voices who speak 
for NRMs tend to be academics with a more limited audience than the mass media who have a vested 
interest in treating “cults” as dangerous and newsworthy. Even media refutations of the dangerous 
Muslim stereotype rest on the assumption that the audience thinks Muslims are threats and, therefore, 
these news stories act as anecdotal evidence that complicates, but does not deflate, the stereotype of 
the dangerous Muslim. 
Through replicating these assumptions in its jokes, The Simpsons has taken an uncritical 
position with its treatment of NRMs and a more critical perspective of Islam‟s role in American life. 
These jokes reaffirm the assumption that only select religious practices are legitimate, and justify the 
disdain that significant numbers of Americans hold towards these groups. Internet discussions at 
tv.com (www.tv.com) and nohomers.net (www.nohomers.net) found “Mypods and Boomstick”‟s 
storyline predictable. However, its predictability lies in a shift in attitudes towards acceptance of 
Muslims among Americans who challenge the assumed association between Islam and terrorism. 
“Mypods and Boomsticks” is a significant change for The Simpsons, and contributes to a larger 
comedic discussion about how Americans should see Muslims not as “the other,” but as part of 
“ourselves.” However, the program has not accepted NRMs. 
The Simpsons‟ jokes build upon the fears and assumed norms of American society. While we 
have progressed from accepted to feared religions over the last five chapters, these examples 
demonstrate the importance of questioning institutionalized religious beliefs. It also suggests a 
mistrust of anybody who does not share The Simpsons‟ perspective. As Bergson noted, laughter has a 
social dimension that is meant to correct immoral behaviour (1956 [1911], 146-155; see also Cowan 
2005b). However, the sociology of knowledge teaches us that moral knowledge is contextualized and 
institutionalized. It is a contentious property of powerful social institutions whose positions are 
replicated through secondary socialization. In ridiculing NRMs and Muslims, The Simpsons has 
largely reproduced these implicit positions. Even if the majority of Americans are ignorant of these 
religious traditions, they have had their moral standards reaffirmed through jokes. In this case, satire 
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is a conservative medium. Only when Muslims can be portrayed as a model minority are they deemed 





Throughout this dissertation I have been concerned with what cultural intertextuality in The 
Simpsons lets us hypothesize about what people know about religion, and how this knowledge 
informs The Simpsons‟ humour. The concept of ignorant familiarity has been especially helpful in 
illustrating the problems surrounding religions‟ depictions in The Simpsons. Specifically, The 
Simpsons‟ humour implies that people know something about different religions, but this knowledge 
is superficial. This superficiality is used to creative advantage and jokes are crafted based on 
assumptions and stereotypes rather than detailed bodies of knowledge. Religions are not easy to learn, 
and most people do not bother learning about any other than their own. They have a practical stock of 
knowledge that enables them to interact with adherents of religions other than their own. The 
Schutzian problem of ideal types (1962, 1967), in which human interaction is based on rationalized 
assumptions about how other people will act, puts this issue into perspective. Our rationalizations 
about religion are often based on incomplete knowledge. The range of ideas, sects, and individuals 
within any given tradition within a religion is staggering, let alone the diversity across all religions. 
Our ideal types are, therefore, incomplete and possibly dysfunctional for facilitating interaction. 
Despite these dangers, The Simpsons‟ humour exemplifies the practicality of ignorant familiarities. 
Even if they are based on incorrent knowledge and assumptions, the fact remains that each ignorant 
familiarity discussed in this dissertation is socially constructed. These ideal types are already 
functional in American culture. Repeating them in jokes reinforces what people already know. 
Jokes in The Simpsons demonstrate that knowledge is both a matter of fact and belief. In 
other words, to know something we not only need to know facts that can be empirically confirmed 
about religious groups (e.g., what a group believes, what they do), but also how to interpret those 
facts sensibly within our own cognitive framework. Mere facts are not practically useful. To be 
practical, they have to be used for a specific purpose. The Simpsons‟ implied politics—in which 
individual pursuits and freedoms are emphasized at the expense of conservative positions—are what 
we have to know, and at least be able to sympathize with, to find it humorous. Jokes about the 
superiority of scientific rationality at the expense of intelligent design and creation science in “The 
Monkey Suit” combat conservative cultural forces. Many people believe that if America abandons 
literally interpreting the Bible‟s creation narrative and engages in open dialogue with non-Christian 
religions, then God will withdraw his providence and protection and punish America with terrorist 
attacks such as those that happened on September 11, 2001. However, The Simpsons portrays these 
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people as misguided, foolish, and dangerous. Jokes about God reinforce the idea that these political 
positions are faulty, as God in The Simpsons is vindictive and not omnipresent, omnipotent, and 
omniscient, unlike the God of conservative Christians. The God of The Simpsons is not one whose 
kingdom can be brought about by politically active evangelicals. This illustrates the larger point that 
Henry (2008) emphasized: The Simpsons‟ politics fall along the “liberal” lines in America‟s culture 
war (see J. Hunter 1991), and the program‟s humour promotes a liberal worldview to conservatives‟ 
detriment. 
Indeed, The Simpsons‟ jokes illustrate that knowing about religion involves knowing how to 
deal with religion. It is not enough to know facts about religions; we also need to know how to 
interact with people who hold those beliefs sacred, perform the rituals sincerely, and try to mould 
themselves to ideals that they consider transcendent. We need to know how to make their unseen 
order comprehensible in light of our own unseen order. In terms of humour theory, we need to know 
where those unseen orders are congruent and incongruent with our own. As the basis for humour, 
incongruity tells us more about what is congruent within the humorist‟s unseen order than it does 
about their opponents‟.  
My analysis reveals a pattern of concentric circles of acceptance. Mimicing Christie Davies‟ 
model of ethnic humour (1990, 1998, 2002), which sees marginal ethnic groups categorized as either 
stupid or canny, The Simpsons‟ satire works from an implied centre built around deinstitutionalized 
spirituality and scientific rationality. From there, an “excluded” ring of religions are treated 
positively. Jews and Hindus are excluded because of their ethnoreligiosity. That is, The Simpsons 
treats them as exclusive by blood. However, these religious traditions are treated with reverence, 
especially Judaism‟s rites of passage and Jews‟ struggles to navigate modern life. Hinduism is 
depicted as an accepted, if strange, religion in the United States, and is constrasted with Christianity‟s 
aggressive missionizing as a more tolerant, peaceful way of living. While these religions are not 
central in the same way as spirituality and scientific rationality, they are ambiguously both inside and 
outside The Simpsons‟ unseen order. They occupy a circle between “stupid” and the centre. 
From there, an excluded, “stupid, but sometimes acceptable” circle includes both Protestant 
and Catholic Christians. Christian beliefs and practices are categorized as different and “stupid” 
relative to the centre. That is, Christian faith in Jesus‟ divinity, Catholic belief in transubstantiation, 
and evangelical missionary zeal are all targets for ridicule. These deeply held beliefs mark Christians 
as external to The Simpsons‟ implied norm of experimental religiosity that does not seek to make 
converts or intrude on other people‟s religious practice. At the same time, The Simpsons presents 
 
 186 
ethical behaviours (such as Ned‟s generosity) approvingly and acknowledges that in a crisis of faith, 
Christianity has elements worth preserving. This selective approval allows The Simpsons to criticize 
Christian practice, discarding what they consider inappropriate in a pluralistic United States while 
keeping Christianity‟s positive practices. 
Finally, there are the excluded religions—cults and Islam. While the dynamics relating to 
changes in the depictions of Wicca and Islam over the program‟s twenty-one seasons challenges this 
simple categorization, The Simpsons has historically treated cults and Islam as dangerous religious 
traditions worthy of ridicule. This is hardly surprising considering these religions‟ contentious 
histories in America. However, Simpsons commentators have treated the show as critically insightful, 
especially in terms of these portrayals, and the negative stereotypes undergirding these portrayals are 
continually replicated but not challenged.  
8.1 The Importance of a Sociological Theory of Religious Humour 
Religion scholars have not seriously studied humour. While they are familiar with religious 
humour, they rarely theorize humour‟s importance in transmitting culturally contextualized 
knowledge and opinions about religion. This dissertation is a first attempt to rectify this problem. The 
Simpsons is a useful example and an important cultural product, but the more important point is how 
people use humour to criticize religions. The Simpsons is not a product made by a religious group as a 
way of communicating a specific religious truth to its own group members or other groups. It is 
designed to “entertain and subvert” (Groening, quoted in Griffiths 2000). Specifically, it subverts 
conservative biases in American culture. This subversion is seen in jokes that attack outsiders‟ beliefs 
that are incongruent with The Simpsons‟ position.  
Drawing from Berger (1967, 1970, 1997; see also Berger and Luckmann 1966), Oring 
(2003), and Davies (1990, 1998, 2002), every joke implies two things: an underlying plausibility 
structure that helps us understand a joke‟s incongruity relative to the congruous understandings of an 
unseen order, and an implied audience that shares that plausibility structure. Professional humourists 
do not tell jokes if they do not think their audience will find them funny. While Alters (2002) and 
Hoover (2006) remind us that not everybody finds The Simpsons humorous, the fact is that a 
significant number of people do. Its status as the longest running sitcom in American television 
history is proof of its popularlity, and its syndication and profitability speak to its continued influence 
in the global cultural marketplace. In short, this is a perspective on American life and, by extension, 
religion‟s role therein, that resonates with people around the globe. Knowing that this is an influential 
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body of ideas about religion is clearly important, and knowing that basic religious knowledge is 
transmitted humorously in easily memorable quotes and visual representations, speaks to how 
religious knowledge is transmitted and manipulated. 
This echoes Prothero‟s (2007) assertion that Americans do not know much about religion. 
While Americans are woefully ignorant about factual knowledge (e.g., naming the Ten 
Commandments, knowing Hindu scriptures, being able to discuss basics of Islamic theology), The 
Simpsons‟ jokes demonstrate that there is a body of practical religious knowledge accessible through 
cultural intertextuality. In other words, while people may not be able to answer multiple choice 
questions about Hindu sacred texts, humorists can craft jokes based on stereotypes of Hinduism‟s role 
in American culture and expect a significant portion of their audience to laugh. However, Prothero is 
correct in asserting that when people lack the understanding of religion necessary to criticize media 
depictions, “ignorance imperils our public life, putting citizens in the thrall of talking heads and 
effectively transferring power from the third estate (the people) to the fourth (the press)” (2007, 10). 
Ignorance is problematic, leading to dangerous and regrettable situations such as the Branch Davidian 
conflict, excluding religious groups such as Hindus and Muslims from building places of worship, 
and treating the Catholic Eucharist as “wafers and booze.” However, this does not change the fact that 
Americans possess such a body of religious knowledge and frameworks for activating it. They have 
both accurate and inaccurate factual information and deeply entrenched interpretive frameworks, 
making ignorant familiarity a dangerous framework for interpreting religion. Furthermore, religious 
facts are not humorous apart from a hermeneutic. Facts and assumptions intertwine when they are 
activated, reinforcing ignorant familiarities through repetition. Whether or not we agree with The 
Simpsons‟ interpretation, their framing of these stereotypes enables us to interpret the jokes and 
presents us with a second level legitimation. That is, these jokes are “various explanatory schemes 
relating sets of objective meanings. These schemes are highly pragmatic, directly related to concrete 
actions” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 94). While Prothero has a well-constructed argument for why 
people should know more about the world‟s religions, those who have an established framework in 
place and do not care to challenge it need pragmatic explanations for how to deal with religious 
people in order to navigate life in the United States. The Simpsons projects a pragmatic approach to 




8.2 The Problems Inherent in The Simpsons’ Perspective of American Religion 
Pinsky concludes The Gospel According to The Simpsons by arguing that “in essence, while 
not at all dangerous or threatening to the status quo, it [The Simpsons] is a sweet, funny show about a 
family as „real‟ as the faith lives of many Americans. It is a show that does in fact give hope and joy 
and, yes, inspiration to millions. But mostly, as my wife reminds me, it‟s funny. And as Homer says, 
„it‟s funny ‟cause it‟s true‟” (226).
150
 Whether the show actually gives hope, joy, and inspiration to 
millions, is open to debate, but Pinsky‟s assertion that the program is “funny ‟cause it‟s true” begs the 
questions: Who says it is true? Why do they say it is true? Who is advantaged by claiming this is the 
truth? Who is disadvantaged? The Simpsons is not funny because what it says is true, it is funny 
because some culturally contextualized people think what it says about different religions is true. 
There is a world of difference between the two positions and this latter stance questions Pinsky‟s 
argument that the show “in essence does not challenge the status quo.” 
In his conclusion to The Springfield Reformation, Heit argues that The Simpsons makes clear 
that “the marriage of Evangelism and neoconservative politics presents a real danger to anyone who 
runs against the grain that their converging interests produce” (2008, 146). That is, “The Simpsons 
thus accomplishes an important social task by making visible how religion has lost direction in the 
midst of competing cultural influences. Despite the caricatured nature that defines how the show 
portrays religion, the message emerges clearly” (147). Finally, “Christianity needs to recover its 
social identity in American culture quickly, or it could become the banner under which the 
neoconservative movement in America passes a tipping point. On the small and large screen, The 
Simpsons makes the risk clear. Its goal is, in part, to elicit a response from its viewers to address 
Christianity‟s problems before they lose the chance to do so” (150). All of this is premised on the 
argument that neoevangelicalism‟s merger with conservative politics is a bad thing. However, this is 
not a foregone conclusion. For those people who believe strongly that the best thing for America lies 
in protecting monogamous, heterosexual families; abolishing access to abortion; supporting Israel and 
having an aggressive position against Muslims in the Middle East; and who think the United States is 
divinely anointed to lead the world by being a Christian example of free market enterprise, Heit‟s 
position is the problem. Conservative Christians honestly believe that they are doing what is 
necessary to save the state and souls from worldly failure and eternal damnation. When we look at 
this unseen order from the inside it is congruent; from Heit‟s position it is misguided and frightening. 
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Heit is correct that The Simpsons criticizes conservative Christianity, but that does not make it a call 
for others to address Christianity‟s problems from within the tradition. The spirituality of seeking that 
Heit decries in his book is central to The Simpsons‟ solution. However, personal seeking in a culture 
of tolerance is more in line with what The Simpsons advocates than is reforming Christianity. This is 
a different truth from what Heit thinks the program promotes, and it differs from what his 
neoconservative opponents believe. In other words, The Simpsons transmits a message that says 
personal spiritual pursuit within rationalist bounds is the answer to America‟s religious problems. 
However, in the big picture of religion and American politics, this is one option among many that 
people could take for improving the United States‟ religious situation.  
In determining how The Simpsons positions itself, I favour one of Chris Turner‟s final 
arguments from Planet Simpson to Pinsky‟s simplistic analysis of The Simpsons‟ humour: “Satire 
comes from deep anger, and it is at its best when it is ruthless in its assessment of the subject‟s ills, 
but its final message is that the sickness, once satirically diagnosed, can possibly be cured” (2004, 
430). This is the corrective power of humour discussed by Bergson, the ability to highlight the 
incongruous in society and ridicule it in order to bring those actions, institutions, and people into line. 
The Simpsons transmits an unseen order, one that resonates deeply with Turner and millions of others 
like him. In religious terms, The Simpsons argues that if we continue along a dogmatic road that 
clings to literalism and the need to force our beliefs on others, then society will fail. The Ned 
Flanders‟ of the world will start monitoring our every move, curtailing our freedoms, and our ability 
to make decisions. If we do not diminish prejudice against Muslims, then we end up like Homer and 
allow suspicion, fear, and irrationality to guide our actions, rather than critically assessing stereotypes 
and challenging them. We run the risk of allowing cherished individual rights to be overthrown by 
fear and hatred, harming ourselves and others in the process. At the same time, if we could encourage 
each other to pursue our spiritual interests, drawing from insightful traditions such as scientific 
rationality, Buddhism, Native American spirituality, and Wicca, then we may avert social disaster and 
find new ways to improve the world.  
As Pinsky, Heit, Henry (2008), Delaney (2008), and Turner illustrate, people care about what 
The Simpsons has to say about religious life in America. It is a critical voice that resonates with 
people. It reflects, and reflects on, familiar issues, framing them in ways that people find humorous. 
Sometimes, this can inspire further reflection. However, it also alerts us to the fact that cultural critics 
can forget that every perspective is positioned; every social truth espoused is relative to particular 
plausibility structures. The Simpsons is built on deeply held liberal beliefs in individual improvement 
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and social responsibility. It advocates allowing individuals to develop to their fullest potential by 
pursuing their desires, rather than enforcing a traditional moral code upon them. For those with whom 
this sentiment resonates, The Simpsons is telling the truth. For those who disagree, The Simpsons is 
lying. Others may find themselves conflicted as they take a middle position on the way The Simpsons 
resolves issues. Perspective matters. It shapes the political impact and interpretation of humour and it 
influences how people will understand jokes. Because people care about The Simpsons, understanding 
its religious bias, how it reflects that bias by selectively interpreting American religious traditions, 
and whom that bias advantages and disadvantages is central to the sociologist of religion‟s job in 
understanding why this popular culture artifact remains relevant twenty-one years after it originally 
premiered. 
The problem inherent in The Simpsons is that its embrace of liberal religion is undercut by its 
acknowledgement that our neighbours‟ faults limit our good deeds‟ influence. The fact that it is only 
Lisa who is the Buddhist and spiritual seeker—and also the feminist, vegetarian, and social activist—
and not all of the characters, leaves The Simpsons‟ moral voice crying in the wilderness. In this sense, 
Pinsky is right: The Simpsons does not threaten the status quo. As a cultural product, The Simpsons 
cannot make people change their behaviour. However, it can challenge us by presenting ideas that can 
cause us to rethink our positions, allowing us to see our folly by shifting perspective and revealing 
things in a new light.  
Ultimately, this is the satirist‟s social role. Satirists are critical voices, calling for change and 
attacking opponents from a different moral position. However, they are not in a position to force 
change, and they may see their efforts wasted. The Simpsons has been a platform for entertaining and 
educating for years because the satirists who join the creative team use it to engage an audience that is 
willing to consider what they have to say, and, as Turner suggests, the audience is willing to entertain 
the possibility that there may be a cure for the social ills the satirist identifies. 
These problems of truth, perspective, and action are inherent in an analysis of The Simpsons 
and satirical humour as a social phenomenon. Rooted in the problem to which conflict sociology 
alerts us—the fact that groups within society are constantly in competition to shape society‟s future—
The Simpsons cannot escape the fact that it is an argument, rather than a transcendent revelation. By 
removing the religiousness with which Berger would treat The Simpsons‟ humour, and emphasizing 
the program as a socially positioned voice for liberal religious freedoms against a social system The 
Simpsons portrays as increasingly totalitarian, we can see that the difficulty with The Simpsons‟ 
 
 191 
religious humour is that it is just another voice among many in a cultural marketplace from which 
people can pick and choose.  
8.3 Where Do We Go From Here? 
There are other projects related to religion and humour that sociologists of religion could 
undertake. Specifically, fieldworkers could include studies of joking cultures (the humorous banter 
that develops within groups) as a way of enriching their studies of religious institutions and 
organizations. There is also humour‟s sacralizing power, which could lead scholars into a variety of 
significant explorations about humour‟s role within religious organizations. While I have argued that 
humour does not reveal the sacred, only the humorist‟s perspective of it, that does not mean that 
groups do not use humour to convey their sense of sacredness and bestow objects in their 
environment with sacredness.  
There is also a need to bring popular culture studies into the mainstream of religious studies. 
Films, television programs, material culture, music, fashion, and various other kinds of popular 
culture beg to be used as analytical lenses. As nodes in the dense webs of people‟s religious lives, the 
artifacts that people take the time to create, use, and destroy encapsulate significant moments that 
allow for further reflection. Regardless of the subject matter in which scholars are interested, popular 
culture is a tool for accessing religious people‟s lives and thoughts.  
Presently, departments of religious studies frequently offer religion and popular culture and 
religion and film courses as first year, introductory, “cash cow” courses designed to generate high 
enrolments. Later, students can be challenged with “important” topics such as the work of a major 
theologian, or religion‟s intersection with politics, gender identities, and violence. However, even in 
the study of influential theologians or religion‟s social impact, popular culture exists as a data source. 
How the theologian is received and understood outside the academy and clergy is important, and his 
or her ideas may be completely unrecognizable when people have interpreted them. Popular culture 
marks the different moments in an idea‟s career when people thought enough of it to transform it into 
something marketable. Popular culture tells us how people transmit their interpretations of religions 
and teaches us how religious ideas are effectively communicated. After all, more people watch The 
Simpsons than read Peter Berger.  
Why popular culture reaches people effectively is something we have to consider seriously 
when asking the larger questions surrounding religion‟s role in modern life. If this dissertation 
reinforced anything I believed in before I started it, it is that popular culture is a data set that needs to 
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be more rigorously theorized, and methods for studying it need to be increasingly defined for 
religious studies scholars. I would encourage any scholar to exploit the wealth of data popular culture 
provides in helping them answer their significant questions. 
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